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' This thesis examines the personal perspectives of senior civil servants in
South Africa on the continuing changes affecting the service as part of 
: wider national changes since the 1994 general elections. Pre-election
political compromises were agreed to ensure a peaceful transition to non- 
racial democracy, which delayed significant civil service changes until 
1999.
'i This study has used a number of theoretical and other perspectives,
particularly the concept of the "convergence" between the roles of senior 
civil servants and politicians in modern governments. The convergence 
concept has been particularly associated with the work of Aberbach et al. 
(1981) in their major study Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western 
Democracies. This concept has been a particular interest of this study.
My project has also studied the possible effects of politicisation on senior 
civil service roles since 1994. Another major interest is representativeness 
(race, gender, and disability) within the civil service under the Affirmative 
Action laws and policies. A third theme is the use of . New Public 
Management techniques, notably personal Performance Management 
Contracts for the most senior officials. All three themes present challenges 
and will help determine the future character of the South African senior 
civil service.
My overall results indicate very strong support among senior officials for 
the Affirmative Action initiatives; the personal Performance Management 
Contracts for all senior officials; and overall change as perceived in their 
own department. I also conclude that South Africa's unique post-apartheid 
situation weakens any clear finding concerning the "convergence" concept 
associated with authors such as Aberbach et al., although their "Image IV" 
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Definition of Terms and Acronyms
AA Affirmative Action. Term refers to the laws affecting the 
public and private sectors in South Africa intended to 
redress the effects of past racial bias in employment 
policy. Affirmative Action targets groups or individuals 
among blacks (Africans, coloureds, Indians), women and 
the disabled, against whom the apartheid policies 
discriminated; such target groups are often given 
statutory preference in public and private sector hiring 
programmes.
AD Assistant Director
ANC African National Congress
Apartheid Literally, 'separate-ness' or 'apart-ness' (O'Meara, 
1996:420). Afrikaans term meaning the separation of 
people according to race, based on the National Party's 
policies (from 1948 to 1994).
Batho Pele 'People first', Government strategy of encouraging a 
close relationship between civil servants and the 
community based on the White Paper on Public Service 
Delivery (1995).
CD Chief Director.
Civil service The staff of South African government departments, 
which are organised at national and/or provincial levels 
(e.g., the Departments of Health and Education — both 
levels — and DPSA (below) which operates mainly at 
national level). As in the UK and elsewhere, staff of 
national public bodies, local government, schools, 
hospitals, police forces or the military are not civil 
servants. This study concerns only government 
department staff (almost exclusively at and above grade 
10 (Assistant Director) so the lack of distinction in the 
South African constitution, legislation, statutory rules, 
white papers, etc. — as well as informal usage — 
between 'civil service' and 'public service' has no practical 
relevance. 'Public service' often appears to describe 
some of the wider public sector employees listed above 
but is also, confusingly, sometimes clearly intended to 
refer only to the civil service within the national or 
provincial government departments. An example of the
xiii
Executing authorities
'civil service proper' being included with other public 
service staffs (e.g., in hospitals or schools) for legislative 
or other official purpose would be the obligation to apply 
Affirmative Action laws (see Chapter 1.2). Because this 
study is focused on only one level within the civil service, 
the vague use of 'public service' as a near synonym may 
be ignored.
Coloureds Term coined by successive apartheid administrations, 








DPSA Department of Public Service and Administration
'Gravy train'
GNU
The statutory term for the President, Deputy President, 
national ministers and regional government members of 
executive councils (MECs) in their capacity as the 
executors of legislative powers. This is the equivalent of 
the UK legislative practice of giving "the secretary of 
state/minister" (rather than the Crown or the minister's 
department as a whole) the powers conferred by a 
relevant Act of Parliament. Designating these elected 
politicians as the 'executive authority' confirms both their 
control relationship with the civil service and their 
individual responsibility, as tested by their political and 
judicial accountability.
Government of National Unity
Refers to the attractive package (like high salaries, car 
schemes, costly offices and subsidised houses) made 
accessible by very senior public service employment:.
HOD Head of Department (usually the second most senior 
official, at DDG or SG level).
xiv
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
MEC Member of the (Provincial) Executive Council
MPL Member of the Provincial Legislature
NP National Party ('New National Party', from 1999)
PERSAL Personnel Salary System
PRC Presidential Review Commission
Public service see Civil service, above
PSA Public Servants Association
PSC Public Service Commission
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
Representlvity Term used in South Africa to define the need for 
demographic balance of people in the public and private 




The perceived advantages that an individual has — 
especially in many areas of public sector employment — 
by virtue of being a veteran of South Africa's liberation 
struggle.
WPAAPS White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service
(1995)




The Study: its Purpose and Methods
1.1 Introduction
This study examines the perspectives of senior civil servants about change 
in post-apartheid South African government departments. The thesis 
analyses the challenges and responsibilities of these officials in selected 
departments and provinces (see next section). The study focused 








The Director-General (DG) is the highest position in the civil service, but 
in some provincial departments (such as Education) the head of 
department is the Superintendent-General. Three of these highest officials 
were interviewed, together with some 177 of their subordinates, as the 
major part of this study. The thesis attempts to understand the changes 
occurring in the respective departments through the perspectives of these 
civil servants. It also considers the possible effect on their perceptions of 
the structures (departments) in which these officials operate. The term 
'structure', as used here, refers to "the arrangement of and relations 
between the parts of something complex" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
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1999). I attempted to interview the national ministers or provincial MECs 
who oversaw these civil servants, on their working relations with them. 
The idea was to assess recent and current changes, at the senior levels of 
the government departments, looking at the extent to which such changes 
have affected the officials' perceptions about public sector reforms in the 
new democracy. I interviewed all of the MECs in charge of the eight 
provincial government departments whose senior cadres I had selected for 
my study. It was not possible to interview the national ministers and 
provincial Premiers in whose national departments and provincial 
governments the study was conducted. (See section 1.4, Methodology).
Many attempts have been made to define the term 'civil service' (e.g. 
Aberbach et al., 1981; Bekke, et al., 1996; Posel, 1999; Pyper, 1995; 
Raadschelders and Rutgers, 1996; and Rose, 1987). Aberbach and his 
colleagues (1981:1) used this term to refer to individuals in the state 
apparatus who are "technically trained, professional and career 
administrators." This seemingly narrow definition appears to exclude 
scientists and other specialists. Pyper's (1995:1) definition could be , more 
helpful. He has stated, with reference to the British civil service, that "Civil 
servants work for the 'civil' as opposed to the military, ministerial or 
judicial arms of the state. Members of the armed forces, government 
ministers and judges are not civil servants." Civil servants might also be 
understood to be "...those agencies and employees directly engaged in 
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the running of government departments and implementing policy 
decisions" (Posel, 1999:100).
A civil service is not a homogenous group. It must be seen as "...an 
amorphous amalgam of departmental structures, within each of which we 
find innumerable horizontal and vertical subdivisions and diverse 
organisational arrangements" (Drewry and Butcher, 1991:55). In this 
thesis the term 'senior civil service' refers to the officials occupying the 
positions shown above (Assistant Director up to DG) but in South Africa 
the term 'senior management service' is often used to refer particularly to 
the Directors and above. At the national level, these officials were mostly, 
though not exclusively, specialists and professionals who were usually 
employed, either permanently or on contract, to render policy advice and 
to manage the national-level departments and ministries. The 
constitutional relationship between the national and provincial civil 
servants is explained in the next section.
This study relied on the literature on comparative executives that covers 
the relationships between ministers and civil servants (among others, 
Aberbach et al., 1981; Dogan, 1975; Peters, 1984; and Putnam, 1975). 
The thesis is not so broad as to cover the overall changes in the entire 
South African civil service but it has drawn on information and material 
covered by literature on it. A study of the perspectives of the (S.A.) senior 
civil service and how the departments are arranged could help to explain
4
the momentum and direction of the current reforms inside government 
departments. Similarly, these perspectives could also help us to 
understand the policy-making process.
As a group, the senior civil service is also important because of the high 
status and positions of its members within the government machinery and 
in the wider society. Their views are therefore crucial for the success of 
the government's policies for, as has been stated, "While [the South 
African] Parliament projected the rainbow nation, the real battles to 
transform the country were waged inside government departments" 
(Sampson, 1999:513). In South Africa, the DGs and their immediate 
subordinates wield particular authority and power that enables them to 
effect changes in their respective departments. However, what would 
normally be an ordinary process of public sector reform in many 
democracies presents enormous problems for these officials in South 
Africa. They also have to deal with the harsh realities of the apartheid 
legacy: how to provide services to a racially diverse society with extreme 
socio-economic inequalities. Therefore, I regarded them as an 
indispensable group to study in order to explain the operations of senior 
civil servants in South Africa. These include rendering policy advice and 
leading their subordinates within the structures that they oversee. 
However, in contemporary South Africa, these officials are constrained by 
structural and other limitations that foil their attempts to perform their
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duties effectively. Such constraints might emanate from — or be closely 
related to — the following factors:
• Fear of change, or at least subtle resistance to it. The senior officials in 
this category were usually (though not always) those white officials 
who were inherited by the new government from the apartheid era.
• Anxiety about little or no change, or eagerness for more changes. This 
applied to the officials (mostly the newly recruited blacks) who were 
often inclined to welcome change and to be impatient over the slow 
pace of reforms in the civil service.
• Ambivalence towards change. This applied to those who seemed to be 
neither for, nor against, the new reforms inside the civil service.
The difficulty of examining these themes is that they could easily be 
concealed within the stated attitudes and beliefs of the officials who were 
interviewed. In South Africa's civil service, formerly an exclusive domain 
for the employment of white people (Posel, 1999), it was inevitable that 
the past racial dynamics would emerge in the attempts to reform it. Thus 
most, though not all, of officials resisting change would probably be white. 
However, there might have been notable exceptions, particularly in 
departments and provinces that were merged with former home lands 
(see next section), and in places such as the Western Cape. In this 
province, some members of the majority coloured (mixed race) 
community, said to be sympathetic to the National Party (now New
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National Party, NNP), are known to be uneasy about the current changes, 
especially Affirmative Action (AA) in the civil service. Nevertheless, it was 
not easy to determine whether such uneasiness was common within the 
civil service, despite my own distinct impression from my training course 
experience with civil servants in Western Cape that there is little or no 
support among them for the AA policy. Accordingly, some members of this 
community have argued that the AA policy excludes coloureds from 
accessing the positions for which (black) Africans are usually earmarked in 
AA appointments, especially in the public sector. Another notable 
exception is KwaZulu-Natal province. Here, for party political reasons, 
very few senior black African officials in official positions under an Inkatha 
Freedom Party provincial government could be said to be sympathetic to 
the policies of the nationally ruling African National Congress. The control 
by the national-level opposition parties of the governments of these two 
provinces (New National Party/Democratic Party in the Western Cape and 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in KwaZulu-Natal) no doubt explains the 
negative perceptions of AA (and possibly other ANC central government 
policies) in these provinces. However, the controversy surrounding the 
implementation of policies such as Affirmative Action cannot be denied 
and this issue will be analysed in Chapter Four.
As against any officials who may resist the idea of change (or particular 
change) some newly-appointed senior civil servants (especially blacks) 
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have expressed disappointment about what they saw as the slow pace of 
change in their departments. They have often attributed this to the 
persistence of a rule-bound administrative culture in a number of 
departments. These views will be examined in Chapter Five.
This research also sought to find out whether the operations of the senior 
civil servants affected the way in which their departments functioned — or 
the other way round. A gap exists in our understanding of the 
characteristics of the present structure of the South African civil service. 
The idea was to explore the possibility of a link between the structure of 
government departments and the perspectives of the senior civil servants, 
which could help explain other changes (such as AA and New Public 
Management, see Chapter Five) that are occurring in the civil service. 
Another significant issue that this thesis seeks to explain is whether the 
senior civil servants' functions are becoming politicised, and to examine 
the implications of this reality on the future civil service. This issue will be 
examined in Chapter Six.
Some have argued in relation to the British civil service, that the 
politicisation of the civil service could be justifiable in certain cases and up 
to a point. The former senior British civil servant, Sir Anthony Part, has 
contended, "...in order adequately to serve the elected government of the 
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day it may be necessary for the bureaucracy to assume, to some minor 
degree, the coloration of the party in office" (Part, in Barberis (ed), 
1997:153). How, and by whom, this "minor degree" should be defined is 
not stated here. In fact, "The tension here Is heightened to the extent to 
which top officials should and do (temporarily) take on some of the 
government's coloration" (Barberis, 1996:29). Thus, I felt the need to 
assess how far politicisation is perceived — especially by the top ranks of 
the civil service in South Africa. This was particularly in view of 
speculation and several media reports in the country, which have 
indicated that the senior civil service is gradually becoming politicised in a 
manner that could pose problems.
Chapter One only highlights the many experiences of the senior civil 
service in dealing with civil service issues which will be examined further 
in later chapters. Chapter Two includes the review of the literature 
concerning the topic of this thesis; it also gives the objectives and 
justification of the study. Chapter Three examines both the past and 
present South African civil service, concentrating on its features and the 
roles of its senior members. Chapter Four assesses the implementation of 
Affirmative Action in South Africa's civil service. Chapter Five discusses 
the managerial reforms in this civil service and how the most senior 
officials have dealt with them. This will be done through an assessment of 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution (1996), Public Service Act 
(1994), the Code of Conduct for the Public Service, various government
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White Papers, and other official documents that regulate operations. 
Chapter Five also looks at the roles and perspectives of these senior 
officials in South Africa, the impact of the structure on their roles and neo­
managerialism and its effect. Chapter Six reviews the interaction between 
ministers and officials and the politicisation of the most senior civil service 
positions. The contribution of senior civil servants to the policy-making 
process in South Africa will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight 
interprets the study's survey and data and overall findings and offers 
conclusions. It will make proposals on how the current public service 
reforms could contribute to the process of change in the country. 
Similarly, an attempt will be made — based on this study and analysis of 
the relevant literature — to make recommendations on measures to 
improve implementation of public policies.
1.2 How the Law Regulates South Africa's Civil Service
This section will sketch an overall picture of the legislative framework 
governing the current civil service (and indeed the entire South African 
public service). The legislation regulating the civil service will be outlined 
and the impact of recent legislative changes evaluated.
The history of apartheid and South Africa's previous political dispensations 
is well documented elsewhere (Adam and Giliomee, 1979a; Beinart, 1994; 
Beinart and Dubow, 1989; O'Meara, 1996; Posel, 1991; Schrlre, 1993).
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Thus, this section will not attempt to reproduce the arguments and laws 
pertaining to that era. However, these laws and arguments will be 
mentioned here only insofar as they help to explain the current situation 
of the civil service. According to O'Meara (1996:419), "The South African 
state was born out of the merger in 1910 of Britain's four self-governing 
settler colonies in southern Africa. It became fully sovereign with the 
adoption of the British Parliament of the Statute of ' Westminster in 1933." 
These four colonies — later, provinces — of the Cape, Natal, the Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State became the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
However, this arrangement excluded both the majority black population 
and the Asian and coloured minorities from participating in the political 
process.
The National Party came to power in 1948 and its successive governments 
enacted apartheid laws that ultimately made South Africa a pariah state 
internationally. "Such laws aimed at separating whites and blacks, at 
instituting as a legal principle the theory that whites should be treated 
more favorably than blacks and that separate facilities need not be equal, 
and at providing the state with the powers deemed necessary to deal with 
any opposition" (Byrnes, 1997:54). The Population Registration Act of 
1950, for example, was formulated to enforce the racial separation of the 
country's inhabitants. "Under the terms of this Act, all residents of South 
Africa were to be classified as white, coloured, or native (later Bantu)
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people. Indians...were included under the category 'Asian' in 1959" 
(Byrnes, 1997:55).
Thus, South Africa was, "explicitly built on a racially exclusive form of the 
Westminster model of British parliamentary democracy, and officially 
known as the Union of South Africa between 1910 and 1961; this state 
was transformed into a republic in 1961 — when it left the British 
Commonwealth" (O'Meara, 1996:419). However, South Africa's 
unceremonious expulsion from the Commonwealth did not cause the 
Westminster system to be replaced. As O'Meara has stated, apart from 
replacing the Governor-General with a ceremonial State President, the 
1961 constitutional amendments did not alter much of the country's 
Westminster-derived system. More than two decades later, "...major 
changes [were] introduced by the Constitution Act of 1983 which created 
an Executive State President with considerable powers..." (Schrire, 
1993:136). However, for the excluded majority black population, such 
moves by the then P.W. Botha regime were seen as mere cosmetic 
changes because, rather than abolishing apartheid, the changes sought 
only to reform it.
Since 1994, the new South Africa has moved with vigorous speed to 
change the apartheid era legislation. Many laws made before and during 
that period have been either changed or repealed. The Mandela (and now 
Mbeki) government have repealed many of the laws that classified people 
along racial lines. However, the legacy of that era will not be easy to
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erase. Thus, the terms 'coloured', 'Indian' (or 'Asian'), 'black' and 'white' 
are still being used both formally and informally (e.g. Pretoria News, 
18/05/00) and in official and other contexts such as the national census. 
Even in the civil service, indications are that the perceptions of the 
present-day officials are influenced largely by this legacy.
Nevertheless, virtually all the draconian and petty apartheid era legislation 
has disappeared from the statute books, mostly (though not always) in 
the name of 'transformation.' South Africa's current President, Thabo 
Mbeki, has summarised the government's view on this issue, stating: 
"There's no way you can sustain the process of national reconciliation 
without transformation" {The Independent, 08/02/01). In this section, 
transformation (a key term which will be discussed further in Chapter 
Two) means the repeal and amendment of such legislation and the 
changing or removal of administrative structures created to enforce 
apartheid. The idea is that transformation is needed urgently now that 
such structures have become unmanageable or unnecessary. It has been 
stated that such public service transformation:
was driven by the need to sustain the delicate democracy [of 
1994] and at the same time to meet the development 
challenges of the vast majority of South Africans. The 
reconfiguration of the Public Service after the 1994 elections 
included the amalgamation of separate administrations and 
creating new ones consistent with the new tiers and 
departments of the government...In essence, Public Service 
transformation in South Africa had to refocus the delivery of
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services to meet the needs of all citizens and to contribute 
towards the democratisation of the state and society in 
general (DPSA Annual Report, 1998:5).
By 'new tiers' is meant the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government as provided for in the new Constitution (Act 108 of 1996). 
The comprehensive legal changes that South Africa experienced soon after 
its general elections in 1994 were brought about largely by the new 
constitution. By far the most prominent of all the legislative changes 
introduced by the new democratic order, this document defines the nature 
of changes to be effected in virtually all areas of South African life — 
including the civil service. The current constitution establishes South 
Africa as a constitutional democracy (Van Rooyen, 1999) and this 
document is now the supreme law of the land (Section 1), unlike before 
1994 when such supremacy was vested in the country's Parliament. As 
indicated by section 1 (a) to (d) of the Bill of Rights, the constitution has 
outlawed racism and racialism, sexism and other forms of inequality. This 
section is closely related to the recently introduced Public Service 
Regulations (1999). The Code of Conduct (C.2.6) in these regulations 
states that South Africa's public service should not "...unfairly discriminate 
against any member of the public on account of race, gender, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, political 
persuasion, conscience, belief, culture or language" (Public Service 
Regulations, 1999). Other grounds not listed here include pregnancy, sex, 
marital status and birth, which are part of the equality clause — Section 9
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(3) — of the constitution (1996). Notably, this includes the blatant 
disregard for human rights — an infamous feature of the old political 
order.
Before its transition to democracy, South Africa was divided into four 
provinces, as stated earlier. These provinces were later re-structured and 
merged with the former ethnic-based black 'homelands' and 'self­
governing territories' (which had not been officially regarded as part of the 
old apartheid-based South Africa). Nine new provincial governments were 
subsequently created — each with its own cabinet and legislature (see 
Figure 1.1). These are the provincial administrations of the Western Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Free State, Mpumalanga, 
Northern Province, Northern Cape and the North West. South Africa is 
also a parliamentary and liberal democracy with a presidential system of 
government that aims to uphold the rule of law and ensure the separation 
of powers between the judiciary, legislature, and executive. It is also a 
unitary state, but with quasi-federal features of government: all the nine 
provinces exercise powers devolved from central government, have their 
own elected Premiers (see below), departmental political heads (MECs) 
and civil service cadres operating the departments (Sampson, 1999:472). 
However, there are visible features of centralisation of power through the 
control of the politico-administrative machinery from Pretoria (the 
country's administrative capital). This arrangement — which is, on
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balance, distinctly more unitary than it is federal — came about as a result
of the pre-1994 election agreements between the various political parties,
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notably the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party in KwaZulu-Natal. Unlike 
the ANC, the IFP was strongly inclined to a federal form of power sharing, 
but accepted the present arrangement as a compromise. Thus, from 1994 
South Africa became "a neo-federalist presidentialist regime with a 
powerful (bicameral) central legislature elected on a mixture of 
proportional and regional representation" (O'Meara, 1996:420).
The head of the provincial cabinet or Executive Council is the provincial 
Premier. As Section 132 (1) of the constitution explains, "the Executive 
Council of a province consists of the Premier as head of the Council, and 
no fewer than five and no more than ten members appointed by the 
Premier from among the members of the provincial legislature." The MECs 
are the elected political representatives (called in law 'executing 
authorities'), with roles and individual legal responsibilities similar to the 
national ministers. The only difference is that the President appoints the 
national ministers from amongst the members of South Africa's National 
Assembly, whereas the provincial Premier appoints the province's MECs. 
All the MECs in each province are therefore directly accountable to the 
Premier, who, as section 132 (2) states, appoints them, "assigns their 
powers and functions, and may dismiss them." Each Premier also works 
closely with the most senior civil servant (the provincial DG) on policy 
implementation matters, while the DG is responsible for the co-ordination 
of administrative matters in the province.
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The Public Service Act is another law that governs the situation of all 
public servants in South Africa. This law explains the role of an 'executing 
authority' or the political office bearer (national Minister or provincial MEC) 
in a department. According to section 1 (1) (a) to (d) of this Act, the term 
'executing authority' refers to any of the following high officials of the 
South African government:
(a) In relation to the Office of the President: The President (acting on 
his or her own).
(b) In relation to the Office of the Deputy President:: the Deputy 
President.
(c) In relation to the Office of the Public Service Commission: the 
Chairperson of the Commission (Section 1, Public Service Act, 
1994).
Therefore, 'executing (or 'executive') authority' refers mostly, though not 
always, to the President, Deputy President, ministers and provincial MECs. 
The civil service was strongly affected by the legal changes mentioned 
earlier. A striking example of such changes is Section 195 (1) 2 of the 
constitution, which outlines the basic values and principles that should 
govern public administration in the new republic. Section 195 (a) to (i) 
stresses the need for "a high standard of professional ethics, efficient, 
economic and effective use of resources, and a development-oriented 
public service." It also stresses that public services must be provided 
"impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias." Public administration is 
also urged to respond to people's needs and to encourage the public to 
participate in policy-making. Section 195 further emphasises the need for
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the public service to be transparent and to have good human resource 
management and career development practices. Furthermore, this section 
underlines the need to ensure that "...employment and personnel 
management practices [are] based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the 
need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad 
representation." This legislative reference to racial group membership as 
part of civil service employment practice dovetails with the country's 
broader Affirmative Action law to which the civil service is fully subject. 
There is therefore both an internal and external legislative mandate for 
the racial and other forms of 'representivity' which figures so clear in civil 
service issues — as this study will show. Section 195 (2) (paragraphs a-c) 
also states that all the principles and values mentioned above have to 
"apply to administration in every sphere of government, organs of state 
and public enterprises." Public administration, section 195 (1) concludes, 
should be "...broadly representative of the South African people." 
Undoubtedly, many of the subsequent laws and policies whose aims are to 
redress public sector inequalities derive from this section of the 
constitution. As just noted, such laws and policies include those on 
Affirmative Action and these will be discussed below in Chapter 4.2.
Clearly, the constitution lays the groundwork for several other laws and 
policies that deal with matters relating to the civil service. Thus, Schedules 
1 and 2 define the 'public service' in South Africa as an organisation that 
"excludes local government, as well as a host of other statutory bodies, 
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parastatals, • quasi-government institutions..." {Public Service Review 
Report 1999/2000:2). Schedules 1 and 2 further state that "the public 
service is made up of employees in all national departments, as well as 
those in the nine provincial administrations of the country...." Similarly, 
the constitution (Section 197) states that "the terms and conditions of 
public service employees must be regulated by national legislation" (Public 
Service Review Report, 1999-2000:6). The most significant of such 
legislation and policies are the Public Service Act (1994), the Public 
Service Laws Amendment Act (1997), the Employment Equity Act (1998), 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997), the Labour Relations Act 
(1995), and the Public Service Regulations (1999). In addition, documents 
such as the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, the 
White Paper on Public Service Delivery (or the Batho Pele principles, see 
Appendix 2), and the White Paper on Affirmative Action have influenced 
South Africa's current legislation on the public service. Most legal and 
other documents commonly refer to the 'public service' and rarely address 
the civil service specifically, even when their actual focus is on the civil 
service.
One significant legal change brought about by the new legislation is "...the 
recognition of provincial departments as fully-fledged departments that 
are accountable politically through the MEC and administratively through 
the Head of Department (HOD)." This move "put accountability squarely
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with the people who hold the levers of management" (Public Service 
Review Report, 1999-2000:7).
In its preamble, the Employment Equity Act (1998) states "...that, as a 
result of apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices, there are 
disparities in employment, occupation and income within the national 
labour market...." It further recognises that those disparities "create such 
pronounced disadvantages for certain categories of people that they 
cannot be addressed simply by repealing discriminatory laws." Therefore, 
the Act seeks to "promote the constitutional right of equality and the 
exercise of true democracy" by implementing employment equity to 
redress the effects of discrimination." It is said that the alm is to achieve 
"a diverse workforce broadly representative of our people" (preamble, 
Employment Equity Act). This gave rise to the need for policies and 
programmes of Affirmative Action (AA) (as will be discussed in Chapter 
Four).
The Code of Conduct for the Public Service (which is part of the Public 
Service Regulations, as stated above) also regulates the employment of 
public servants in South Africa. Chapter 2 of these regulations states that 
the Code "should act as a guideline to [government] employees as to what 
is expected of them from an ethical point of view, both in their individual 
conduct and in their relationship with others. Compliance with the Code 
can be expected to enhance professionalism" (A.2). This is another way
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through which the government hopes to encourage accountability and 
responsibility among the civil servants, as is commonly done in 
Westminster systems (Peters, 2000:129).
Chapter 2 of the Public Service Regulations further states that the Code "is 
not an exhaustive set of rules regulating the standards of conduct" (B.2). 
However, it attempts to regulate the relationship of civil servants with the 
legislature and the executive (C.l), their relationship with the public (C.2) 
and among themselves (C.3). In its attempt to regulate procedures for 
appointment, promotion and termination of public service employment, 
regulation VII.A makes the same emphasis on Affirmative Action as other 
sections of this document. It states that "Employment practices (in the 
South African public service) shall ensure...equity, fairness, efficiency and 
the achievement of a representative public service." It further states that 
"Affirmative Action shall be used to speed up the creation of a 
representative and equitable public service and to give practical support to 
those who have been previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination to 
enable them to fulfil their maximum potential." Therefore, this section 
considerably affects the recruitment, selection, promotion, and transfer of 
all public (including civil) servants. In other words, it regulates the career 
opportunities and other career-related matters of the entire South African 
public service.
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The relationships between the elected and non-elected public officials are 
also controlled by the Public Service Regulations (as stated earlier). These 
regulations, e.g. B.2 (r), refer to 'senior management' as "the group of 
employees occupying posts on grades 13 and higher [i.e. Director position 
and above: see Appendix 4 for an outline of the other grades], and 
designated as manager by the minister." They also regulate 
communication between the senior managers and the minister. For 
instance, regulation H.l (a) states that "If a head of department needs to 
communicate with the minister [of Public Service and Administration] on 
any matter that falls within the Minister's powers and duties, she or he 
shall communicate through the Director-General: Public Service and 
Administration." This effectively channels all communication between 
senior civil servants and the minister via the DG's office. Ideally, this is 
what happens, and should happen, in all departments. However, whether 
this route will be followed depends largely on the (managerial or 
leadership) style of the minister. Some 'hands-on' ministers are known (as 
my interviews with officials indicate) to have ignored this rule, thus 
communicating directly with the senior officials well below the DG level. 
Such ministerial action was bound to cause disquiet and has been 
described as political Interference by some senior civil servants.
The powers and duties of the 'executing authorities' are further spelt out 
in the Public Service Regulations (1999). Regulation III B.2 states that the 
'executing authorities' shall:
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• determine the department's organisational structure in terms of its core 
and support functions;
• grade proposed new jobs according to the job evaluation system 
referred to in Part IV (of these regulations);
• define the posts necessary to perform the relevant functions....
The Public Service Regulations (1999) also give an elaborate outline of the 
powers and duties of the 'executing authorities' (regulations VII B-C) 
regarding such issues as recruitment, selection, appointment and 
promotion of the heads of department. Clear emphasis is laid on the need 
for administrative heads of department to be bound by employment 
contracts, and this provision is closely associated to section 12 (4) (a) to 
(c) of the Public Service Act (1994) that deals with performance contracts 
for senior civil servants. (See Chapter Five, below, for a discussion on 
performance related contracts in the South African civil service). Similarly, 
Section 3 B. (1) and (2) of the Public Service Act (1994) regulates the 
appointment of heads of department. According to this section (3 B. (1) 
paragraphs (a) to (b)), "a head Of department at the national level is 
appointed by the President, and at provincial level the relevant Premier." 
The Act, according to Section 3 B. (2), (a-b), also regulates the 
deployment of the heads of department within their respective (national 
and provincial) areas of operation, subject to authorisation by the relevant 
executing authority (minister at national level, or MEC in the case of the 
provinces). South African civil servants may be transferred between the 
provincial and national levels.
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A significant shift brought about by the new legal changes has been the 
"...transfer of the management authority for the public service from the 
Public Service Commission (PSC) to the Minister of Public Service and 
Administration" (Public Service Review Report, 1999-2000:6). The 
minister's powers, as indicated by Section 3 of the Public Service Laws 
Amendment Act (Act No.47 of 1997), are to make policy regarding:
• the functions of and organisational arrangements in the public service;
• employment and other personnel practices, including the promotion of
broad representativeness, as well as human resource management and 
training;
• salaries and benefits;
• labour relations
• information management and information technology; and
• transformation and reform
(Public Service Review Report, 1999-2000:6-7).
Quite clearly, this marks a departure from the practices of the apartheid- 
era public service (to be discussed in Chapter 3.1) in which the PSC 
played a prominent role on these matters. Notably, the PSC also played a 
key role in the recruitment and appointment of the heads of departments 
(HODs). However, the ministers and MECs were often not consulted on 
such matters, hence the subsequent tensions or "disturbing clashes" 
(Sampson, 1999:514) between these two sets of public officials that 
briefly characterised the civil service in the mid-1990s. On the one hand, 
such clashes arose apparently because, between 1994 and 1997, the 
provincial DGs were responsible for all administrative matters in their
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respective provinces. On the other hand, these clashes also occurred 
because of disagreements "...between the more headstrong reforming 
ministers and their Directors-General; often about administrative practice 
rather than ideology" (Sampson, 1999:514). However, this apparent 
imbalance of power— between the provincial DG and the MECs— created 
a loophole, legally, because the MECs had fewer powers than the 
provincial DGs. Therefore, the government amended the 1994 Public 
Service Act (Public Service Laws Amendment Act, 1997) to permit the 
MEC to take administrative initiatives, including individual recruitment 
decisions.
Currently, the role of the national Minister of Public Service and 
Administration is crucial to the functions of all public service employees in 
South Africa. The minister "has power to provide a framework of norms 
and standards with the aim of giving effect to any of the above policies. 
[These] duties include advising the President on the establishment of 
national departments and related matters, allocating, transferring, and 
abolishing public service functions, and advising the [national and 
provincial cabinets] on a range of public service and linked issues" {Public 
Service Review Report, 1999-2000:7). To an extent, this indicates the 
centralised nature of the country's political and public administration 
systems.
26
There is no doubt that South Africa faced an enormous task of re­
organising its public service after the demise of apartheid. Thus, it was 
quite inevitable that the primary focus of the post-1994 legislation should 
be "...the amalgamation and rationalisation of the various organisational 
units inside and outside...the then public service framework into a single 
public service" (Public Service Review Report, 1999-2000:6). Despite 
signs of success here and there, it is still early to say whether the 
amalgamation of the former apartheid structures into this 
national/provincial form of one formally unitary service has borne any 
meaningful fruit.
Finally, it is important to mention the issue of political appointees to the 
staffs of the executive civil service (i.e. not simply ministers' political 
advisers) for whom provision is made in the constitution. Section 195 (4) 
states that "The appointment in public administration of a number of 
persons on policy considerations is not precluded, but national legislation 
must regulate these appointments in the public service." The government 
has stated that "despite all the problems that continue to plague the 
public service, there has been great progress since 1994." However, it has 
equally acknowledged that "More work...is still needed to change ■ and fill 
gaps in the [public service] regulatory framework, and this will be 
captured in future regulatory and legislative change" (Public Service 
Review Report, 1999-2000:7). This indicates hope and optimism that the
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post-1994 legal changes will eventually ensure progress in the entire 
public service.
Despite such optimism, however, an evaluation of the legislation 
governing the civil service suggests that — while the constitution gives 
broad guidelines — such guidelines can be subject to different 
interpretations. A typical example is the problem of implementing policies 
which are formulated largely at the national level but which must be 
applied by the provinces. In some instances, it would appear that the wide 
discretion allowed by the constitution to national legislation creates room 
for the centralisation of power by national government. Needless to add, 
this could fuel tensions and lead to wrangles between the two levels of 
government such as those experienced by the (post-1994) Government of 
National Unity (GNU) soon after it came to power. At that time, the 
argument of some of the provinces was that functions such as education 
and policing (which are national competencies) should be devolved to the 
provinces — an unpopular move in the national government's perspective.
The appointment of new officials "on policy considerations" is bound to 
create anxiety for civil servants because of the uncertainty surrounding 
the appointment and activities of such people. In fact, the legislation 
seems to make provision for the politicisation of the senior civil service 
because of the substantial power vested in the national and provincial 
ministers, especially with regard to the appointment of senior civil 
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servants. This could detract from the "high standard of professional 
ethics", efficiency and effectiveness required by s 195 of the constitution 
(already quoted above). Overall, as will be shown below, several officials 
stated in interviews that while the apartheid laws have now changed, the 
(racial) mindset of that era has not and persists among some officials.
1.3 Methodology
This study has relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. 
Interviews (of between 45 minutes and one hour per interviewee) served 
as the primary source of collecting data and were conducted in selected 
government departments and provinces as explained below. An Interview 
Guide (see Appendix 3) was used for all interviewees. Apart from the basic 
questions on the personal and career data of the officials interviewed, 
each interview contained more than twenty questions divided into four 
sections: (i) the respondents' perceptions of the senior civil service; 
political and administrative relationships and roles; (II) questions on the 
officials' assessments of changes in the civil service since 1994; (iii) their 
perceptions on matters such as selection, recruitment and promotion of 
civil servants — particularly in view of the government's Affirmative Action 
policy — and • (iv) questions around organisation, management, 
performance and productivity issues in their departments.
The secondary sources of data for this study included official and other 
documents, academic and other books and journals. In addition, historical
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and official records, newspapers . and periodicals, the internet and case 
studies were used to supplement the interviews. Furthermore, I also 
attended a few sessions of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on the 
Public Service, at which the subject of public service reform was 
frequently discussed. My aim was to gain an overall impression of South 
Africa's civil service across the country by studying a randomly selected 
subset of four provinces. KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and North 
West were chosen from all nine provinces by lot. The government 
departments to be approached were, by contrast, chosen for substantive 
reasons.
I originally intended to conduct interviews in three departments, at both 
their national and provincial levels. The Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) was chosen specifically because it is responsible for 
South Africa's civil service reform policies and their implementation. DPSA 
operates only at national level (although it has provincial co-ordinators). 
The other two selected departments, Education and Health, operate at 
both the provincial and national levels. I chose them because they, 
arguably, face the most challenging tasks in the implementation, mainly 
at regional level, of the new government's social policies. At the national 
level, these two departments are responsible for education and health 
policies which affect the bulk of the population — particularly the urban 
and rural poor. Education and Health were chosen, therefore, for the 
intrinsic importance and difficulty of their service fields. My interviews 
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have therefore covered three national jurisdictions (DPSA, Education and 
Health) and eight regional ones (Education and Health, each in four 
provinces).
The statistics from these 180 interviews with senior officials are presented 
in five parts below, each within the appropriate chapter: Chapter 4.2on 
their perceptions and attitudes on representivity (Affirmative Action); 5.5 
on senior civil service management performance issues; 6.3 on officials' 
working relations with their ministers/MECs and 'politicisation'; 7.2 on the 
policy-making process; and 8.1 on post-1994 change in the senior civil 
service. (Overall conclusions on the interview results appear in 8.2.)
For reasons to be explained the data are mainly presented in the simple 
form of percentage figures of the direct and substantive responses to each 
question. 'Don't knows' are, of course, excluded (although any unusual 
number of them arising on a question is reported, to put the percent 
figures into context). But the few cases of a small group of respondents 
making other comments than the question was seeking have also been 
excluded (with the same proviso If their number was high on any 
particular question). The numbers and the range of this interview survey 
are unusually large so the loss of cases from excluding substantive, but 
extraneous and mixed responses — the 'other comment' — is not a 
serious point. The advantage of basing percentage results on clear and 
direct responses to the question is a real one. Some are simple yes/no or 
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agree/disagree responses, while others have been coded on a broader 
frame using several alternative statements to which each respondent's 
comment can be attached as best suits it. There is no multiple coding.
My interview survey is, of course, based on a systematic, purposive 
sample of a defined elite group; it is not based on an uncontrolled 
snowball sample. The respondents were defined by their official posts as 
organised into two national and eight provincial South African government 
departments. I tried to interview as many officials in each of these as 
were eligible on my broad definition of the senior civil service. In some 
sections of these departments I obtained full coverage; by contrast, no 
more than a few national Department of Health officials could be included, 
whereas 33 DPSA national-level interviewees represented a good coverage 
of that department's senior cadre.
Elite interview strategies do not admit the random sample approach in any 
practical way. Whereas a very large elite interview study could draw a 
genuine random sample from the current lists of (say) the entire South 
African senior civil service, or university academics or military officers, it 
would be very difficult to apply in the field. The refusal rate would be 
much higher than in a mass (non-elite) survey and the consequences of 
trying to substitute for these refusals from individuals who were not 
originally sampled are more damaging in terms of statistical method. The 
proposed substitute could be significantly different (in grade, section, 
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department, etc.) from the randomly selected individual, and the 
statistical benefits of random selection would soon be damaged or lost. 
The practical arrangements for immediately interviewing a named 
substitute following a refusal would, in any case, be too difficult — 
certainly at the level of some 180 officials' interviews overall which I was 
to achieve. My already considerable time commitment to fieldwork 
periods in various departments spread around South Africa would have 
become unmanageable.
If a truly random sample was not a practical option, even for a quite 
large-N study such as I was planning, the problem of how the data should 
be reported became quite acute. I produced the basic numerical results 
(marginals) from the coding and expressed them in percentage terms 
(with d/k, undecided or 'other' responses excluded, to base these per cent 
figures only on the direct and substantive replies). It is, of course, 
common academic practice to report non-random survey data with 
statistical significance tests, even though this is statistically incorrect, and 
to claim that chosen chi-square or gamma (ordinal score) 'results' are 
statistically significant. Guided by my Department's statistics adviser (Mr 
Eric Tanenbaum) and others in the Department, in addition to my 
supervisory board, I was doubtful of going beyond statistical limits to draw 
conclusions with no technical foundation.
I generated and studied chi-square and gamma analysis (the latter 
applicable to ordinal scales) but was reluctant to report it or make any 
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claims of its significance. Eric Tanenbaum then pointed out that the 
overwhelming majorities among my respondents on the study's key issues 
would, in any case, much reduce any potential interest in cross­
tabulations or other break-downs of my 180 respondents. The near­
consensus opinions on several basic issues (notably on perceiving and 
welcoming the recent changes in the senior civil service) would possibly 
form a sufficient conclusion to report, at least in a more formally academic 
doctoral thesis. This has been a difficult issue. The percentage totals of 
marginals in this version of my study submitted for the degree are plainly 
over-simple. However, I wished to avoid having claims to 'significance' of 
some outcomes of the data quite rightly challenged on statistical grounds, 
either at the degree examination or subsequently, at publication stage. 
These are my reasons for reporting the data as I do.
As a contribution to the continuity of survey analysis of comparative 
political executives, I based several questions on Suleiman's (1974) 
question forms (Ezra N. Suleiman, Politics Power and Bureaucracy in 
France, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Appendix 391-415). My 
key question asking what my respondents saw as the two main operating 
criteria for senior civil service appointment or promotion in South Africa 
(Q.37-8) followed his Q.1.17, although my question was open-ended. He 
asked:
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"What are, in your view, the factors which most contribute to the 
promotion of higher civil servants up to the level of Sous-Directeur in 
the French administration? Choose two among the following factors 
in order of importance." (p. 395)
I also re-used his question on favouring outsiders or insiders for senior 
appointments when I asked (my Q.42) for a choice between an insider of 
20 years standing and an outsider with most job experience outside the 
civil service. Suleiman's slightly different question (his 1.18) was:
"If you were a minister forced to choose between two officials for a 
high administrative position, which one of these two would you 
choose: an official who had spent all his life in the Administration, or 
an official of equal intellectual capabilities, who had spent several 
years outside the Administration?"
On the central issue of the South African Director-General's routine or 
potential transfer whenever a new minister/MEC is appointed, I adapted 
Suleiman's Q.2.4. This asked his senior French officials whether their 
minister should be free to choose his directors (broadly equivalent to the 
three highest South African grades) from outside the civil service or only 
from any current officials or even only some types of official (p. 400). (In 
asking about the range of choice the minister should enjoy, this question 
assumes that these directors serve only at their minister's political or 
personal pleasure — as one aspect of the partly politicised French 
system.) I also asked (Q.25) whether senior South African officials were 
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seen as having much/some/very little influence on policy-making: this 
drew from Suleiman's Q.1.1 (p. 391) asking the same about officials' 
influence on "politics" as a whole:
In some countries, the higher civil servants have a great deal of 
influence on politics; in others, they only have a little. Would you say 
that in France the higher civil servants have much some, little, very 
little, or no influence on the politics of the country?
Finally, my Q.36 asked whether the changes which the respondent 
perceived in the senior civil service since 1994 were desirabe/undesirable 
— a form which Suleiman used on three different issues (his Qs. 1.5a; 
1.11; and 4.17).
As noted above, the first group of these survey reports forms Chapter 4.2 
('representivity'/AA).
The target group were senior civil servants at Director (grade 13) up to 
DG (grade 16) who are defined by the Public Service Regulations (B.2(r)) 
as senior management — plus Assistant Directors (grades 9-10) and 
Deputy Directors (grades 11-12). Including these less senior grades 
greatly increased the N of this study. (These officials vary greatly in age 
and years of service in these grades: they are by no means nearly all 
recent entrants.)
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There is much collaboration between the provincial and national levels of 
government. However, the national level senior civil servants are 
controlled from Pretoria (the national administrative capital), whereas the 
provincial officials' directives are issued by their respective provincial 
administrations. In all the departments, I wrote to the Director-Generals1 
offices (or the DDG/SG in the case of the provinces and some 
departments) asking for permission to interview them and to carry out the 
study in their department. Once permission was granted, I arrived and 
asked for a list of the officials in the grades 9-16. This list was not always 
available, in which case I would ask the HOD's secretary or personal 
assistant to help compile it. Where such a list was available, I normally 
asked for the internal extension (or other contact) numbers of the officials 
concerned and immediately called them for appointments. I always tried 
to start with the Assistant Directors and to work up the hierarchy in order 
to maximise my knowledge of the department before meeting the most 
senior people. In some cases, however, the most senior civil servants in 
some departments chose to be interviewed before their subordinates. I 
tried to interview all the senior civil servants on the list provided; thus all 
the listed officials who were to be found in their offices during my stay in 
each department — and willing to be interviewed — were included in the 
study. I often obtained a complete coverage of grade 9-16 officials in a 
particular department.
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I sought to interview the provincial Premiers of the four selected provinces 
and the national ministers of the three selected departments but was 
refused. But all eight members of the provincial Executive Councils (MECs) 
who act as ministers of health or education in the four selected provinces 
did agree to interviews. (Two additional, individual, interviews with MECs 
in two other provinces were obtained.) Being only ten in number, the 
MECs1 interview material is presented in qualitative, not statistical, terms: 
they are not part of the 180 officials' data set.
I had also hoped to interview retired officials who could have offered 
valuable information on the past civil service. However, this was not 
possible owing to time and other constraints. Therefore, all the officials 
who were interviewed were currently serving in the various departments 
in which the study was conducted: DPSA (national level only) (n = 33); 
Department of Health (seven at national level and 72 at provincial level); 
and Department of Education (65 at provincial level).
Altogether, 190 interviews were conducted — that is, 180 senior civil 
servants and ten MECs — spread across four provinces and two national 
departments. Table 1.1 gives the details. Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal 
yielded more respondents because the departments are larger in these 
provinces, which are the most populous in the country and I was readily 
granted access to them.
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Table 1.1 Breakdown of 190 fieldwork interviews for this study
Respondents Groups
Group a Senior officials in the national government's Department of
Public Service and Administration. Number: 33
Group b Senior officials in the national government's Department of
Health. Number: 7
Group c Senior officials in the provincial governments' Departments of
Health. Numbers: Mpumalanga province 13
North West province 11
Gauteng province 23
Kwa Zulu-Natal province 25
(Group c sub-total: 72)
Group d Senior officials in the provinciaI ooeernmnnts ' Depattmen t of 




(Group d sub-total: 65)




(Group e sub-total: 3)
Total of national government senior officials 40
Total of provincial government senior officials 140
TOTAL CIVIL SERVANT RESPONDENTS 180
(Ten provincial 'ministers' (Members of Executive Council) were also 
interviewed but not included in this statistical analysis.)
I set aside the ten politicians for non-statistical analysis and commentary. 
These MECs' perceptions have been used to verify some of the responses 
of the senior civil servants or to offer the contrasts which arise from their 
position as the other side of the crucial official-minister relationship. The 
responses in the Interview Guides were fully coded and analysed. I 
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compiled a commentary based on the responses, which is spread 
throughout the thesis, topic by topic. I used the Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyse the data and drew upon other 
quantitative material such as official statistics. However, the research also 
used qualitative data, notably from academic and other published sources.
This study was carried out around South Africa and at the University of 
Essex between October 1998 and May 2001. The bulk of the work was 
done while based in Cape Town, although I also spent about one month 
collecting data in each of the four randomly selected provinces. I spent a 
brief period in the Northern Cape province, which I chose to pilot the 
initial Interview Guides. The provinces and national departments in this 
study were visited in the following order: Mpumalanga, North West, 
Gauteng, KZN, DPSA and national Department of Health in Pretoria. I 
considered KZN and the Western Cape to be of particular value to the 
study. Unlike the three other provinces studied, which are under ANC 
provincial rule, these two provinces had, since the 1994 general elections, 
had other parties (IFP and NP, respectively) which are in opposition to the 
ANC at national level governing them as the provincial majority party. This 
feature persisted after the 1999 general elections (although the 
Democratic Party overtook the New NP in the Western Cape, eventually 
forcing the NNP to allow them into the provincial government as a 
coalition partner). Very unfortunately, I was not allowed into the Health 
and Education Departments in the Western Cape. Within my study of the 
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senior officials, only the KZN province did not have an ANC government. I 
did interview one MEC in the Western Cape and one in Northern Cape, 
making ten MECs in all.
This study is an empirical project that is informed by the theoretical 
assumptions and approaches of several scholars, notably those in 
comparative executives, public administration and management. I felt that 
no single perspective or theory could provide answers to the complex 
issues under investigation. To find possible answers to the questions 
which the research sought to answer (see Objectives in Chapter 2.1, 
following next) I surveyed the related literature, notably on comparative 
executives, and decided to re-visit Max Weber's ideal-type theory of 
administration. The comparative executive literature was particularly 
useful because it helped me to place South Africa's latest public sector 
reforms in an international context. Weber's views on the bureaucracy 
(and several other studies that sought to either support or criticise his 
ideas) helped me to understand the ideas of the early writers on career 
public officials. From the comparative executive literature, this study has 
drawn from the thesis of Joel Aberbach, et al. (1981). They posited that 
there was a "convergence" to be observed between the roles of the senior 
civil servants and the elected public officials (ministers) in contemporary 
advanced democratic political systems.
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I have also considered the relevance of the arguments of rational-choice 
theory, developed largely through the ideas of William Niskanen (1971), 
to the present research. This approach has been used in the United States 
to understand "...the relations between bureaucrats and their 
congressional masters" (Wintrobe, 1997:432). As Wintrobe has stated, 
the rational-choice approach is concerned (among others) with questions 
of efficiency and "responsibility of bureaucrats" (p.432), which could in 
way help explain the current drive to effect changes in the South African 
civil service. Quite significantly, he wondered how much responsibility 
individual bureaucrats who worked in "...an organization [that] engages in 
immoral or criminal activities...bear for the actions of the organization." 
This argument could be applied to the case of senior officials who worked 
for the apartheid government.
This chapter has introduced the study and reviewed the South African 
usage of the terms civil service and public service. In addition, it has 
emphasised the importance of interviews with senior officials as an 
empirical source, and has outlined the anxieties and challenges facing 
these cadres as changes unfold in their service. It introduces the themes 
of Affirmative Action, personal Performance Management Contracts and 
potential politicisation within the context of a description of the legal 
framework regulating the South African civil service. The chapter 
concludes with an account of the study's research methods.
A plan and calendar of the study is offered . below (Appendix 8).
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Chapter Two
Objectives and Literature Review
2.1 Justification of the Study
The overall objective and justification of this study is to examine the 
changes that were introduced in the South African civil service after 1994, 
drawing on the perspectives of the senior civil servants and provincial 
ministers (MECs) who were interviewed for the study. As part of this 
endeavour, I sought to find out whether these civil servants' perspectives 
were in any way affected by the structure of the departments in which 
they worked. I have made two guiding assumptions: (i) that the structure 
or organisation of the civil service was changing because of the post­
apartheid political realities and (ii) (in some respects depending on the 
first) that the perspectives and responsibilities of the senior civil servants 
were perceived as changing. Thus, the idea was to investigate whether or 
not these were indeed the case and to assess the implications of such a 
change on the country's future civil service. Another particular interest of 
the study was the concept of convergence (Aberbach et al., 1981) within 
the South African situation. While I chose to examine civil service reforms 
from the perspectives of the officials themselves, other sources of 
information were used to verify or assess these perspectives. I also 
wanted to explore the possible uniqueness of South Africa's public sector 
reforms.
The following questions guided the research:
43
1. What are the responsibilities of senior civil servants in South Africa?
2. How do they perceive the current reforms?
3. Are their perspectives on the senior civil service seen to be 
changing? If so, to what extent? If not, why?
4. How do the perspectives of politicians affect those of the officials?
5. In what organisational structure/s do the senior civil servants 
operate?
6. Are these structures changing? If so, how? If not, why?
7. How do these structures enable or constrain the civil servants work?
8. What are the implications of a changing (or static) structure for the 
perspectives of the respondents?
These questions required that I should study the involvement, activities 
and responsibilities of the senior civil service, especially in the 
implementation of public policy. To answer these questions I obtained 
information from various sources, including the interviews with senior civil 
servants and MECs and scrutiny of legislation and policies on the civil 
service.
During South Africa's pre-election inter-party negotiations in 1993, a 
concession was made to the NP by the ANC regarding the civil service: 
what are now known as the 'sunset clauses' (Deegan, 1999; Sampson, 
1999). As Deegan has correctly pointed out, "The idea [conceived by the 
late South African Communist Party Leader, Joe Slovo] ...was that the sun 
was setting on the NP and the ANC should accept a power-sharing formula 
for five years to enable those who supported the former government to 
make a dignified exit from power" (Deegan, 1999:19). These sunset 
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clauses were intended to "...safeguard the jobs of white civil servants and 
allow for a coalition government between Afrikaner Nationalists and the 
ANC ministers" (Sampson, 1999: 467). As a result, the two parties agreed 
that the civil service "that supported the NP and implemented its policy of 
apartheid" (Kotze, in Faure 1996:37) should remain intact, at least until 
after the second elections to allow the new government to consolidate its 
power.
The ANC government therefore inherited administrative structures that 
were often ill prepared for, or less responsive to, the post-apartheid 
challenges. How has this inheritance related to the current transformation 
in the civil service? 'Public service transformation' has become a 
fashionable phrase in South Africa. It refers to the strategies or practices 
that are intended to introduce fundamental change in the civil service. In 
other parts of the world terms such as reinvention, modernization, 
improvement, reform, and re-engineering have been used (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000:16,18). The reform of the civil service has also been a 
topical issue elsewhere in Africa. However, this was brought about 
primarily through the IMF/World Bank-inspired Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) undertaken by several African countries (Corkery and 
Land, 1997; Lienert and Modi, 1997).
In South Africa's case, reform means re-organising the civil service from 
being an instrument formerly used to implement racial laws to one that 
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facilitates a democratic order in the country. Thus, the significance of this 
present study is that it was carried out at a time when the civil service 
was grappling with the nature of such reform in government departments. 
The study could therefore indirectly help to explain some of the problems 
affecting post-apartheid reconstruction and development in the country.
I regarded the empowerment (capacity enhancement) of the civil servants 
as crucial to South Africa's transition to democracy. I was eager to 
understand the extent to which the civil service, which helped to sustain 
institutionalised inequalities throughout the apartheid years, could help to 
eradicate that legacy. This last point does not suggest that the civil service 
alone sustained the past racial system. On the contrary, it is obvious that 
this task would not have been accomplished without the involvement of 
other arms of the state such as the army, police, and intelligence services. 
Further, I thought that this study could shed light on the challenges of 
implementing the new government's policies. I also felt that my results 
could help scholars and other researchers in the fields of civil service 
reform, public administration and cross-cultural management to gain 
deeper insight into the South African civil service. They could also 
contribute to the general comparative study of state executives and their 
higher cadres, particularly in Africa.
The importance of the study is that it was an in-depth analysis of the 
perspectives of the senior civil servants about the changes in the civil 
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service. These issues were explored by taking into consideration the 
powers and roles of the ministers leading the departments in which the 
officials were interviewed. A recent study on South Africa suggested that 
few published studies "focus[ed] primarily on the upper echelons of the 
civil service, underlining the awesome powers of senior bureaucrats to 
'run' their ministers and to shape the policy-making process" (Posel, 
1999:100, citing Adam & Giliomee, 1979; Baxter, 1994; and O'Meara, 
1979). Of these writers, only Posel (publishing in 1999) could have 
considered the perspectives of the senior officials in the post-1994 civil 
service. Obviously, the others focused on the old regime.
Official studies such as the Presidential Review Commission Report (1998) 
and the Provincial Review Report (1997) have attempted to examine 
several issues on the South African civil service. Both reports were 
initiated and commissioned by the government and raised issues around 
public sector reform. However, they covered a very wide range of topics 
on the public service generally; not much attention was specifically 
devoted to the civil service. Another attempt to address issues on public 
sector challenges and reform (Van Rooyen, 1999) did not examine the 
convergence of the politico-administrative roles (Aberbach et al., 1981) 
and concentrated on a much narrower empirical base than this study.
In my analysis of the perspectives of the senior civil servants I have 
looked at the possible effect of several variables. These are race, gender, 
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disability, and the relationships between the officials and the political 
heads of their departments. Race plays a significant role in the South 
African situation. Similarly, gender was expected to be important to the 
study, especially because in the past civil service women were deliberately 
excluded from top positions. I also had to consider the relevance of the 
size of the civil service, as part of assessing the possible effect of the 
structure of government departments on the perspectives of the officials: 
they are under constant political pressure to reduce their staff. Of 
particular significance concerning the size of the civil service is the 'ghost 
worker' problem (see Chapter 5.3, below) and the integration of the 'ex­
departments' (homelands). This was particularly in view of one observer's 
comments that, "Until now, most students of public administration seem 
to have focused on behaviour and attitudes without relating them 
explicitly to bureaucratic structure" (Egeberg, 1999: 167).
As I noted in Chapter One, the former self-governing territories, the 
nominally independent black 'homelands' and the previous white, coloured 
and Indian administrations were merged to become the new Republic of 
South Africa. This integration spawned new challenges with which the 
senior civil service is currently grappling. When I interviewed my 
respondents (1999-2000) a sizeable proportion of serving civil servants 
had, irrespective of grade, not been long in the government. The 
newcomers were anti-apartheid political activists, returned exiles, 
employees from the private business sector or a range of other 
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backgrounds, including the universities. It was important to ascertain how 
all these individuals (especially in the more senior grades) survived inside 
a structure that they could not change (at least immediately) after the 
new government came to power. This study could therefore contribute to 
academic and other debates on public sector reform within the South 
African civil service and also to the study of dramatic innovation in senior 
national bureaucratic cadres, as part of the comparative executives 
academic field.
2.2 A Review of the Related Literature
This section of Chapter Two examines the literature on the senior civil 
service or, commonly, 'the higher civil service' (Suleiman, 1974:98). The 
chapter will first outline Max Weber's model and briefly relate it to South 
Africa's civil service. It will then re-visit the work of Aberbach et al., 
(1981) on political and administrative elites in selected industrialised 
countries — particularly their "convergence" model. This model was 
offered in the 1970s, suggesting that the roles of ministers and senior civil 
servants were becoming more similar. The chapter will conclude with a 
summary of other writers' views on comparative executives, in relation to 
the Aberbach study.
Much of the work in this area is covered under the title 'comparative 
executives' and usually — though not always — includes political
49
executives (ministers) (e.g. Aberbach et al., 1981; Aberbach and 
Rockman, 1977; Eldersveld et al., 1981; Farazmand, 1997; Peters, 1984; 
and Putnam, 1975a, 1976). Some scholars have studied the senior civil 
servants alone (e.g. Armstrong, 1973; Dogan, 1975a, 1975b; Heady, 
1991; Putnam, 1975b; Rose, 1984; and Suleiman, 1984). Others have 
focused only on the political executives (Heady, 1974; Norton, 1998; and 
Tarrow, 1977).
Career executives, as Rosen has argued, should be studied because they 
"...are usually experts in a particular subject." They "...know the territory, 
the laws, the interested power centres, and what has worked or failed [in 
their departments] and why" (Rosen, cited by Page, 1987:234). Rose 
(1987:216) has used the term "hautes fonctionnaires", "administrative 
class" and "senior executive service" to describe the highest grades of the 
French, British and American civil services, respectively. Many scholars 
of comparative executives commonly use the term 'bureaucracy' (as 
Weber did) to define all civil servants (e.g. Dunleavy, 1991; Etzioni- 
Halevy, 1983; Peters, 1984; and Suleiman, 1974). However, as Rose 
(1987:211) has pointed out, this generalisation probably arose from the 
erroneous "...assumption that all officials conform (or should conform) to 
a single type, the bureaucrat." He added that being a civil servant is not 
synonymous with "...being a bureaucrat." Therefore, the term senior civil 
service or higher civil service is used in this thesis to describe top 
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government officials in departments and ministries. The terms bureaucrats 
or bureaucracy will arise only within citations of other authors' works.
The German sociologist, Max Weber (1864-1920) is renowned for his 
great interest in what he termed the "ideal-type bureaucracy", meaning a 
unique public administration model. He has been described as "the 
theorist who made bureaucracy one of his central concerns and whose 
concept is considered central to the contemporary analysis of 
bureaucracy..." (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:27; also, Merton et al., 1952). 
Weber's conception of the administrative order of the state rested upon 
his well-known ideas on power, domination and authority. He outlined 
three types of authority (traditional, charismatic and legal-rational) which 
he believed all served as the basis for legitimating the authority of a 
leader, ruler or polity.
Needless to add, one or more of these three forms of authority is often the 
characteristic feature of many polities. South Africa, for instance, was 
ruled after 1994 by a charismatic leader who not only had legal training 
but also strong traditional ties. However, the government has hardly used 
charismatic influence to re-mould the civil service. The legal-rational 
aspects of power and authority are more likely than the other two to 
influence this aspect of the new state. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out 
completely the influence of traditional forms of authority and Nelson 
Mandela's personal charisma on the country's administrative arm. The 
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major difficulty would be to determine exactly how much influence 
charismatic authority exerts within the civil service, especially on the 
higher ranks. At the time of writing, the government was examining ways 
of accommodating traditional forms of authority by incorporating the 
traditional leaders into mainstream political processes in the country. 
These traditional leaders — hereditary ethnic chiefs, including the Zulu 
King — are found mostly in the provinces that were merged with the 
former black homelands, such as KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and 
the Northern province. If plans to integrate traditional leaders into the 
political system succeed, the senior civil servants in these provinces will 
have to be able to work with these traditional leaders.
Gerth and Mills have outlined the following "major features of the 
Weberian bureaucracy":
i. A well-defined sphere of competence (clearly marked duties) and 
offices;
ii. A hierarchy of offices - each office is supervised by, and is the 
responsibility of, a higher one;
iii. Authority is restricted to official duties (complete separation of official 
activity from private life);
iv. Officials hold office by appointment, not election (contractual 
relationships);
v. Selection is based on objective qualifications - acquired through 
training, established examinations or diplomas;
vi. Career: protection from arbitrary dismissal, permanent job.
Promotion is by seniority, achievement, or both;
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vii. Officials are entirely separated from the means of administration, 
hence they cannot appropriate their positions;
viii. Rules: general, consistent, abstract [rules] regulate [staff] activities;
ix. Impersonality: official duties are conducted without hatred but also 
without affection;
x. Bureaucracy frequently has a ■ non-bureaucratic head. Bureaucrats 
follow rules, he sets them. Such a person inherits position, 
appropriates it or is elected to it (Gerth and Mills, 1958:196-198).
These Weberian characterisations of ideal bureaucracy are important to 
our understanding of both the administrative and political elites. Weber 
regarded his model as an ideal-type, or "a theoretical construct, 
combining several features of a phenomenon in their purest and most 
extreme form" (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:29). Inevitably, therefore, the 
features of this model will be compared to modern governmental 
structures. Many points in Weber's model might be applied to South 
Africa's current civil service, though with slight alterations as will be 
explained below (the South African senior civil service will be analysed in 
Chapter Three). This is not surprising because Weber himself stressed 
that, "this type of organization is in principle applicable with equal facility 
to a variety of different fields" (Weber, in Merton et al., 1952:22). 
However, his model could have changed over the years, or at least its 
features could have become slightly modified, especially if it were to be 
examined in relation to specific (country) cases.
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Point (v) in Gerth and Mills' list describes typical merit-based selection 
criteria for civil servants. As in Weber's model, recruitment and selection 
in the South African civil service are supposed to be based on objective 
qualifications and training, but the standards are undoubtedly not yet as 
rigorous as in the West, notably the British and French systems. In the 
UK, such standards are supposed to be encouraged and maintained 
through the country's tradition of a Civil Service Commission, with its 
emphasis on rigorous standards for employing civil servants (Civil Service 
College, 1999/2000). (Increasingly, devolution to Scotland and Wales, 
plus departmentalised recruitment and pay scales are now weakening this 
tradition in the UK — or, at least, altering it.) In France, the same 
standards are, arguably, well-established through France's world- 
renowned tradition of the Ena (Ecole National d'Administration), which 
trains the highest cadres of civil servants for the Francophone countries — 
although practice within such a tiny elite may not have much wider 
relevance.
However, in the case of South Africa, the country's Management 
Development Institute (SAMDI) has just begun to perform similar training 
functions. At the time of writing, this institution — which was originally 
outside government — has only recently been integrated into the DPSA. 
Most certainly, SAMDI will benefit from Britain's £3 million assistance 
package which was pledged in April 2000 to support South Africa's public 
service transformation (DPSA, 2000). SAMDI's main task will be the 
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delivery of training and is likely to play an influential role in the human 
resource matters of the public service. It is doubtful whether, at ■ present, 
the (Weberian) merit principle applies fully to South Africa's civil service — 
especially in view of the new government's policy on Affirmative Action 
(AA) appointments to redress the apartheid legacy. The issue of AA 
appointments and how they shape the new civil service will be examined 
further in Chapter Four.
Closely related to the issue of merit in the South African civil service is the 
role of partisan political loyalties in the appointment of (especially) senior 
civil servants. It has been stated that "...many modern bureaucracies 
have practised appointment and promotion by partisan-political loyalties 
rather than by qualifications and allocation of benefits by partisan criteria 
rather than by formal generalised rules" (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:37). This 
point referred to the United States and some states in Europe. However, it 
also applies to the civil services in Africa and elsewhere, particularly after 
independence (Subramaniam, 1977:297). An attempt will be made in the 
present study to examine how such practices — particularly the 
politicisation of the civil service as discussed in Chapter Five — affect the 
South African civil service.
As point (x) in the Gerth and Mills list shows, elected persons are usually 
heads of ministries and departments; but it would be over-stretching the 
point to argue, as Weber's model implies, that such politicians entirely set 
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the rules which bureaucrats follow blindly, with no say in their 
formulation. This in fact resuscitates controversies surrounding the alleged 
separation between politics and administration (the politics-administration 
dichotomy model) which will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
Weber's model gave birth later to what became known as the classical 
models (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:8), which were developed by 
later scholars.
Weber's elaborate model of the ideal administrative structure has been 
criticised from many angles. As Page (in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:35) has 
pointed out, Weber ignored "bureaucracy's other face", meaning the 
"...informal relations, informal norms and values, and informal power 
hierarchy and informal power struggles — all of which have no place in 
Weber's model." Similarly, "...it has been commented that his ideal type is 
far from being ideal as a conceptual tool, for it has led Weber to a lopsided 
view of bureaucracy. Of the many discrepant and contradictory features of 
bureaucracy Weber has highlighted one side only, that which fits in with 
his ideal type" (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:35).
Another critic — Sir Henry Bland, writing on the Australian experience — 
has further criticised Weber for overlooking empire-building. He was 
referring to "...a practice whereby bureaucrats and bureaucratic agencies 
not only infringe on each other's spheres of competence, but indeed 
attempt to swallow up each other's domains, in their unceasing struggle 
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for power" (Bland, cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:36). Other observers 
have criticised what could possibly be described as the rigidity of Weber's 
model. For, as has been stated, "Among his best-known generalizations is 
that which holds that the bureaucratic machine will ordinarily continue to 
operate essentially unchanged even in the face of revolutionary changes in 
society" (Merton et al., 1952:18). Weber did not put much weight on the 
impact that significant changes in society — such as the coming to power, 
even of a revolutionary new government — could have on the principal 
established operations of the public bureaucracy. In the context of this 
present study of South Africa, this last comment is important because it 
implies that — if Weber's perception was correct — much of the apartheid 
era's civil service operations would have continued as before in spite of 
the 1994 change of government. His perception was quite consistent with 
his emphasis on the "overtowering" or pervasive role of the officials in 
society (Weber, cited in Farazmand, 1997:xi).
Some analysts have noted the "excessively ethnocentric" nature of 
Weber's model (Peters, in Bekke et al., 1996:29); and the sharp 
distinction he drew between what he termed the "political master" and the 
"expert or trained official" (Gerth and Mills, 1958:235). Nevertheless, 
Weber's concern about analysing the "typical or ideal official" and the 
"typical political leader" (Bendix, 1960:440-441) should be seen as one of 
the earliest attempts at examining the link between political and 
administrative elites. To this extent, his model has been described as the 
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"intellectual gold standard against which real-world bureaucracies have 
been most often compared" (Peters, in Bekke etal, 1996:29-30).
Perhaps a major characteristic of Weber's model — important to my 
present research — is that he did not specifically study the senior civil 
service as a separate entity. Neither did he specifically study the other 
diverse sectors of his overall ideal bureaucracy model. This task was left 
to his critics, some of whom became interested in his model (e.g. 
Aberbach et al., 1981). Like many of his successors, as already stated, he 
used the term bureaucracy to lump together all public and private sector 
organisations, thus blurring the distinction between diverse forms of 
governmental and private structures. It has been stated in Weber's 
defence that his ideal type model referred only to the "purest and most 
extreme form" of administrative apparatus that does not exist in practice. 
Accordingly, "Weber never claimed that all modern organizations, or even 
all administrators, display all the aforementioned features. He merely 
claimed' that there is a general tendency in this direction and that the 
closer an organization comes to displaying these features, the more 
rational and effective it is likely to be" (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:29).
Despite these criticisms, Max Weber's contribution to the study of politics 
and (especially) administration has left an indelible mark on many areas 
of the social sciences. Thus, some have stated that "Notwithstanding its 
limitations, [Weber's theory] is and can still be used as a general 
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framework for global and historical comparisons" (Raadschelders and 
Rutgers, in Bekke etal, 1996:70; also Peters, in Bekke etal., 1996:30).
Therefore, it is not surprising that modern scholars continue to grapple 
with and criticise Weber's model (see Peters, 1996; Raadschelders and 
Rutgers, 1996; and Warwick, 1975). Contemporary politics, Max Weber 
had claimed, "...was being shaped...by the emergence of modern 
bureaucracy — most especially the growing state apparatus, increasingly 
led by technically trained, professional career administrators" (Aberbach 
et al., 1981:1). Such claims have also encouraged scholars to conduct 
further research on the connection between the political and 
administrative elites. The ideas of Aberbach and his colleagues on these 
issues will be analysed next. Such ideas not only help us to understand 
classical Weberian bureaucracy (Barberis, 1998:455), but also to probe 
the connection between modern politicians and senior civil servants.
Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam and Bert Rockman's (1981) study on 
comparative executives was one of the best scholarly attempts to define 
the roles of public policy-makers in Western Europe and North America. 
This study was conducted between 1970 and 1974 although it was seven 
years later (1981) that its findings were published. This classic work 
(henceforth, 'the Aberbach study'), entitled Bureaucrats and Politicians in 
Western Democracies, was an extensive comparison of two powerful 
elites: the senior civil servants and politicians. As an informed analysis of 
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politicians and civil servants in Europe and America (even though more 
than a quarter of a century has elapsed since it was concluded) this 
pioneering work is obviously of great relevance to this present study of 
South Africa. The main reason for analysing the Aberbach study is that not 
only did it cover the previous literature on comparative executives, but it 
also stimulated several related studies on the topic. The study could be an 
indispensable link to our understanding of the relationship between 
political and administrative office bearers, especially because it also 
recorded change in the character and power of civil servants from as early 
as 1870 (Aberbach et al., 1981:2).
The Aberbach study covered, in all, seven Western countries: Sweden, 
Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and the Netherlands. In 
this intensive exercise documenting the relationships between the two 
groups, about 900 higher civil servants and over 500 politicians serving as 
political executives (ministers) were interviewed (Aberbach et al., 
1981:26). In addition, they interviewed more than 150 younger 
administrators whom they called "high-fliers" — promising young civil 
servants in five of the countries in their study (not Sweden or the United 
States), (Aberbach et al., 1981:269-270n). The study was also an attempt 
to understand how the aims, attitudes and ambitions of these individuals 
differed in different cultural settings.
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In its detailed analysis and comparison of political executives and senior 
civil servants, the Aberbach study focused on certain features of its 
respondents, notably their biographies and careers. This also included 
their family backgrounds and social origins, age and tenure in 
government, gender composition and the interviewees' own perceptions 
on what they understood to be the proper roles of senior civil servants 
(Aberbach et al, 1981:241-242). The researchers also studied the roles of 
these actors in relation to technical matters and partisan political issues in 
their respective spheres of operation. As these writers emphasised, both 
political executives and senior civil servants engaged in politics — broadly 
defined — though with a different approach. They summarised this, saying 
that the elected politicians, "are rather polarized ideologically, hold strong 
and coherent views about the proper role of the state in social 
reform...The civil servants are no less consistent ideologically, but their 
consistency is centrist, seeing a certain inevitability about the existing 
direction of policy" (1981:242).
The perceptions of both ministerial politicians and senior civil servants 
about the principles of equality and liberty were also considered by the 
Aberbach study to be important. It assumed that such perceptions largely 
influenced the behaviour of politicians and senior civil servants in the 
policy-making process (Aberbach et al., 1981:242). Senior civil servants 
and politicians, the study observed, "[were] fundamentally sympathetic to 
the principles of liberty and equality that comprise the ideal of 
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representative democracy." Unlike the politicians, senior civil servants 
were thought to be more sceptical "...that the ideal of political equality 
should be pushed very far." While the politicians were critical of the status 
quo and generally inclined to make proposals for political reform, senior 
civil servants appeared to be more cautious about political reform and 
were more likely to be content with the status quo (Aberbach et al., 
1981:242-243).
Overall, the politicians and senior civil servants in the Aberbach study 
were seen as "energizers" and "equilibrators", respectively. Energizer 
politicians had pro-reform inclinations and attitudes towards policy-making 
whereas equilibrator civil servants emphasised the maintenance of the 
status quo (Aberbach eta/., 1981:242-243). These assumptions could still 
be relevant today, but a reverse phenomenon could be described in the 
case of some developed countries — notably Britain. For instance, the 
politicians in both the Thatcher-Major period and the Blair government 
since 1997 could be described as energizers because of the many reforms 
that they have introduced into the UK civil service.
As is often the case with comparative studies, the danger of over­
generalization always lurks in the background. However, Aberbach and his 
colleagues made serious attempts to avoid this peril. For instance, they 
constantly cautioned their readers about the exceptional nature of the 
American political system (Aberbach et al., 1981:243). The United States 
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political system was an exception because "...the worlds of the two elites 
much more [in that country] than in Europe" (Aberbach et 
al., 1981:243). However, even with reference to Western Europe, these 
researchers made many attempts to indicate the peculiarities of the 
different country case studies. This was done particularly in the cases of 
Sweden, France and — to a certain extent — the then West Germany, 
whose senior civil servants often included political appointees.
In its search for a formula to describe the interaction the politicians and 
senior civil servants, the Aberbach study outlined four basic models (or 
'images') in an attempt to summarise this relationship. Table 2.1 depicts 
their ideas on the evolving roles of Western politicians and senior civil 
servants.
As can be seen from Table 2.1, politicians and civil servants share certain 
roles and responsibilities whilst engaging in operations that are quite 
distinct, depending on the assumptions of each image or model. ■ Image I 
is, quite clearly, the classical Weberian and Wilsonian model that posits 
the separation of politics from administration. The classical models of 
administration in the 1920s and 1930s centred around three concepts: 
organisational hierarchy (Weber) the separation of politics and 
administration (Wilson) and the efficiency ideas of Frederick W. Taylor 
(Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:8). Woodrow Wilson, an American 
political scholar (later, US President) had published in 1887 an influential
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S = Shared responsibility 
(Source: Aberbach et al., 1981:239).
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paper whose main assertion was that the separation of politics and 
administration was not only feasible but necessary. Taylor could have 
attempted to develop these ideas when he hypothesised that 'man' 
(employees) could be made as efficient as a machine. "The key 
contribution that Wilson made to 'classical' [administrative] theory was a 
belief that administration [was a]...non-political activity [that] could be 
carried out on the basis of objective principles of scientific rationality" 
(Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980:16). Such ideas were later developed 
and challenged by later scholars. As the Aberbach study (p.5) aptly put it, 
the Weberian-Wilsonian model "...of the division of labour between 
politicians and bureaucrats exalts the glittering authority of the former 
and cloaks the role of the latter in gray robes of anonymous neutrality."
Thus, it could be said that Image I might have initially provided a useful — 
though limited — description of the formal interaction between the two 
sets of policy-makers in the countries covered by the Aberbach study. 
Beyond this, however, the model cannot fully explain the behaviour of 
modern political and administrative executives. Aberbach eta/., (1981:6) 
have said that "Image I assumes a degree of hierarchy of authority, of 
simplicity of decision and of effective political supremacy that now seems 
unrealistic to students of modern government." They have added that 
while it could still be regarded as a useful description of the situation at 
the lower levels of government operations, this model is only a limited 
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explanation of what happens at the more senior levels between politicians 
and civil servants.
Image II assumes that politicians and civil servants both participate in 
policy-making "... but that they make distinctive contributions. Civil 
servants bring facts and knowledge; politicians, interests and values." 
Thus, politicians are said to add political sensitivity while civil servants 
contribute neutral expertise to the political process in this model that 
makes for a distinction between "political rationality" and "administrative 
rationality" (Aberbach et al., 1981:6-7). Notably, these writers have said 
that Image II found some resonance in their empirical evidence. However, 
they also showed that this model has certain limitations, adding that 
critics have seriously questioned its accuracy (Aberbach et al., 1981: 8). 
One such critic has said that "...the increasing educational standards and 
professionalization of politicians reduces the plausibility of Image Il's 
suggestion that bureaucrats monopolize expertise" (Putnam, 1976:205­
207, cited in Aberbach etal, 1981:8).
Image III posits that "...both bureaucrats and politicians engage in 
policymaking and both are concerned with politics. The real distinction 
between them is this: whereas politicians articulate broad, diffuse 
interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused 
interests of organized clienteles" (Aberbach et al., 1981:9, emphasis in 
original). Image III — more like the previous models — essentially 
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describes the relationship between politicians and civil servants as a 
dichotomy. According to Rose (1974) the main limitation of this model is 
that it fails to explain the fact that "In practice, policy-making usually 
develops dialectically; both politicians and civil servants review political 
and administrative implications of a major policy" (Rose, cited in Aberbach 
et al., 1981:10). Another criticism of Image III is that it largely ignores 
unorganised political and other interests (Aberbach et al., 1981:10). Thus 
the Aberbach study looked for another (hopefully more reliable) model, 
'Image IV', to define the association between politicians and senior civil 
servants.
According to the Aberbach study (p.16) the fourth model is "the pure 
hybrid", and is distinct from the other three images. Unlike Image IV, all 
the previous three models "...suggest[ed] a progressively greater degree 
of overlap between the roles of bureaucrat and politician...[and] the 
intellectual origins of the three conceptions [were] progressively more 
recent." They added that Image I basically related to the second half of 
the nineteenth century in which the relationship between politicians and 
senior civil servants was characterised by a clear Weberian distinction 
between the two actors. Image II has been dated to the first half of the 
twentieth century, a period in which "...a certain policy-making role for 
civil servants' was envisaged in the government process. Image III, 
'...which concede[d] to bureaucrats a rather more 'political' role, ha[d] 
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been extracted from writings of the last several decades" (Aberbach eta/., 
1981:16) — that is, the mid twentieth century.
The Aberbach study's Image IV marked a significant departure from their 
previous models. The writers cautiously stated that there was a 
progression from the previous models to Image IV, adding that:
Assuming a rough, if lagged, correspondence between 
government realities and scholarly interpretations, this 
progression is at least consistent with the notion that in 
behavioural terms the two roles [of politicians and 
bureaucrats] have been converging — perhaps reflecting, as 
some have argued, a 'politicization' of the bureaucracy and a 
'bureaucratization' of the politics (Aberbach etal, 1981:16).
Taking this notion of convergence into consideration, Image IV was the 
central model of the Aberbach study. Thus, this model could be regarded 
as the starting point from which further studies on this topic would be 
examined. This model was quite significant considering that many studies 
were, around the time of the Aberbach study, still preoccupied with the 
politics-administration dichotomy debate. They added, notably, that 
"...ever since the appearance of cabinets responsible to parliaments (or 
presidents), ministers have occupied a Janus-like role at the top of 
departments, facing simultaneously inward as administrators and outward 
as political leaders, though perhaps giving special attention to one or the 
other facet of their complex role. But the trend that we are here 
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addressing extends well beyond the long-established dualistic position of 
the minister" (Aberbach etal., 1981:16-17).
Their other findings were that "...Western civil services . have become 
increasingly specialised, highly profesionalized, and unquestionably 
powerful — a cadre of experts in the running of the modern state" 
(Aberbach et al., 1982:3). Certainly, issues of specialisation, 
professionalism and power — as highlighted in the Aberbach study — 
arose in my interviews in South Africa. In addition, Aberbach et al., 
carefully outlined the distinctions between what they called the 
'superbureaucrats' and traditional civil servants (Aberbach etal., 1981:18, 
citing Campbell and Szablowski, 1979). The 'superbureaucrats,' differed 
from the traditional civil servants:
...in the broader, more flexible authority they enjoy[ed]; in 
their greater social representativeness and substantive 
innovativeness; and in their recognition of the legitimacy of 
politics — not merely in the sense of responsiveness to 
clientele interests, but in the broader sense that Image III 
ascribe[d] to politicians alone (Aberbach eta/., 1981:18).
The last statement refers specifically to Canada (Campbell and 
Szablowskis 1979 study), which was not covered by the Aberbach study 
although it could have been similar to other cases that were analysed by 
the Aberbach study's collaborators. Aberbach and his colleagues 
suggested that their convergence hypothesis might mark the demise of 
what they called the "Weberian epoch of modern government." As 
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indicated at the b^mmng °f this chapter, the Aberbach study assumed 
that the roles of the politicians and the top officials were gradually 
merging, suggesting greater sharing of responsibilities. This is suggested 
particularly by their comment that, "if circumstances perhaps have led 
bureaucrats in the industrial democracies to become more sensitized to 
political concerns, they also may have moved political leaders to become 
increasingly familiar with administrative and technical aspects of policy 
problems" (Aberbach et al., 1981:85). Nevertheless, they cautioned that 
"...pure hybrids are still relatively rare in most countries, and are typically 
found in novel niches such as cabinet offices, ministerial cabinets, and 
legislative staffs..." (Aberbach et al., 1981:20). In spite of this caution, 
however, the outlooks of politicians and civil servants may well have since 
developed further, given the considerable period of time that has elapsed 
since their study was conducted.
Aberbach and his colleagues made thought-provoking comments about 
the situation of the developing countries, arguing that:
...Although most countries in the Third World today have 
organizations labelled 'legislatures,' 'parties' and 
'bureaucracies', in few of these systems is power actually 
divided between elected politicians and career administrators' 
(Aberbach et al., 1981:3).
The present study has sought to assess South Africa's situation in the light 
of these comments, particularly the extent to which such division of power 
70
affects the ^ucture of the dvN service and the perspectives of the top 
officials within it. Perhaps it might be too early to say whether the above­
stated comments apply in the South African case, given the unfolding 
transition to democracy in the country.
The Aberbach study's 'most striking and unexpected findings' were "...that 
civil servants, more than parliamentary politicians, [were] interest brokers 
in the national politics [of the countries they studied]" (p.91). This, 
however, is not immediately apparent when the models presented in Table 
2.1 are closely examined. According to those models, politicians were 
presented as the sole interest brokers only in Image I and Image II, 
whereas they shared this responsibility with bureaucrats in Image III and 
Image IV. Nevertheless, how far this applies to South Africa — and which 
model could be said to depict closely the reality of the situation in this 
country — will be a consideration below, as part of the analysis of this 
present study's data, for example in Chapters Six and Seven.
The Aberbach study reached two main conclusions concerning the nature 
of the relationships between politicians and senior civil servants. These 
were that "...politicians articulate society's dreams, and bureaucrats help 
bring them gingerly to earth" (Aberbach etal., 1981:262). This seemingly 
conciliatory summary of their views essentially emphasized that politicians 
are best at policy advocacy whereas senior civil servants work best on 
implementation. These comments clearly suggested the existence of 
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amicable interaction between the two sets of actors, but whether such 
interaction differed significantly from that of Aberbach et al.'s first three 
models was not specified.
They further said, referring to the classical (Weberian/Wilsonian) models, 
that "the earliest theory about the relationship between politicians and 
bureaucrats was in many ways the simplest: politicians make policy; civil 
servants administer. Politicians make decisions; bureaucrats merely 
implement them" (Aberbach et al., 1981:4). This was a simple re­
statement of the politics-administration dichotomy whose application is 
practically quite complicated, as discussed below. However, Aberbach et 
al., (1981:93) rejected this earliest model which they presented as Image 
I (Table 2.1).
Their conclusion could be seen as an attempt to resuscitate the old 
'politics-administration' controversy surrounding this model. This model 
was an ' attempt to address what was then perceived as the problematic 
and often antagonistic relationships between politicians and senior 
administrators. The idea was initiated mostly by earlier American scholars, 
among others, Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, Woodrow Wilson and 
Frank Goodnow (Aberbach et al., 1981:85). These and other scholars had 
argued that there was a need to separate what was then perceived as the 
world of politics from the world of administration. However, these classical 
ideas have since been challenged and subsequently prompted lengthy 
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debates and further rese^ch on the retedonsWpis between polit^al and 
administrative executives (see Peters, 1984; Farazmand, 1997 and 
Williams, 1988). The model mapped out the operational terrain for both 
the politicians and their subordinates — the non-political (non-elected) 
administrative heads of departments and ministries. As was highlighted 
above, the model suggested that the politicians and the senior civil 
servants operated in neatly and clearly defined policy environments, which 
is not the case.
A recent study (Raadschelders and Rutgers, in Bekke et al., 1996:66-69) 
re-visited the politics-administration dichotomy model. The writers have 
argued that this model, "provided another basis upon which a modern civil 
service could develop" (Raadschelders and Rutgers, citing Chester, 
1981:315; Hattenhauer, 1989:151; Nelson, 1982:113; and Parris, 
1969:33). These writers have suggested that the convergence notion (of 
Aberbach, et al.) is not a new concept. They have said that, "up to the end 
of the eighteenth century it was common for higher functionaries to 
perform both administrative and political tasks...the concepts of 
government and administration [as we know them today] were not yet 
distinct. Notions regarding the division of power were very influential in 
this respect. Once the fields of administration and politics had been 
demarcated, a modern civil service could develop" (Raadschelders and 
Rutgers, in Bekke et al., 1996:89). This, however, does not seem to 
invalidate the modern convergence tteste Nsdf.
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The idea that politics ran be separated from admmfctration is unrealistic 
because, as Peters has stated, "...what appears administrative may 
actually be political, and that those who make administrative decisions do 
so for political reasons. The politics involved are the protection and 
promotion of organized interests rather than the promotion of one political 
party over another, but they are politics nevertheless" (Peters, 1984:4, 
citing Allison, 1972). Dunsire (1993:257) further alluded to this point. 
Thus it could be said that the politics-administration dichotomy model was 
perhaps relevant in the past as a conceptual tool of analysis but that the 
model is less helpful today for explaining the operational environment of 
politicians and top civil servants.
The Aberbach study covered many important variables that will continue 
to be relevant to writers on the subject of politicians and senior civil 
servants. Overall, its findings could be generalised to many other Western 
countries, in spite of the national idiosyncrasies which the study so ably 
documented. The four images outlined are, largely, helpful conceptual 
tools for analysing the behaviour between politicians and administrative 
elites. In particular, the assumptions of their Image IV are quite 
remarkable because they suggest a possible shift from the traditional 
behaviour and thinking patterns of the two groups of policy-makers 
towards those characterised greatly by convergence.
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The contrition of the Aberbach study to our understanding of the 
relationship between the higher civN servke and politicians was most 
important. They made a serious attempt to present a balanced analysis on 
a topic that could be as complicated as the working environment of the 
public officials they studied. Throughout their book, they constantly 
cautioned the reader against overlooking what they have called the 
'American aberration', meaning the peculiar features of that country's 
political system (Aberbach et al., 1981:94). This emphasis, however, 
could have had an even greater effect had the writers done likewise on 
the French case which was highlighted less than the American, Swedish 
and German examples although France also has its peculiarities 
(Suleiman, 1974). Nevertheless, and more remarkably, these authors 
made attempts to explain the possible role of ideology in influencing the 
behaviour and perspectives of their respondents (Aberbach et al., 
19181:168). Therefore, their findings were crucial as they help researchers 
to make reasonable assumptions about the nature of the higher civil 
services and politicians even in those countries not covered by this 
detailed study (including other west European countries).
However, the study has certain limitations that call for further research on 
the issue of the senior civil service in government machineries. Its major 
limitation, particularly in the context of the present research, is that the 
study covered developed countries only. Therefore, not all its 
generalisations and findings may be applicable to developing countries 
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such as South Africa. In their sole reference to the 'Third World', Aberbach 
and Ns c°lleagues added that, "In fart, mstitutionaHzation of mass-based 
parties and of professionally staffed bureaucracies is widely taken to be 
the hallmark of a modern political system" (1981:3). This could be true 
only insofar as it does not suggest that such political parties and 
bureaucracies exist in the developed countries alone. Also, it is less 
surprising that the study found an overlap in the environment in which the 
political and administrative elites operate, although this was said to be 
much more visible in the United States than in Europe.
My own uncertainty over the practical manifestation of their model is 
strengthened by the question mark between their last two 'images' (Table 
2.1) and by their concluding remarks that, "it is clear that no single 
formula has yet been discovered for ensuring a creative dialogue between 
politicians and bureaucrats, nor are we as yet certain how such a dialogue 
would affect policy performance" (Aberbach et al., 1981:262). While they 
denied that the politicisation of the higher civil service necessarily reduces 
its expertise, they equally expressed concern on what they saw as the 
long-term effects of "...greater reliance on political credentials for 
administrative appointments... (Aberbach et al., 1981.260-261). To this 
extent, it could be surmised that further and more extensive research in 
both developed and developing countries needs to be conducted before 
the validity of the Aberbach study's convergence model could be accepted 
as broadly applicable.
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Other scholars have als° attempted to analyse the re^honship between 
pollticians and top administrative officials, notably Ezra Suleiman on the 
French case. He stated that there were two common views on the role of 
the civil service in different political systems at the time of conducting his 
research (Suleiman, 1974:3-4). These were that the civil service was 
totally subordinate to the political institutions (major examples being the 
UK and the US) or that it was all-powerful, for instance in France or other 
continental European countries. These issues are not the focus of this 
present study on South Africa, but in future it will be interesting to assess 
these two perspectives in relation to South Africa's civil service. 
Suleiman's work, unlike the Aberbach study, focused on "civil servants 
who occupy the highest posts in the politico-administrative system, thus 
excluding other high civil servants lower in the hierarchy..." (Suleiman, 
1974:7).
However, unlike the Aberbach study, Suleiman's project was not an 
intensive one. In what I feel could assist in analysing the South African 
case, Suleiman's study found that "The changing roles and role 
perceptions of the higher civil servants...suggest that there is a 
considerable degree of functional autonomy which influences behaviour" 
(Suleiman, 1974:235). In the South African context, as in many countries, 
such functional autonomy has been underpinned by and subject to 
constitutional and other legal provisions regulating the behaviour of the 
civil service. Suleiman's main contribution is on what he called the "role 
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perceptions" of civil servants, referring to the officials' own explanation of 
their roles. This term is useful as it stresses the importance of obtaining 
data about the roles and structure of the senior civil service from the high 
officials themselves. He cited two factors, education and training, which 
appeared to be particularly remarkable in the French civil service. These 
factors are also important to this thesis but have only been cited here in 
an attempt to explain the perspectives of the senior civil servants on the 
current changes in South Africa: might they feel that their education and 
training are now less valued when appointments and promotions are 
made?
Farazmand reviewed the work of several scholars in public administration 
and classified it into three categories that he believed could explain the 
relationship between politicians and administrators (Farazmand, 1997:xi). 
First was the classical Weberian approach with its stress on the politics­
administration dichotomy. Second was the "dualist and integrationist" 
approach that recognised that "The relationship between bureaucrats and 
politicians is mixed and interactive" (Farazmand, 1997:xi). This approach 
further assumed that "public administration theory is political theory also," 
emphasising the need to promote the utility of administrative officials and 
to reconcile them with democracy. This approach rejected both the 
politics-administration dichotomy and the fear of the senior civil service 
stimulated by Weber's model. Instead, the focus was on the positive and 
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professional rede of the non-elected offices (Farazmand, 1997:xib citing 
Heclo, 1977; Levine, 1985; Long, 1949, 1952; and Waldo, 1981,1986).
The third approach that he identified was "developing and gaining 
increased attention": it accorded the high-level administrative officials 
some autonomy in relation to politicians. It emphasised the constitutional 
empowerment of the career administrators as 'actors in the governing 
process' (Farazmand, 1997:xii, citing Wamsley, et al. 1987:43, 1992). 
Accordingly, this would "promote broad general public interests and 
prevent politicians' potential abuses of power and privilege..." 
(Farazmand, 1997:xii, citing Friedrich, 1940; Goodsell, 1994; and Rohr, 
1986).
Peters (1997) has also contributed to this debate,offering five models that 
are very similar to Aberbach et al.'s (1981) Images. He has argued that 
the relationship between politicians and higher officials is a continuum. On 
the extreme ends of this continuum are (i) the Weberian/Wilsonian model 
and (ii) what Peters called the "administrative state" (Peters, 1997:235­
236). Between these two extremes are the other three: the "adversarial", 
"village life" and "functional village life" models. His adversarial model 
assumes a substantial separation between the two sets of decision­
makers. The village life model posits that the politicians and senior civil 
servants should not be seen as being in conflict with each other; rather, 
they should be seen as "two components of a single group serving the 
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state and tine public." The functional village Hfe model "...assinries the 
same integration but only within specific functional areas of government" 
(Peters, 1997:230). On the other hand, his administrative state model 
visualised the senior civil service as "a dominant partner" in a 
dichotomous relationship between the two sets of public actors. However, 
like Weber, he also saw these models as ideal types (Peters, citing 
Giddens, 1971). His contribution to the debate on political administrative 
elites is that he examined the applicability of each of his models to both 
parliamentary and presidential systems of government. This was in an 
attempt to find out how the form of government affects the link between 
these two sets of public officials (Peters, 1997:236).
Another study, by Dogan (1975a) concerned the political role of very 
senior Western civil servants. He likened them to the mandarins of 
Imperial China whom he said were "hybrid" personalities as they 
performed "half-political" and "half-administrative" tasks (Dogan, 1975a: 
41). Dogan stated that "...the highest level in the central public 
administration [is] a level where the separation between politics and 
administration becomes artificial or, better said, where political power and 
administrative action merge" (Dogan, 1975a. 1, citing LaPalombara, 
1963:14). The senior civil service, he added, "...will always be deeply 
involved in the political process. Indeed, it is impossible even in the most 
statutorily differentiated political system to conceive of a complete 
separation of functions" (Dogan, 1975a:41). He concluded, like Aberbach 
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et al. (1981), that "These two functions — the p°litical and the 
administrative — are merging at the top of the hierarchies in nearly every 
Western European country" (Dogan, 1975a:5). He attributed this to two 
main explanations: the increasing scope of the modern state and the 
decline of legislatures.
Christoph's study of the British case focused on "...the tiny group known 
until 1971 as the Administrative Class, the highest echelon of the [civil] 
service whose members [were] principally involved in making and 
implementing policy and dealing directly with political officials (ministers, 
junior ministers, parliamentary secretaries)." At that time, this 
administrative class "numbered about 2,800 in 1968, or less than one-half 
percent of all the civil servants" (Christoph, 1972: 27). He noted that the 
British senior civil servants were gradually becoming sensitised to the 
political environment. The senior civil servants, he added, were becoming 
involved in various processes the scope of which were:
...bound to sensitize civil servants to the political world in 
which they are imbedded. While they adhere as strongly as 
ever to the view that their roles must be politically neutral and 
non-partisan, in the sense of their serving ministers of 
whatever political stripe, higher civil servants are beginning to 
cast off the myth that what they do stands apart from politics, 
that their job is simply that of administering policies elsewhere 
or of tidying up in the name of practical realism, the loose 
formulations of politicians (Christoph, 1972. 30).
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Such observations deaHy support the Aberbach study's convergence 
notion as earlier stated. Referring to Putnam's (1975) study on the 
political attitudes of senior civil servants in Western Europe, Christoph has 
added that "...in Britain the performance of a finite number of political 
roles by bureaucrats is generally accepted as legitimate by the political 
elites and wider public" (Christoph, 1972: 45). However, like Dogan 
(1975b), he has concluded that "...what British civil servants do falls short 
of being 'total politics', just as it does of being 'total administration"' 
(Christoph, 1972: 51).
This chapter has attempted to analyse the leading item in the literature on 
comparative executives — the Aberbach study — in its context of earlier 
studies (notably Weber's). The views of other authors have been used to 
assess the Aberbach study's main idea, which suggests that the roles of 
the contemporary political and administrative elites are converging. As 
was stated at the beginning of this chapter, Aberbach et al.'s (1981) 
detailed study on the elites in selected industrialised countries may be 
regarded as a fundamental contribution to this field of study. Some of 
their ideas, notably their convergence thesis, have been re-visited with 
the aim of understanding the relationship between the politicians and the 
senior civil servants.
It has emerged from the literature on political and administrative officials 
that this area is contentious among scholars because they have often 
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dif^ered on how best to study and understand the relationship between 
these two sets of policy makers. Some scholars have studied the senior 
civil servants alone whereas others have focused solely on the politicians; 
still others analysed the two sets of public actors jointly. This present 
study on South Africa attempts the joint approach, although with much 
greater emphasis on senior civil servants emerging as its practical 
outcome because they formed nearly all of the 190 interview subjects.
Perhaps we may conclude, with Yves Meny, that there is an "osmosis 
between the administrative and political sectors" (Meny, 1993:323). He 
stated that the "...political and bureaucratic elites belong more or less to 
the same world. There is more than one way of interpreting confusion 
between the political and administrative sectors" (Meny, 1993:322). 
Similarly, and following Dunsire, it may be added that the roles and 
responsibilities of the senior civil service are quite likely to be "...greatly 
influenced by the perceptions of the senior civil service themselves of how 
these roles ought to be" (Dunsire, 1993:274-5). This, of course, does not 
overlook the effect that politicians have on the perspectives of the senior 
civil servants.
In conclusion, this chapter has outlined a justification of this study, 
touching on the officials' perspectives on current changes and the possible 
influence of their roles and responsibilities within departmental structures 
on these perspectives. It has also reviewed recent South African civil
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service reform issues, notably 'representivity' and the integration of the 
"ex-departments" (notably the former black homelands). A review of the 
related academic literature followed. Some of the issues that have been 
highlighted in this chapter — such as the relevance of Weber's model, and 
Aberbach et al.'s (1981) convergence concept — serve as the groundwork 
for the next chapter on the civil service in South Africa.
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Chapter Three
The South African Senior Civil Service: Structure, Roles 
and Perpectives Before and Since 1994
3.1 An Overview of the Apartheid Era Civil Service
This chapter attempts to examine the past and current civil services of 
South Africa. It will be argued in the first section that the apartheid-era 
civil service was a crucial element, indeed the main player, in the 
implementation of the many racial laws that were applied during this 
period. I shall evaluate the relationships between the senior civil servants 
and the politicians at that time — focusing on how the politicians 
influenced the perspectives and operations of the civil servants. The 
second section will outline the present South African civil service, with a 
brief look at the administrative structure, in an attempt to determine how 
far the apartheid era structure has influenced the current one. In Chapter
3.2 the post-1994 structure of the civil service will be examined in an 
attempt to explain its role in South Africa's transition to democracy.
One of the challenges of conducting research on the apartheid era civil 
service is that there is limited information on the public sector, especially 
the civil service, because of the tight veil of secrecy on government 
operations during much of that era. A typical example that encouraged the 
general clampdown on freedom of expression was the countrywide state 
of emergency that was declared by the South African government in June 
1986 This resulted in severe restrictions on the national and foreign 
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media — particular1y on reports about what the state calted political 
unrest. During this period, the apartheid regime "...imprisoned, without 
trial or charge, a large but indeterminate number of ...people, the vast 
majority of whom were black and therefore not [defined as] citizens of 
their own state [according to the racial legislation then in force]" (Harris, 
1988:3). Schrire (1996) has made the following observations about the 
nature of South Africa's past political order:
The history of South Africa's polity is dominated by the use of 
political power to attain and maintain socio-economic ends. A 
white minority inherited political power in 1910 and during the 
next eight decades used this power to entrench itself politically 
and to enhance its economic, cultural and social interests 
(Schrire, 1996: 59-50).
This means that, before 1948 and during the apartheid era, many laws 
were passed to enforce racial segregation in all facets of South African life 
— including the civil service. Perhaps observations such as Schrire's might 
also be relevant to the present period, because the balance of power has 
since changed dramatically in favour of the former victims of apartheid — 
if mostly in only political terms. As Posel comments, "Labour relations 
within the apartheid bureaucracy have not been the focus of much 
research in and of themselves; nor has the apartheid bureaucracy more 
generally attracted great analytical attention (Posel, 1999. 100). She 
adds that the few available studies on the past civil service "...focusfed] 
primarily on the upper echelons of the civil service, underlining the 
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awesome powers of the senior bureaucrats to run their ministers and to 
shape the policy-making process" (Posel, 1999: 100, referring to Adam 
and Giliomee, 1979; Baxter, 1994; Norval, 1996 and O'Meara, 1996). 
Analysed from this angle, the apartheid era civil service seems to have 
exercised tremendous power and influence in the policy-making process of 
that period. It would appear from these observations that the South 
African senior civil service also played a much greater role than in some of 
the countries cited in Chapter Two, such as France and the UK. In her 
analysis of the power of the apartheid civil service, Posel (1999: 111) 
underlines the significance of this role, and states that:
The massive expansion of the apparatuses of the state, the 
vast complexity of the apartheid system and the strongly 
administrative bias of much of apartheid legislation, all 
contributed to the enormous powers wielded by civil servants. 
Their support, co-operation and commitment were absolutely 
essential for the daily functioning of apartheid.
It would appear from this analysis that the civil servants in Posel's study 
were more "energizers" and less "equlibrators" as suggested by Aberbach 
et al., (1981). This explanation seems, however, to overstate the capacity 
of the civil service, as formally defined, because other external forces — 
notably the Broederbond, as will be explained later in this section also 
influenced and manipulsted that civil service.
The civil service of the apartheid period was structured according to the 




3. Professional (in the case of the civH serv^e, primarily lawyers).
4. Technical
5. General A (other officials with the school-leaving matriculation 
qualification).
6. General B (non-matriculants)
7. Services
• Non-classified positions.
The apartheid administration was clearly hierarchical. However, the 
structure does not suggest much about the powers and responsibilities of 
each category, such as the Administrative, Clerical and Professional ranks.
This present study focuses on the perspectives of the senior 
administrative decision-makers: DGs down to Assistant Directors' levels. 
There does not seem to be a clear comparison between the grades of the 
apartheid government structure in the list above and those of the present 
system. The administrative divisions of the past included the highest 
grade (departmental Secretaries) and their deputies, accountants and 
other administrative officials who functioned as the supervisors of the 
clerical officials, and the majority of the officials in the General A and B 
Divisions. "On the eve of the National Party's political take-over [1947-8] 
there were 26 government departments; by 1970, this figure had 
increased to 41" (Posel, 1999:104, citing Roux, 1971). This considerable
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increase might have been intended by the National Party to alter 
significantly the rom^siton and mcHnations of the civil service.
Thus, in the 1970s P.W. Botha's government "announced the need for a 
'thorough-going reorganization' of the civil service..." (Posel, 1999: 110). 
This followed the perennial crises then facing the civil service — because 
of the incessant resignations and the resultant staff-shortages. Another 
reason for this move appears to have been the constant tug-of-war 
between the hard-liners (Verkramptes) and the moderates (Verligtes) over 
policy direction, which was discernible throughout much of the apartheid 
era. At that time, government departments had been very slightly reduced 
to 39.
With the coming to power of Botha, this reorganization saw the further 
reduction of government departments from 39 to 22. Botha also saw to 
the creation of a new rank — that of DG, a "super-management position 
— to replace the position of departmental Secretary." The new position 
was intended to attract fresh talent, with higher salary and benefits which 
were intended to compete favourably with those of the private sector. This 
change is said to have brought about the development of "new modes of 
management" but, apart from this, "Botha's strategy could be read as 
more of a political manoeuvre to marginalize right-wing opposition within 
the civil service than a thorough-going programme of rationalization and 
restructuring" (posel, 1999: H0).
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Botha s reforms would certainly have cast hum as an energizer p°litician 
(in the language of Aberbach et al., 1981) but he could equally have been 
seen as an equilibrator owing to his conservatism, particularly on the issue 
of releasing Mandela and the abolition of apartheid. An observer has 
stated that, "Despite his tough-man reputation, he [Botha] was 
considered to be a member of the 'verligte' (enlightened) branch of the 
National Party" (Riley, 1991: 219). This appears to have led to Botha's 
commitment to the introduction of a new constitution in 1984. The limited 
power sharing that resulted from this constitution excluded blacks, but the 
arrangement was intended — through the 'tri-cameral' parliament that 
emanated from it — to give coloureds and Asians a greater say in the 
running of the country (Riley, 1991: 219).
Botha's reorganization of the civil service, indeed appears to have been 
aimed at the advancement of the NP's agenda. His efforts hint at the 
influence and power of the apartheid politicians over the senior civil 
service. In fact, it has been stated that his reforms gave the politicians 
"...an opportunity to reconfigure power relations in the top echelons of the 
civil service" (Posel, 1999: 110, citing O'Meara, 1996). Following this, 
some senior civil servants formerly "considered obstructionist" to Botha's 
so-called restructuring, "found their authority superseded by newly- 
appointed Directors-General drawn from outside the civil service while 
compliant Secretaries could be rewarded with internal promotions to the 
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same positions" (Posel, 19": l10). This subtle use of the carrot and stick 
strategy possibly resulted in many of the new appointees becoming 
members of the covert Broederbond, whose activities will be explained 
shortly. Such restructuring could also have been one of the main 
grievances of many white senior civil servants during Botha's era, and 
possibly throughout the apartheid years.
According to Posel (1999), the roles of the apartheid era civil servants 
were constrained by four (possibly interrelated) factors. Firstly, the senior 
civil servants had to act in accordance with the National Party's mandate 
of implementing the racial laws. Judging from Posel's analysis, it seems 
that white civil servants were almost unanimous in their pursuit of this 
goal — given the benefits that would accrue to whites overall, and 
Afrikaners in particular. However, this unanimity and apparent 
contentment of the white civil servants was a paradox in itself: while they 
appeared to be content with the sheltered employment conditions that 
they enjoyed, they could not do much about the way the state treated 
them. A point in case was the civil servants' deep "disaffection with the 
system of wage determination", which excluded collective bargaining but 
allowed "joint consultation between the Public Service Commission (PSC) 
and the various personnel bodies of white civil servants that existed at the 
time" (Posel, 1999: 112). (The role of the PSC will be analysed next.) 
Thus, "By 1973 feelings were running very high amongst [white] civil 
servants" (Posel, 1999: 114). Widespread "discontent among public 
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servants in almost every major state department..." was reported in the 
media. The main issue was "...the Cabinet's administrative policy and 
other interference by the Cabinet in the running of internal public 
servants' affairs" and such disaffection fuelled speculation of an imminent 
state of rebellion in the civil service (Posel, 1999: 114, citing the Sunday 
Express, 14/10/73).
The second and third factors — the roles of the Public Services 
Commission and those of the Public Service Association — should be 
tackled together because they closely regulated the operations of the 
senior civil servants and also dealt with matters affecting the lower 
grades. "In terms of the 1957 Public Services Act, the PSC was actually 
responsible for civil service appointments within the central state 
authorities. On paper, South Africa's Public Services Commission was 
intended to function in much the same vein as similar institutions 
elsewhere in the world" (Posel, 1999: 113). The PSC's "job was to protect 
and police the neutrality of the public service." In practice, however, the 
law was completely ignored, as thousands of Afrikaner public servants 
remained loyal and active participants in the National Party (Posel, 1999: 
114-115). The PSC was originally intended to ensure impartiality and 
avoid nepotism and unfair appointments (at least among white public 
servants); but in practice, as Posel added, "impartiality and fairness did 
no rank among the PSC's strong pdnts.
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Another body that related the of the aidministrative ^ficia^
was the Pubic Service Association (PSA), formed in 1920. The PSA was 
"the single largest organization representing the interests of white public 
servants" (including the civil service) in South Africa (Posel, 1999: 105, 
116). In 1953, its membership was estimated at 23,000 but by 1981 this 
number had almost doubled, to 40,000. The PSA was not different from 
the PSC, except that the PSA dealt with the daily operations of the (white) 
civil servants at a lower level whereas the PSC dealt mostly with the 
senior levels and the politicians.
According to Posel (1999), most white civil servants were disenchanted 
with both the PSA and the PSC, which they regarded as being "useless". 
They particularly regarded the PSA as a "toothless organization" because 
of its apologetic and pliant stance towards personnel grievances, 
particularly in its dealings with the politicians. For its part, the PSC 
appears to have lost the respect of many white civil servants over the 
apartheid years because it was seen to be always attempting to suppress 
what they perceived as their genuine grievances. Subsequently, the senior 
civil servants began to take their complaints about their plight in the 
various departments directly to the opposition Members of Parliament, 
bypassing these two official or semi-official bodies (Posel, 1999: 114-15).
The Afrikaner Broederbond (League of Brothers) is the fourth factor that 
greatly influenced and perhaps even controlled the roles of the apartheid 
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era senior civil service. This body, which came to exert tremendous 
influence on government policy in the apartheid era (Beinart and Dubow, 
1995: 236), was a secret society formed in 1918. According to Nigel 
Worden, the Broederbond was dominated by intellectuals and clergy in the 
then Transvaal to mobilise political support for Afrikaner nationalism 
(Worden, 1994: 89). It has been stated that in 1944 the government 
banned civil servants from becoming members of right-wing Afrikaner 
organisations such as the Ossewabrandwag (Ox-wagon Guard) and 
belonging to the Broederbond (Riley, 1991). The former was formed in 
1939 "as a society to protect and foster the cultural, religious and material 
needs of the Afrikaners, but soon took on military overtones'' (Riley, 
1991: 11). At that time, General J.C. Smuts "described the Broederbond 
as a secret Fascist organization" (Riley, 1991: 11). This ban was lifted a 
few years later in 1948 when the NP came to power.
The Broederbond gradually became very influential in National Party 
circles and later formed numerous task forces, "the function of which was 
to monitor and police selected institutions and policy areas within the 
state." All the task forces included top civil servants loyal to the Bond's 
cause (Posel, 1999: 117, citing Strydom, 1973). One of the main 
strategies of the Bond was to place reliable people in key positions in the 
civil service and throughout the Afrikaner society (O'Meara, 1996: 44). It 
also recruited high-ranking civil servants into its ranks so that, "Several 
municipal Managers of Non-European Affairs and many of the more senior 
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labour bureaux officials...became Broeiderioond memtas" (P°sel, 1991: 
118)- Its activities became more apparent in the implementati°n of 
policies relating to the non-white racial groups, particularly Africans. As 
Worden observed the Broederbond in the late 1950s:
...held a much stronger position behind the scenes of decision­
making. Its members already influential in many branches of 
the government, it infiltrated the Native (renamed Bantu) 
Affairs Department (BAD) and also won over the South African 
Agricultural Union by advocating the limitation of urban 
African workers [in the 'white areas'] (Worden, 1994: 108).
The Native Affairs Department marginalised other departments in its close 
control of policy relating to black South Africans; eventually, the NAD 
became "the vanguard of apartheid policy-making within the state" as a 
result of the operations of the Broederbond (Posel, 1991: 6-7). Other 
observers traced "the working out of a segregationist ideology within the 
Native Affairs Department, documenting the ways in which the 
department consolidated and extended its powers" (O'Meara, 1996: 441, 
citing Dubow, 1989). It is therefore not surprising that the number of 
whites in the NAD rose dramatically during much of the apartheid era. 
Thus, "By 1960, the number of whites employed by the NAD exceeded 3, 
000, as compared with 1, 750 in 1948 (Posel, 1991: 64, quoting Lazar, 
1987).
The Broederbond intimidated white civil servants and many complained to 
opposition MPs about its "domination and interference in their professional 
95
Hves. They also fek that many dvH servtae appomtments were made 
solely on the grounds of Broederbond membership (Posel, 1999: 118, 
citing Rand Daily Mail, 10/01/72). The Broederbond was a clandestine 
body that was pervasive in virtually every arm of the apartheid 
establlshment — including the civil service. It is not possible to assess 
exactly how far the tentacles of this 'brotherhood' extended inside the civil 
service; neither is it possible to disentangle its activities in the whole civil 
service from those affecting only the roles of the senior civil service. 
Despite this, the limited information about its operations shows that many 
senior civil servants could not exercise impartiality. Similarly, their own 
initiatives over policy matters were compromised as long as they were 
subjected to the secret machinations of the Bond.
It was stated at the beginning of this chapter that the apartheid-era civil 
service was arguably the main vehicle for enforcing racist policies in South 
Africa. In fact, Posel (1999: 111) refers to that civil service as the 
'backbone of the apartheid state', in spite of the disenchantment and 
disaffection of many white civil servants during much of the apartheid era. 
In the black areas, particularly, the various departments that dealt with 
matters affecting black people were predominantly staffed by supporters 
of the ruling National Party (Posel, 1999: 100). Since coming to power in 
1948, this party had made a concerted attempt to implement racial 
segregation laws, based on its pre-election manifesto. Modern historians 
now state that "In the early stages of their legislative journey, the
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[Aft-toner] Nationalists had very real concerns about thek capacity to 
maintain power." Therefore, "They rapidly Afrikanerized the state both to 
provide jobs and to ensure a pliant bureaucracy. Key English-speakers in 
spheres such as the army, military intelligence...were sidelined or retired" 
(Beinart, 1994: 142). This brought about a radical shift in the
administrative culture of the civil service: an apartheid culture that would 
obviously pose problems as the ANC government began to dismantle the 
apartheid system in the mid-1990s.
The administrative culture of the former civil service was strongly 
influenced by patronage and sexist tendencies (Mokgoro, in Maphai 1994: 
122). In view of this, one of the challenges facing the present government 
is how to grapple with the consequences of this . culture. As Mokgoro 
added, such a culture meant that most of the civil servants spoke the 
same language (Afrikaans), went to the same church (Dutch Reformed), 
supported the same sporting codes (mainly rugby and cricket) and voted 
for the ' same political party (NP). It is also possible that such a culture 
largely encouraged the fragmentation of the South African civil service 
into what has been called the "many bureaucracies" of the apartheid era 
(Wallis, in Fitzgerald et al., 1995: 88). The official concept of the Republic 
of South Africa, as stated earlier, at that time excluded the so-called 
independent black homelands and the former self-governing territories, 
which were essentially dependent extensions of the apartheid ecHfice.
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Many legislative instruments were formulated by the apartheid regime to 
enforce racial segregation. The fohow^ could well have been the most 
important that the civil service had to enforce to perpetuate the system: 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949); the ^putetfon Registration Act 
(1950); Immorality Act (1950); Group Areas Act (1950); Bantu Education 
Act (1953); Native Resettlement Act (1954); Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act (1953); and the Job Reservation Act. The key question 
regarding these laws is exactly why the civil service — especially the top 
echelons — enforced such a wide array of repressive legislative 
instruments, particularly after apartheid had been declared an 
international crime against humanity by the UN General Assembly.
The Job Reservation Act specifically enforced segregation in the public (as 
in the private) sector. This racial employment system was upheld 
meticulously in the public sector, resulting in the predominance of a white 
Afrikaner male culture in the civil service (Mokgoro, in Maphai, 1994). The 
system was intended to serve the twin political and economic ends of the 
apartheid government. Politically, the essential aim of the apartheid 
administration was to ensure the persistence of white supremacy in South 
Africa, wnt^rr^c^s in <co^i^<^nr^ic terms — apartheid souht t to nnswet the 
regime's 'posr white' problem. Thus whites were preferred in the 
allocation of jobs in both the public and private sectors. They were also 
paid higher wages even if they had lesser or no qualifications at all, 
compared to members of other races. However, "...this form of patronage 
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[later] became an instrument of authoritarian control wielded with a heavy 
hand by their employer, the state" (Posel, 1999: 100-101). The overall 
result was the entrenchment of the National Party's rule, as many 
unqualified or under-qualified whites (particularly Afrikaners) increasingly 
looked to this party for patronage (Posel, 1999: 101). Presumably, this 
would result in greater loyalty by the white (mainly Afrikaner) population 
to the NP government. The effects of such patronage should not be 
underrated, but it would be difficult for modern researchers to determine 
exactly how many white South Africans blindly supported the apartheid 
policies solely as a result of the NP's patronage.
This form of patronage extended even to the so-called independent Bantu 
homelands, like the former Transkei, whose senior civil service positions 
were expected to reflect the demographic profile of such territories. 
Writing about the situation in this territory, nearly a decade before it 
became 'independent' in 1976, Wilson and Thompson (1971: 90) noted 
that in the 1960s there were serious criticisms within the Transkei about 
the composition of its civil service. The residents of the territory were 
generally dissatisfied that the top positions of Bantu Commissioner and 
Assistant Bantu Commissioner were held by whites for many years, 
despite the provisions of the apartheid legislation and assurances from NP 
politicians that those regions would exercise autonomy over their own 
affairs. For many critics of the regime, however, this was sufficient proof 
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that: it had a hidden agenda with its envisaged pten of • granting 
independence to the predominantly black rural settlements.
The influence and power of the politicians over the administrative officials, 
particularly the senior civil servants, appears to have been tremendous. 
One possible reason for this is that, as Beinart explained, during the early 
years of the apartheid era "Politicians insisted that there were two 
alternatives [facing white South Africans]: integration and submersion...or 
the increasingly elaborate system of apartheid" (Beinart, 1994: 142). 
Such fears and anxieties must have immensely influenced the civil 
servants as well — leading to their increased support for the ruling party. 
The civil service apparently also had significant power, particularly "as a 
large bloc of Afrikaner voters. Their disaffection with the National Party en 
masse could have been politically destabilizing" and the NP government 
was quick to realise this and use it to its advantage (Posel, 1999: 111). 
In fact, as O'Meara (1996) argued, the apartheid ministers were well 
informed about "the capacity of senior and middle-level bureaucrats to 
frustrate the policy initiatives of even the most popular administration." 
So, one element of the NP government's strategy was to consolidate its 
hold on power by focusing on the control of the civil service. They 
therefore consciously discarded the "Westminster-derived culture of civil 
service neutrality in politics," and this led to the politicisation of all state 
departments (O'Meara, 1"6: 61-63).
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In conclusion, it is worth stating that the operations of the apartheid era 
civil service appear to have been far-reaching and that this administration 
was crucial to the entrenchment of the racial system. This section has not 
been able to analyse the operations of other racial groups within the civil 
service because they were either prohibited from holding certain public 
positions (the Job Reservation Act) or confined to the lowest-level jobs.
It has been stated that the predominantly white pre-1994 civil servants 
were dissatisfied, not so much with the inequalities of the apartheid 
system, but with what they felt were the NP's manipulations, achieved 
with the aid of the Broerderbond. They were also disgruntled with their 
conditions of employment and the general attitude of the state towards 
them. As has been suggested, because civil servants possessed significant 
potential power as voters, they could have used it to weaken the 
apartheid system if they were sufficiently organised. However, they 
appear to have been quite incapable of such action, at least so long as 
they accepted leadership from such pliant and weak organisations as the 
PSA. Their anger and frustration were easily suppressed by the double 
strategy* the covert and powerful Broederbond (which controlled most 
senior civil servants and dominated public policy); and racially-based 
privileges,, notabte patronage and promotion, as long as they were 
prepared to acquiesce and c°-operate with the NP regime.
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A brief look at t:he ^erattor^ of t:he NP's aparthetf era [jonticians confirms 
that they had a significant impact on the perspectives and behaviour of 
the senior civil servants. There are several indications to suggest that 
senior civil service positions were at that time highly politicised, perhaps 
in a manner never seen before in South Africa. The reason for devising the 
huge edifice of apartheid laws and structures — especially for dealing with 
issues relating to 'non-whites' — was that such devices were vital for 
perpetuating white supremacy in South Africa. However, an overview of 
the former civil service clearly shows that economic reasons — such as the 
provision of jobs for poor whites — also led to the proliferation of 
government structures before the 1994 general elections.
Opposition to the entire system of apartheid mounted, despite the 
increasing repression of the regime. Opposition was not encouraged by 
the perennial crises that erupted within the mostly white civil service. As 
Posel (1999) argues, the situations of many white civil servants put them 
in an insecure position because (to outside observers) they were 
seemingly the most contented members of the apartheid apparatus. 
However, this misunderstood the seething disaffection of many apartheid 
era civil servants. In her earlier (1991) work Posel argued that the notion 
of contentment was too simplistic to explain the complexities of public 
sector employment during the apartheid years. She also refuted any 
notion of a grand plan - that from the beginning the NP had a clear, 
comprehensive strategy to install the elaborate apartheid system. In
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PoseKs words, the idea °f a "mast:er pten" has a superficial appeal and is 
"un^er^t^n<dably sedative"; but she dismissed it as an inadequate 
explanation of the dynamics facing civil servants during the past era 
(Posel, 1991: 1).
Whatever explanations are given to account for the rationale of the past 
system, it is clear that apartheid bequeathed to the new government a 
rather complicated, if politicised and crisis-prone, civil service structure. 
To a large extent, this summarises "...the huge task faced by the ANC in 
reversing apartheid's legacy of [racial] discrimination..." (The Times, 
01/12/00). This reversal is now being tackled by the new government in 
its attempts to transform the civil service. What is not clear, however, is 
how long it will take to eradicate that legacy.
3.2 The Features of South Africa's Post-1994 Civil Service
In 1994, soon after taking power, the ANC began outlining its objectives 
of "transforming" the civil service that would be expected to carry out its 
new policies. It inherited the apartheid era structures and traditions of 
the civil service. It had also agreed the sunset clauses, described above, 
which would encourage but not require senior white officials to retire 
early. The terms public service and civil service are often used 
interchangeably, even when the speaker is referring to only the civil 
service. The List of Definitions, at the start of this thesis, covers this point 
very briefly.
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This commonplace confusion and overlapping of the civil service proper 
with the whole of the public sector may have its root in the text of the 
constitution itself. Section 197 (1) states that, "Within public 
administration there is a public service for the republic, which must 
function and be structured, in terms of national legislation, and which 
must execute the lawful policies of the government of the day." Since this 
section does not refer to the civil service specifically, it has helped to 
confuse government pronouncements and media reports, particularly 
when an official is referring to only one and not the other part of the 
government service. For example, an important recent report delineated 
the civil service but labelled it the public service:
The public service currently comprises approximately 26 
ministries; the Offices of the President and Deputy President; 
the Public Service Commission; 32 departments aligned to the 
various ministries; 5 quasi-independent organisational 
components, including the South African Revenue Services 
(SARS); the Centre for Statistical Services (CSS); the 
Independent Complaints Division; the South African 
Communication Services (SACS); the South African 
Management and Development Institute (SAMDI); and the 
nine provincial administrations, each with a wide range of 
departments interfacing with each other and inter-acting at 
inter-governmental levels (Presidential Review Commission 
Report, 1998: 7).
If, as suggested above, most of the present civil service structure has 
been inherited from the apartheid era since 1948, some can be traced to 
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as far back as the former Britishi cotomes and Boer rap^blic^ ^rar^^ab 
Orange Free State, Cape Colony and Natal). This fact underlines the ANC 
government's concerted efforts to change the structure of this historically 
rooted civil service to serve the current realities. In his final parliamentary 
speech as the first democratically-elected leader of a free South Africa, 
President Mandela highlighted the government's position on the civil 
service and the influence that managerialism has on this approach:
Last year, we spoke of the need to cut expenditure on 
personnel, as part of reducing a bloated civil service and 
changing its orientation. That commitment remains. The new 
civil service regulations based on each individual's output:, 
especially management, rather than just observance of rules, 
should see to the improvement of service to the public 
(Mandela, Address to Parliament, 1999).
In some ways, changes inside the civil service have been minimal since its 
structure was not expected to change significantly in view of the sunset 
clauses protecting established pre-1994 officials. Since 1994, a number of 
official policy documents (white papers) have been produced attempting 
to resolve the many challenges faced by the new civil service. The most 
conspicuous of these challenges include the persistence of racial practices 
and attitudes within the civil service and the continuing effects of the 
previous government's grossly unequal funding to different regions and 
departments (for example, funding per pupil or per patient in mainly white 
and black schools or hospitals).
105
Official efforts have also targeted the "ghost worker" frauds in s°me civil 
service sections and provinces. This topic is covered in Chapter 5.3.
In 1995, the new ANC government published a White Paper on the 
Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) which outlined a broad 
policy framework for transforming the public service so that it could serve 
the new democracy. It stated:
The Government of National Unity is committed to continually 
improving the lives of the people of South Africa by a 
transformed public service which is representative, coherent, 
transparent, efficient, effective, accountable and responsive to 
the needs of all (WPTPS, para. 2.1).
In pursuit of this vision, the government offered a mission statement, 
emphasising, "The creation of a people-centered and people-driven public 
service which is characterized by equity, quality, timeousness and a 
strong code of ethics" (WPTPS, para. 2.1). In addition a reliable 
administrative structure, capable of sustaining the momentum of 
transformation, was essential. But how may "a people-centered and 
people-driven" civil service be developed quickly out of the unpromising 
bodies of the old multiple systems? To encourage values such as 
transparency and accountability inside a structure that for many decades 
relied largely on covert operational methods must prove a great task for 
the new regime.
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The structure of the public service genera||y, and civU service in p^ticd^ 
has undergone irreversible changes since Mandeb's retease from prteon in 
I990 wfth the introduction, from 1994 onw^^ of new centra^ pmovmcia 
and local levels of government. As a result of the amalgamation of 
provinces and the other various old administrations, new government 
departments were established to operate at either or both national and 
provincial levels (WPTPS, para. 2.1).
It has been stated that the three most senior positions in the present 
South African civil service (DG, Deputy DG and Chief Director) "...require 
qualitatively different — though not necessarily more important — skills 
from those required at the lower levels" (PRC Report, 1998: 21). The skills 
required by the senior civil service include "the formulation of policy, the 
development and management of strategic vision and plans, the 
management of human and other resources, the co-ordination of policies 
and the handling of public relations and the media." The most important 
skill, however, was "the management of the often sensitive interface 
between appointed and elected officials" (PRC Report, 1998: 21).
The above arrangement of centre and provinces (with local government 
below) implies a deliberately decentralised structure; but public policy­
making in South Africa in fact appears to be centralised in the shape of 
the powerful national departments. This is especially visible on finance, 
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where the central go^rnirrent dommates fiohcy-mald^ because the 
provinces cannot raise their own taxes or other incomes independently.
Similarly, there are problems regarding the respective operational spheres 
of the administrative and political officials. This same PRC investigation 
revealed this weakness in the present system of governance, noting the 
"uncertainty, even confusion, as to the relative responsibilities of ministers 
and MECs on the one hand, and senior officials on the other...". Such 
problems appear to arise from lack of clarity in the roles of these two sets 
of policy-makers. Thus, as the PRC noted, "if ministers and MECs act as 
managers, involving themselves in details of administration, and if senior 
officials act as politicians, involving themselves in political processes 
outside their departments, this is to the detriment of their proper and 
necessary roles" (PRC Report, 1998: 22). Following this, the PRC proposed 
that both the elected and appointed officials should have "distinct but 
complimentary roles." It appears that the earlier confusion was caused by 
the interim legislation, which had failed to spell out the relation between 
politicians and senior officials in detail, because of the pre-1994 election 
compromises made between the different political parties. Thus the ANC 
had to settle with the NP, for example on civil service sunset clauses, 
while getting the IFP (in KwaZulu-Natal) to accept much less provincial 
autonomy than they were demanding.
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The 1994 Public Service Act gave the Minister for Public Service and 
Administration the legal authority over national public service norms and 
standards, salary determination and related conditions of employment. 
The Act also defined national government departments as legal entities. 
"Each national department and provincial administration was assigned a 
Head of Department (HOD) and an accounting officer at the level of 
Director-General. The de facto heads of individual departments within 
provincial administrations were designated at the rank of Deputy Director­
General" {PRC Report:, 1998: 98). (Each province's government was to be 
headed by its DG.) It seems that this arrangement was stifling to the 
provinces because the 1994 Act, "assumed that the same management 
strategy for national departments could be applied to provincial 
administrattons" — a weakness which the 1997 Public Service Laws 
Amendment Act sought to address {PRCReport, p.98).
An attempt has been made in the new legislation to address the uncertain 
relationship between the elected and non-elected officials. As the 
Presidential Review Commission report added, "The new Act, in theory at 
least, open[ed] the way for a much more direct relationship of 
accountability between the MECs and their respective heads of 
departments who, in contrast to the previous [post-1994] legislation are 
now defined and acknowledged as de jure as well as de facto [Heads of 
Departments]." Another attempt was to clarify the position of the 
provincial DG whose status and role as head of the province's 
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adrrdntetraton were nrt expHritty stated by previous lisgislatton shortly 
after South Africa's all-race elections.
The 1996 Constitution outlined the powers and structures of the political 
executive decision-making such as the Cabinet and Provincial Councils 
(Executive Councils: EXCOs). It defined the "principles under which public 
administration should operate...[but noted that] considerable uncertainty 
and confusion [remains] as to who should be responsible for managing 
what in the public service [although] recent legislation has gone some way 
to clarifying the situation" (PRC Report 1998: 97, emphasis in original). 
The above administrative patterns were again amended by the 1997 
Public Service Laws Amendment Act, introducing a "significant shift in the 
development of a new macro-legal framework for regulating the basic 
institutions of the public service..." (PRC Report 1998: 97). Thus, 
executive authority was now to be vested in the political Heads of 
Departments (ministers and MECs). National government ministers and 
provincial MECs were accorded "original" powers governing internal 
organisational matters like staff appointments and promotions. However, 
the politicians were expected to delegate most of the administrative 
functions to the administrative HODs (PRC Report, 1998: 97-98).
The relationship between the elected politicians and their senior civil 
servants in South Africa is presently a potentially explosive one. While 
such tensions are acceptable in a developing democracy, it would appear 
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that the senior civil service grades are being cautiously politicised by some 
ministers or MECs and by party interests. Clashes between ministers and 
their DGs have become a common event — something that was 
unthinkable shortly after Mandela came to power. As stated in Chapter 
One, such clashes probably caused the high staff turnover among senior 
civil servants that has been frequently reported in the media. It has been 
suggested that many of the old guard senior civil service who left the civil 
service subscribed to what has been termed the "apartheid perspective of 
the old DGs" (Ncholo, in Malala, 1999). According to Ncholo, "the DGs of 
the past shared an apartheid perspective with their ministers and in that 
situation no clear delineation [of political and administrative functions] 
was necessary. But in a democratic envir°nment...y°u need those lines to 
be drawn" (Ncholo, in Malala, 1999). This need, after 1994, was probably 
one explanation for the high staff turnover among senior officials. Yet it 
could be difficult to verify this: it is unsurprising that, for example, very 
few of the former apartheid era public servants (including the police, 
intelligence and army) have publicly shown any "apartheid perspective" 
when they appeared before the country's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission — a major public investigation of the apartheid atrocities. 
This need might well also be a reason why the new government seeks 
greater control of the senior civil service. Most of the problems arising at 
this level (DG) appear to have resulted from either personal or role 
clashes between (national) ministers and their DGs. Similar clashes have
Ill
also at (jrovfodd tev^ between [premiers o- MEC and ttefr ^toi-
civil servants (Harber, 1997).
One other equally fundamental challenge for the new civil service is that it 
must now be governed by the ethos of democratic governance as cited in 
the new constitution. The culture of authoritarianism, intolerance, 
impatience or outright arrogance, reminiscent of the past, must change if 
the civil service is to shed the image of "an outdated, undemocratic and 
racist civil service" (Mskgses, in Maphai, 1994: 114). A new culture of 
tolerance, respect for human rights and a deeper understanding of the 
communities in which the new civil servants will be deployed must replace 
that of the apartheid era. Malcolm Wallis referred to such an 
administration as a "developmental bureaucracy" (Wallis, 1995: 86-100).
To conclude, it could be stated that the features of the present structure 
of the South African civil service are not completely different from those of 
the former apartheid administration, possibly because less than a decade 
has passed since the building of the new structure even began. Certainly, 
many changes have been introduced since 1994, but it would appear that 
the impact of such changes will be felt only during and beyond the present 
government's second term of office (under President Mbeki). Despite the 
pioneering legislation during Mandela's term, his government appeared to 
be hamstrung by the pre-1994 compromise agreements, which made it 
difficult for the ANC government to effect radical changes within the civil 
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service without antagonising its former NP partners in the Government of 
National Unity. Since the 1999 general elections, however, the 
government has no longer been tied down by these former constraints. 
The implications of the present changes inside the South African civil 
service will be explored below, following the next chapter that concerns 
'representivity' and AA as another essential element in transformation.
This chapter has reviewed the character of the past and current South 
African civil services — the apartheid years and the period since 1994. The 
legacy of apartheid was found to be both complicated and likely to persist 
for some time to come. The post-1994 civil service has been judged to be, 
so far, not completely different from the apartheid service.
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Chapter Four
'Representivity' in the Senior Civil Service
4.1 Laws and Poiicies for Affirmative Action in South African 
Government Departments
Before I report interview survey results on this central issue for the civil 
service (and for the new South Africa at large) the implementing 
legislation for AA deserves a separate section here. The new Public 
Service Regulations (1999) augment the general South African law 
(Employment Equity Act, 1998) to regulate Affirmative Action (AA) in the 
South African public service. The 1998 Act defines AA as "...measures 
designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups 
have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated 
employer" (section 15 (1) Employment Equity Act, 1998). Affirmative 
Action is clearly related to the Africanization which has been applied in 
post-colonial Africa in recent decades. This process involved replacing 
(often expatriate) whites with blacks especially in senior government and 
private sector positions — even if the blacks had few or no qualifications 
and experience based nn the objectiee o r claim taa t the [^i^fciHc service 
should reflect the demographic profile of the society.
In South Africa's case, observers stated in the early 1990s, that "The new 
government has made it a priority to Africanize...^ the process, the civil 
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service, the traditional and raciaHy protected home of Afril<aans [speaking] 
whites, can, for the foreseeable future, be expected to target blacks as job 
incumbents" (Hugo and Stark, 1992: 52). What has since happened is not 
radically different from these observations. However, South Africa's 
Africanization has not followed the examples of other African countries 
because of the government's apparent attempt to ensure racial and other 
balancing in the civil service. In this country there seems to be much 
concern and emphasis on racial and gender balancing (although other 
factors such as disability are sometimes considered by employers). Thus, 
a survey of the Western Cape province by a local newspaper (Cape Argus) 
at the end of 1999 reported that this provincial government employed 
only one woman among its 109 most senior officials. There were fifteen 
women officials within a wider range of senior people. As to racial 
categories, 26 individuals were coloured and seven Indians. The 
provincial government administration was overwhelmingly white and male 
(Mail and Guardian, 20-26/08/99). It is possible that this situation might 
now have changed because provincial governments wish to avoid such 
negative publicity. Of course, the need for a representative civil service 
rests on such reports. However, in the case of the Western Cape 
administration which was the NP's only provincial government, it has been 
argued that "...the explanation for this imbalance lies not so much with 
racial or gender prejudice as political bias" (Mail and Guardian, 20- 
26/08/99).
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Representativelrett'', as defied by the PutaKc Serv^e Regdation^ means 
"the extent to which employment in an organisation broadly reflects the 
composition of the South African population, including composition 
according to race, gender and disability" (Chapter 1, B.2 (n)). Thus, all 
public and private sector organisations are legally obligated to incorporate 
Affirmative Action into their employment plans and programmes. It is to 
be aimed specifically towards the "historically disadvantaged", meaning 
"persons or categories of persons who have suffered unfair discrimination 
in the past" (paragraph (I)). Regulation . III D.2 of the Public Service 
Regulations states that, "An executing authority shall develop and 
implement an Affirmative Action programme which shall contain as a 
minimum the following:
(i) A policy statement that sets out the department's commitment to 
affirmative action and how that policy will be Implemented;
(ii) Numeric and time-bound targets for achieving representativeness;
(iii) Annual statistics on the appointment, training and promotion within 
each grade of each occupational category, of persons historically 
disadvantaged;
(iv) A plan for redressing numeric under-representativeness and 
supporting the advancement of persons historically disadvantaged."
However, "designated groups" and "designated employers" are the ones 
who are targeted by the law and AA-related policies. According to the 
Employment Equity Act (Chapter 1), "designated groups" means "black 
people [or Africans, Indians and coloureds, collectively] . women and 
people with disabilities." The term "people with disabilities" often presents 
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problems of definition in South Africa, as elsewhere. However, the law 
(chapter 1, section 1, Employment Equity Act, 1998) defines "people with 
disabilities" as "people who have a long-term or recurring physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits their prospects of entry into, 
or advancement in, employment." The Employment Equity Act deals 
broadly with Affirmative Action, its implementation and further gives a 
definition of "designated employers":
(i) an employer who employs 50 or more employees;
(ii) an employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total 
annual turnover that is equal to or above the applicable annual 
turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 of the Public 
Service Act, 1994;
(iii) a municipality, as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution;
(iv) an organ of state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution, but 
excluding local spheres of government, the National Defence Force, 
the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret 
Service;
(v) an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 
or 31 of the Labour Relations Act, to the extent provided for in the 
agreement (Employment Equity Act 1998, Chapter 1).
These laws have, quite understandably, evoked controversy in some 
quarters. However, disagreement about the country's Affirmative Action 
programmes only serves to illustrate the intricate situation in which the 
ANC government finds itself concerning public service restructuring. On 
the one hand, it must try to effect meaningful political and administrative 
changes within the civil service, in line with its goal to build a non-racial 
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and rtomsexfet: dem°cracy. On the otter hantt ft must attempt to appease 
these officials who doubt or oppose policies such as AA. These include the 
remnants of the former apartheid era civil service. To avoid alienating 
their acquiescence during the transition period, policy change has been 
only gradual. Thus, the key challenge for the government and its most 
senior officials is to convince both critics and supporters of this policy that 
the strategy is crucial to the success of the government's programmes in 
the long-term. The government has stated on many occasions that 
Affirmative Action is a corrective measure against the racial bias in former 
government policy. Given the wide disparities of the apartheid era that 
persist to this day in South Africa, this policy appears to be aimed at 
tackling these disparities. However, it is not clear how far Affirmative 
Action will particularly redress those disparities, against the formerly 
marginalised and disadvantaged social groups.
Perhaps the major shortcoming of South Africa's AA policy is that it is 
subject to different interpretations. To begin with, it is difficult to ensure a 
common understanding (by the civil service in particular) of constitutional 
terms like "broad representation" and "representativeness." Such 
differences in interpretation and understanding were bound to occur, and 
have led to the current controversy in South Africa about the real meaning 
of AA. The ANC did not invent. On the contrary, as Ramphele argues, 
"South African [whites] were recipients of one of the longest and most 
successful Affirmative Action programmes in history" (Ramphele, 2001: 
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11). Noting that attempts to redress "...tee inherited [rectal and °teer] 
imbalances have been uniformly successful", she cautioned against the 
tendency of appointing people beyond tear ^vc1 of competence as this 
had "unfortunate results" (Ramphele, 2001: 11). She concluded that AA in 
South Africa was being used to affirm black males alone, "making them 
instant millionaires." Sono has argued that "...Affirmative Action policies 
are unnecessary [as] they help only middle-class blacks who can look 
after themselves, while doing nothing for the poor" {The Economist:, 
24/02/01, p.16). In addition, a prominent South African political analyst 
has stated that "Many political appointments are made without any 
consideration of academic qualifications." Criticising the general disrespect 
of today's youth towards the country's education authorities, he 
concluded:
By rewarding those who were in the forefront of the toyi-toyi 
[political demonstrations], the message that gets to the youth 
is that education is not the most important thing, but your role 
in the toyi-toyi is.... The youth then reach the inescapable 
conclusion that to be a senior in the government or civil 
service, you need to have a toyi-toyi profile more than 
education (Seepe, The Star, 01/06/00).
Thus, the argument that AA policies will ensure the correct balance of 
society might be rigorously challenged if one were to ask exactly who will 
benefit. For its part, the government has attempted to tackle this 
apparent dilemma by formulating broad laws and policies but problems 
inevitably arise at the implementation stages of such laws and policies.
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So, despite the government's assurances to the contrary, not only some 
white civil servants but also others from coloured and Indian communities 
have expressed resentment of what they see as the illegitimate 
advantages for Africans flowing from this strategy, arguing that it is 
intended to re-introduce reverse racism within the civil service. The 
Economist has alleged, "Instead of de-raclalising, the government is re- 
racialising" (The Economist, 24/02/01, p.18). However, the government 
firmly believes in the special provision for the recruitment and promotion 
of certain groups according to race, gender, and disability to redress the 
apartheid legacy.
4.2 Senior Officials’ and MECs' Perspectives on 'Representivity' 
(Affirmative Action): a Survey Report
This section reports the interview survey results on the previous section's 
subject of AA and 'representivity' in the civil service. (Similar sections 
reporting these results appear below in the appropriate place: Chapter 4.5 
will give results on management performance issues; Chapter 5.xx on 
officials' working relations with their ministers/MECs and 
politicisation; Chapter 6.5 on the policy-making process; and Chapter 
7.1 on post-1994 change in the senior civil service. Overall 
conclusions on the interview results appear in 7.2. In most cases, 
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selected quotation fr°m tte officials and MECs are fe^ured, effh^sr within 
the text or in quotation boxes covering particular interview topics.
This survey report on Affirmative Action and 'representivity' begins with 
the respondents' own racial profile. Fully 176 of 180 officials 
acknowledged their race (four saying that they were of 'South African' 
race or none). The 176 were black, 54%; white, 37%; coloured 4%; and 
Asian/Indian, 5%.
Under apartheid laws, as stated in section 3.2, only whites were permitted 
senior civil service positions. It was reported recently that AA was clearly 
necessary in the Justice Department following "...the skewed [racial] 
representation" revealed by an EU-funded study in this national 
department (Stack and Soggot, 2001). It is possible that white officials in 
the selected departments under-responded to my invitation to an 
interview on the recent and prospective changes in their work 
experiences. Perhaps more likely is the higher incidence of African 
newcomers in senior posts in Education and Health Departments, 
particularly at provincial level, compared with other policy fields. The 
pressing social demand for new and better public services in these fields 
may have stimulated both the supply and the demand for many more 
African, coloured and Asian officials to help to meet this challenge. Of the 
ten MECs interviewed, seven were black, two Indian and one white — 
(these politicians are not part of the 180-person survey of senior officials 
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but their comments win appear in the text: and the quotation boxes of both 
this and the subsequent sections presenting the survey results).
Having conducted this combined total of 190 interviews with officials and 
MECs, followed by the transcription of ' potential quotations and the 
tabulation of responses, I would claim that racial groupings and AA law 
and policy form the most prominent and controversial aspect of the senior 
civil servants' professional world in South Africa. Issues of management 
performance, the alleged politicisation of the senior grades or how policy 
is made are all important:: a major and lasting change in any of them 
could radically change the service for better or worse, possibly for ever. 
Perhaps these other issues, notably politicisation, are linked to race and 
AA in their practical applications. But the deliberate departure from a 
merit-based, 'rational' system of senior civil service appointments and 
promotions towards a mixed merit/race basis (with a gender policy laid on 
top, with added effect) is uniquely prominent in many officials' minds.
Generally speaking, black respondents were optimistic about AA and 
welcomed its implementation, whereas whites were more often 
ambivalent or pessimistic. However, there are many exceptions to this, 
particularly white officials who welcomed the quite rapid move to a racially 
balanced senior civil service. Of course, on this most emotionally powerful 
issue covered by my interview survey, it would be foolish to take 
interview-based data at face value, even when confidentiality was assured 
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at the start of each meeting. Firstly, white officials who genuinely 
welcome the post-apartheid South Africa and the end of the former white 
monopoly on senior civil service posts were probably more likely to grant 
an academic research interview than those who oppose and even resent 
these changes. Secondly, some respondents (not only whites) may have 
supported the official line — as also endorsed by the AA laws and civil 
service regulations — when answering my outside visitor's questions and 
appeared less critical of racial or gender policies on appointments and 
promotions than they privately are. (This could include those who thought 
these policies had been applied too weakly as well as those who oppose 
them in principle.) Senior civil servants are attuned to presenting official 
policies or decisions, irrespective of their own views, and are probably less 
frank than equivalent elite interviewing groups (e.g., business leaders, 
academics or lawyers) would be on a major issue such as the 
implementation of AA in their professional fields. It is no guide to the 
relative frankness of my respondents to note that some of them did 
appear ' to be quite open (and openly critical) as some of their quoted 
comments will soon indicate.
I cannot tell how much more frank any individual might have been 
because the officials possibly had to maintain political correctness on race 
and gender discrimination when discussing the past and present civil 
service. Nor am I able to say , how general frankness might have increased 
if all professional civil service discretion (including their traditional 
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attitudes and apiaroa^s to outage researchers) could somehow have 
been suspended for the duration of my interviews. Thirdly, there is the 
probably minor point that respondents might well moderate their 
comments to an interviewer of different race: in my case, white officials 
potentially criticising AA and the shift to senior black recruitment to a 
black researcher. Having at least some whites or coloureds speaking to 
me about AA being simply a "reverse racism" which is quite wrongly 
placing under-qualified or incompetent blacks in senior posts, obviously 
indicates that the professional, political and personal inhibitions just 
mentioned did not dominate these 180 interviews with senior officials. 
However, it is wise to assume that some balance between these 
inhibitions was in play. If so, respondents' conditions or limitations on 
their support of the new race and gender policies were rather stronger 
than the coded data suggest. Any general understatement of criticisms or 
reservations would probably apply to all topics raised in the interview, 
although race and AA are probably the sharpest examples.
Q. 44 Does this department have an Affirmative Action policy?
This question sought a general perception, perhaps an opinion, on AA in 
the respondent's own department by asking the factual question of 
whether the department had an AA policy. This was a false question in 
that the law required all of the civil and other public services to comply 
with national AA legislation. But it hoped to measure both the saliency 
and the merits of the overall legal position by asking about any working 
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policy in their own department which the respondent may have noticed or 
directly experienced. Many d/k responses would have indicated a vague 
and weak policy presence or uninterested respondents: in fact there were 
only six. Of the 166 Yes/No responses, only 2% said there was no such 
policy in place. Within the almost unanimous perception that there was a 
policy in place, however, one-third (32%) offered significant rhnhrvatisns 
on its reality, quality or value. My general impression was that these 
reservations rested on opinions that such a policy should be much 
stronger and better applied. Moreover, officials with these views seemed 
to complain that the policy was not doing enough for their own group 
(usually, obviously, blacks — both genders — and women, of any race).
Asking next about the apparent priorities of their .department's AA policy 
offered more information. I asked if it seemed to be placing equal 
emphasis on all three legislative objectives: race, gender and disability 
affirmative action in hiring and pesmstisns. This served as an open-ended 
question, with respondents' own descriptions of AA practice as they saw it 
allocating priority. Of 107 officials who gave a direct answer (six made 
other comments) 46% said that race alone enjoyed priority and a further 
41% said that race and gender discrimination was the joint objective of 
the AA policy, with no significant effort to advance the cause of the 
disabled. Only 8% replied that gender issues were the policy's sole 
interest: no-one saw any priority for the disabled and this cause merely 
i.tered equal status in the ey^ of the mere 5% w^ ^d that s|1 
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three fields got equal emphasis from the policy. With 87% saying that 
race tiad been the s°|e cr joint priority of the new ^w's application t° the 
civil service, the general perception of the respondents is very clear. If 
the 41% who saw race and gender as joint objectives had been pressed to 
say which had been more important, there is little doubt that race would 
advance even further in this balance.
Box 1:
Officials speak about Race and Gender Affirmative Action:
1.1 "The department does implement AA and I agree with it in 
principle. There's no more exclusive male Afrikaner appointments 
and we are getting the best people from all races. However, I am 
not entirely satisfied with its implementation — some appointments 
are made just on the basis of people's skin colour." (Female, 
white; provincial department; less senior grades)
1.2 "More flexible recruitment policies based on AA and targeting the 
designated people were introduced; but AA is difficult for whites to 
swallow." (Male, black; provincial department; less senior grades)
1.3 "The AA policy is successfully implemented in my department, 
especially on gender, perhaps because the Head of Department 
(DDG) is a woman." (Male, black; provincial department; less 
senior grades.)
1.4 "We have an AA policy and I'm generally satisfied with its 
implementation. AA focuses on race and gender. We haven't 
empowered people with disabilities yet." (Male, black; provincial 
department; most senior grades)
1.5 "AA is being implemented in my department and I view it as both
' capacity building and empowerment. Recruitment panels often give
extra points [to target groups]. We now have a fair mix, almost 
black of senior civil service and most female black Directors." 
(Female, black; provincial department; less senior grades)
1 6 "The DPSA has an AA policy and has now reached the required 
racial and gender proportion. Merit is now the main criterion used 
in DPSA." (Male, black; national department; senior grades)
1 7 "AA is being wrongly implemented. The wrong people get 
' appointed. I'm waiting for the day when somebody will learn that a 
rnjjntry's survival depends not only on the skin colour of a person 
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but on his skill and mental ability. In interviews, whites perform 
well. Blacks often perform worse, but get appointed. We do 
courses and training for AA appointees but their work ethics are 
generally very poor." (Male, white; provincial department; senior 
grades)
1.8 "It's good that the department has an AA policy but I'm not 
satisfied with its implementation process. We're experiencing 
resistance to implementation. However, transformation is not an 
event but a process, and we need to deal with the mind set against 
AA." (Male, black; provincial department; senior grades)
1.9 "AA is being implemented, but I'm concerned at the way it's being 
applied — reverse discrimination — in the department." (Male, 
white; provincial department; senior grades)
1.10 "In this department race is synonymous with black males because 
only they are being affirmed presently in the department. It is only 
at Deputy Director level that females are present: otherwise there 
is no AA for females." (Female, black; provincial department; less 
senior grades)
1.11 "The current changes in the civil service are very slow, especially in 
relation to black empowerment and AA." (Male, black; provincial 
department; less senior grades)
1.12 "The opening-up of avenues for previously disadvantaged people in 
the civil service is a welcome change; but ' there has been too quick 
fitting [appointment] of these people into senior positions. There is 
need for support for such appointees." (Female, black; provincial 
department; less senior grades)
1.13 "AA policy is being implemented in the department, but it is 
generally racism in reverse." (Female, white; provincial 
department; less senior grades)
1.14 "aa is totally out of control in this department. I'm the only white 
' person in my Directorate and none has been appointed since I
joined in 1995. Many blacks are now being appointed even if they 
have questionable experience but I feel the way blacks must have 
felt before 1994." (Male, white; provincial department; less senior 
grades)
In my interviews, I asked a number of non-African officials whether they 
felt "personally threatened by AA policy." (I expected that race would be 
generally seen as the dominant AA policy objective.) Unfortunately, only 
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38 non-African officials (i.e. whites, coloured and Asians) offered a 
response: they were very largely national, not provincial, officials (men 
and women). Of these, 24% said that they did feel that their future 
career was threatened by the onset of AA, as it was being applied, but 
76% said that they did not. Among this majority were a number who 
added that they felt confident that ability would always be needed at more 
senior levels and that they would not be overlooked, even if positive 
discrimination for blacks was continued, even indefinitely.
Box 2:
Officials speak about Affirmative Action as a Personal Threat
2.1 "The department applied the AA policy but I think this mostly has 
to do with numbers or quotas. The policy does not empower AA 
appointees: these people are thrown into the deep end without 
support. I feel threatened by AA because at my grade there are 
only very limited posts; so, to apply AA means practically ending a 
person's career." (Male, white; national department; senior 
grades)
2.2 "We have a fairly good spread racially but we've gone a bit 
overboard on gender. I do not see AA as a personal threat. 
Human nature or ethnic/cultural group ultimately matter more than 
racism." (Male, white; provincial department; less senior grades)
2.3 ' "There is a racist interpretation of AA in the department. I do not
feel personally threatened by AA, but I feel uneasy when 
competent people leave the organisation purely because of the 
colour of their skin." (Female, coloured; national department; 
senior grades)
2.4 "When advertising posts and in appointments, they give preference 
to AA candidates but we sometimes appoint the best person (e.g. 
based on experience). However, I do feel threatened personally by 
AA because, while the previous regime discriminated against me on 
the basis of gender, the present one uses race to the same effect." 
(Female, white; national department; less senior grades)
2 5 "I'm satisfied with AA, particularly on gender. However, on race, 
' the department is not yet perfect and representative but we are 
getting there. I do not feel threatened personally by the AA policy 
hut I might regard it as reverse discrimination." (Female, white; 
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provincial department; less senior grades)
2.6 "MydepartmentappliestheAA policybuthaphaza rdle . Thecurrent
minister emphasises experience, but lower-level managers often 
decide to appoint individuals from one group only (race, gender). 
However, I do not perceive AA as a threat." (Male, white; national 
deearCment; less senior grades)
My interviews with provincial government MECs naturally produced much 
comment on their political perspectives on penpesertivity and AA, 
regarding both race and gender. (These ten MEC respondents consisted 
of seven blacks, two Indian and one white — with a party breakdown of 
eight ANC, one IFP, serving in the KwaZulu-Natal government, and one 
member of the joint DP-NNP government in the Western Cape. Six of the 
ten were the political heads of provincial Education departments and four 
of Health departments.) These politicians mentioned several interesting 
structural or background points which constrain the implementation of AA 
at the senior levels. The supply of much potential senior talent is rooted 
in the civil service's lower grades from which more senior career paths 
might be mapped out. Junior black officials naturally hope to move up 
into senior posts, on AA criteria if necessary. But their unequal school 
backgrounds weaken their prospects before they have even applied to 
join. If the most effective schools are still employing their independent 
status to operate "apartheid-based" entry policies, the key to non-racial 
employment lies outside those employments and in the school system. A 
different type of structural impediment is seen in the South African health 
field where nearly all nurses are female. Senior nurses may become 
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senior civil servants in health departments but with almost no males from 
this background to provide a gender balance. At the same time, Health 
departments' finance and management ranks have always been male- 
dominated so two gender imbalances co-exist.
At least one province covering a former apartheid era African homeland 
(North West) has faced the converse problem of introducing officials of 
other races into solely African sections of its re-designated head office. 
Attempting such a strategy while also creating a properly trained 
personnel (Human Resources) department had been very difficult, 
according to one of its MECs, particularly when a general "exodus" of 
officials was taking place. The MECs whom I interviewed reflected the 
perspectives of many of the 140 provincial officials in noting how slowly 
AA seemed to move beyond the appointment and promotion of black 
males. Within this small group of ten MECs, the five women spoke more 
sharply of AA's lack of impact, particularly on advancing women officials 
(of all races) which they — like a number of my women civil service 
respondents — clearly see as running a poor second to racial AA as such 
and male racial AA in particular. One ANC woman MEC commented: "AA 
is not sufficiently dealt with in this department and there is no monitoring. 
There is a fair racial mix of officials but very few African women above 
Deputy Director level." Another female MEC complained that AA was 
weak overall in her department but specified that "very little has been 
done in the promotion of gender."
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It is important to remember that representivity and AA are national 
government policies resting not only on the ANC's political commitment 
but on the legislative obligations which its government has imposed on 
both public and private sector employers (as described in the previous 
section). Provincial governments must follow both the law and the DPSA's 
rules and guidance on its implementation.
There remains some political resistance to AA at provincial government 
level (and also, of course, in other public service organisations, not to 
mention the private commercial and professional sectors). One of the 
non-ANC MECs commented on this legal obligation: "This department has 
an AA policy and is applying it but our problem is implementation ... While 
some people may see AA as a threat, we cannot get rid of it because it is 
now government policy." This particular remark probably does not imply 
that either this MEC or his party would abolish AA within their province if 
they could. One non-ANC province might be different: the Western Cape's 
Democratic Party/New National Party government attempts to appeal to 
coloured voters, including those in public service employment. "Coloured 
voters, largely concentrated in the Western Cape province," as one 
observer noted, "were concerned [before the 1994 elections] that their 
interests might be ignored by an African majority government. Hence they 
voted for the NP..." (Byrnes, 1997: xlvii). Whether their concerns were 
well-founded is debatable. As I have already noted, my own experience of 
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teaching on civil service training courses there suggests considerable 
support among officials for a strict merit principle as against AA ideas. On 
this view, the merit principle cannot combine with black advancement 
because the quality is simply missing. The Western Cape government is, 
as we have noted, legally obliged to formulate and apply AA but at least 
one of its departments is claimed by its MEC to be following the merit 
principle on recruitment and promotions. How energetically the national 
ANC government will try to enforce this law upon non-ANC provincial 
governments still remains to be seen.
One further racial and AA point should be reported before covering the 
disability aspect of the AA law and policy. An interview question about 
post-1994 problems in the senior civil service (reported below in Chapter 
7.1) asked which of them had their causes in the pre-1994 years. The 
second commonest single choice of problem on this open-ended question 
was my code "race or gender prejudice among senior civil servants" 
(29%). ("Bureaucratic inertia" was the sole choice of 46% and 
"bureaucratic arrogance and secrecy" of 5%.) At 29% for a single 
nomination this proportion (of 129) officials suggests that AA policy and 
the historical background which it claims to be tackling faces a significant 
challenge or backlog.
If AA for women officials has run a poor second to black advancement, the 
disablement aspects of the new laws and policies have made almost no 
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showing at all. My civil servant respondents saw an almost complete lack 
of official emphasis: it became a commonplace during my 33 interviews 
with DPSA officials (whose department is responsible for overseeing this 
statutory policy's implementation across the civil service) to hear that 
disabled people could not even get into their building, almost as if this fact 
ended any discussion rather than being its starting point. The MECs as a 
group showed little more interest in AA for disability than many of the civil 
servants but to the same effect:: "Very few disabled people apply for 
jobs"; "We have not done well on disability ... we lack specification or 
targeting of disability in the recruitment process"; "There is no concerted 
effort to encourage them to apply ... there is no deliberate need for people 
with disabilities and they are therefore a marginalised group"; "... there is 
no proper focus on disability and we need to concentrate on this"; "... 
there are no people with disabilities in this department; we have access 
problems for such individuals in this building.1'
This outline survey report on my respondents' perspectives on 
representivity and AA should conclude on a plainly political note because 
AA in the senior civil service is not simply part of a national swing to 
representing the majority racial group in national life after its exclusion 
under apartheid. One ANC MEC's comment expresses the political point: 
"I agree with the ANC's strategic deployment of its cadres" — i.e. within 
the senior civil and other public services. AA policy involves the dominant 
majority party (ANC) placing its partisans from the dominant majority 
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racial group (blacks) in senior posts within the state machinery. The 
assertion of black power is also an assertion of government and governing 
party power. Thus reservations or outright opposition to this twin process 
is also on a double track of race and party — at least in the provinces (all 
but two) where the ANC proves the provincial as well as the national 
government. If AA and alleged politicisation are the two most prominent 
and controversial broad issues facing the South African senior civil service, 
it is important to see them as linked. In most parts of South Africa's 
national/provincial government system, a new black face sitting at a 
senior civil or public service desk is not only black, rather than white 
coloured or Asian, but also quite likely to be an ANC face. In 1999, 
following speculation and concerns that the ANC Cadre Policy and 
Deployment Strategy would create a "broederbond", the party's Smuts 
Ngonyama dismissed such concerns:
The ANC's deployment strategy is no secret. It does not seek 
to create a "broederbond", illuminati or politburo — 
accusations of such are evidence of over-active imaginations 
and blatant propaganda.... Concerns raised that the ANC will 
deploy cadres into the civil service without following the 
correct channels are unfounded (Ngonyama, City Press, 
08/08/99).
Furthermore, he insisted that "All civil servants are employed only after 
the vacancies are openly advertised. They compete on an equal basis, 
with all other applicants for positions." Various other bodies, such as the 
Public Service Commission and the Public Protector (Ombudsman), he 
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concluded, were "established to ensure that proper procedures are 
followed In civil service recruitment" (Ngonyama, 1999).
To conclude, this chapter has presented the 'rharhnhntivity' issues and my 
interviewees' responses on them. This has included reports of various 
critics of Affirmative Action (notably the view that "re-racialining" is 
occurring). The major shortcoming of AA policy, the chapter concludes, is 
the different interpretations placed on its ctsracter and purposes. On my 
interviewees' perspectives, it concludes that race is the dominant element 
in the AA policy, with gender equality running a poor second, according to 
my interviewees' responses. Finally, a link has been suggested between 
AA policy and attempts at civil service politicisation by dominant parties, 
at both national and provincial levels.
I cover alleged politicisation of the civil service and report the survey 
results on that topic in Chapter 5.
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Chapter Five
Management innovation in the Senior Civil Service
5.1 The Pprsspctives of Sen'ior Civvl SSrvants i n SSuth Affka
We should firstly note that there is not any set pattern of 'perspectives' of 
the senior civil service in South Africa, particularly considering ChaC the 
country has only recently entered its transition stage from apartheid 
authoritarianism to democracy. What follows is an attempt to understand 
these perspectives, based mainly on my interviews with them between late 
1999 and mid-2000. In this chapter, as in the rest of the thesis, the term 
'senior civil service' refers to the top, middle and lower senior managerial 
government positions (Director-General (grade 16) down to Assistant 
Director (grades 9-10), as outlined in Chapter One.
The term 'perspectives', in this chapter as in the rest of the thesis, refers to 
the way the officials explain their various functions, roles and responsibilities 
and how they perceive their situation generally. We may outline their 
functions as being to:
■ interact with their ministers or MECs (the political-administrative 
interface);
■ exercise power and authority in their respective departments/ 
ministries;
■ interact with members of the public (individually and collectively);
■ represent government at all levels;
■ formulate (with ministers or MECs); articulate; and implement policy;
■ give managerial support and advice to their ministers or MECs.
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Of course, the practical combination of these functions differs according to 
individual seniority and the precise nature of a government department's 
work. The second (bulleted) point raises questions of definitions of the terms 
power and authority, but the interviewees who mentioned these terms often 
did not explain or define them. With reference to policy formulation and 
articulation, Charlton (1991:265) has emphasised the "...[^s^i^tricularly 
prominent role played by senior bureaucrats in policy-making in 
[neighbouring] Botswana." This may not be as outstanding in South Africa, 
but some interviewed officials felt they had to perform (or were already 
performing) this function in addition to their policy implementation duties.
As explained in Chapter 1 it was necessary to include the Assistant-Directors 
(ADs) in my study because this grade is the entry point to the managerial 
positions at which many newly appointed (or promoted) officials normally 
began their senior careers. As the entry grade to a potential senior career, 
the position of AD seems to be where many people who were formerly 
disadvantaged by apartheid are concentrated. As the bottom rung of the 
senior management echelons in their departments or ministries, these 
officials may well be the only senior civil servants who maintain grassroots 
level contact because of their regular dealings with bodies such as schools, 
hospitals or local government and with the public.
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At the provincial government level, some interviewees strongly expressed the 
view that the only truly senior or powerful grades are Chief Director and 
upwards: Chief Director, Deputy Director-General and Director-General. 
Other interviewees felt that 'senior' also included the Directors. Such officials 
were said to have more power and authority to make effective decisions in 
their departments and ministries, often without having to seek prior 
permission from their superiors. Even so, some Directors were reluctant to 
include themselves among the 'senior' civil servants, and instead used this 
term to refer only to those above them.
One of the limitations of attempting to outline the duties of senior civil 
servants is that such duties may be unclear and ambiguous. In his study of 
Permanent Secretaries (comparable rank to South Africa's Director-General) 
in Commonwealth Africa, Lungu (1997) emphasised that this particular class 
of senior civil servants faced what he termed "role ambiguity and 
ambivalence." Noting that the office of Permanent Secretary is a key position 
in African public management systems, he concluded that:
...an adequate knowledge of its roles and functions, of its scope 
and limitations, of its potential frustrations is essential, together 
with other civil service variables, to the understanding of and 
designing strategies for containing the current administrative 
crisis [in Africa] (Lungu, 1997:3-4).
He also acknowledged that African public management systems could not be 
understood adequately or wholly "by focusing on the office of [the Permanent 
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Secretary]" (p.4), a point that I have found also applies to South Africa's 
Directors-General. Lungu's points — especially about the scope, limitations 
and potential frustrations faced by the Permanent Secretaries — are 
significant: some top officials interviewed in this study also expressed them. 
One provincial Superintendent General who said that the "greatest challenge 
to transformation [in my department] is racial attitudes", summarised these 
potential frustrations as follows: " I have a difficult task of assuring the old, 
formerly advantaged senior officials that standards have not dropped, 
contrary to their beliefs. Similarly, I have to deal with those on the 
disadvantaged side who, while agreeing that standards have improved, still 
feel that much should be done." Lungu has further said that "...African 
[Permanent Secretaries] experience considerable role ambiguity and 
ambivalence due to conflicting and contradictory expectations of their office, 
but more so due to the mismatch between the original ideals governing the 
office and the political context that works against these ideals" (Lungu, 
1997:5). Perhaps, in the South African case, the "mismatch" between the 
ideals of the Director-General's office and the political context that opposes 
these ideals has not yet become fully apparent. However, the high turnover 
in these highest civil service grades in the early 1990s suggested something 
closer to these observations (Malala, 1999). (Chapter Six will examine this, 
and related issues). In his study, Lungu (1997) identified the following major 
roles that could also help clarify the position of the most senior government 
officials in South Africa, namely:
(i) poHtiaaI appointee in a neurra I roee;
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(ii) chief executive or minister's clerk;
(iii) responsible officer or rubber-stamp.
In the South African case, however, it would appear that these observations 
are applicable not only to the DGs, but also to the other senior officials 
interviewed. The main difference, of course, is that the importance of these 
points may differ according to level of seniority and from case to case. Dogan 
(1975:4) referred to the senior civil servants as the modern 'mandarins,' 
adding that "The top civil servant who plays an important political role has a 
hybrid personality: half-political, half-administrative. Like Janus, the Roman 
god, he has two faces. He is kin to the mandarins of old Imperial China." 
Dogan's observations clearly apply to South Africa, although this could differ 
by province and the varying natures of government departments. 
Montgomery (1986:211) conducted a study of Permanent Secretaries in nine 
Southern African countries (Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland). He noted that, "The political 
role of senior civil servants in [Commonwealth] Africa cannot be 
differentiated from their administrative roles." Insisting that this Whitehall 
tradition "is alive and well in Africa," Montgomery concluded: "The [African] 
Permanent Secretaries play a largely predictable, almost interchangeable, 
role in the nine countries. But that role is far from identical with that of their 
counterparts in Europe" (p.220). In fact, another and later observer has 
noted that the public administration systems of many African countries 
"...are characterized by declining aerfsrmsnch levels in terms of policy­
making and implementation, they are excessively formally centralized but 
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ineffective and have become mired in a crisis of identity, morale and 
direction" (Olowu, 1998:41). South Africa was one of only two countries (the 
other was Botswana) which were singled as having public administration 
systems that are "generally efficient and effective." While this might be true, 
to a certain extent, these comments obviously raise issues around the 
definition of efficiency and effectiveness — or the nature of the administrative 
reform process in a country.
In terms of South African law, the duties of the senior civil servants include 
policy-making, liaison with the political heads of their departments or 
ministries, representing the government in various forums and implementing 
public policy within these structures (Public Service Act, 1994). The Public 
Service Act (1994) clearly outlines and regulates, the composition and 
operations of the South African civil service as follows:
In the making of appointments and the filling of posts in the 
public service, due regard shall be had to equality and other 
democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution 
(Section 11 (i), Public Service Act, 1994).
Similarly, Chapter 10 of the Constitution spells out these values and 
principles and generally maps out the required characteristics of the 
country's public sector employees at large. These principles and values are, 
among others, those of equality, representativeness (or 'representivity', in 
South Africa) transparency and accountability. Representivity is usually 
defined by relevant legislation (notably the Employment Equity Act 1998) as 
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proportional parity in terms of the country's demographic profile. Certainly, a 
number of the interviewees mentioned equality and other democratic 
principles stated in the constitution which they said were being used 
currently in civil service appointments and promotions. However, some 
expressed fears that negative aspects, especially nepotism, and political and 
other networks, were increasingly being used as criteria for the recruitment 
and promotion of the senior civil servants.
There was almost a consensus amongst the interviewed senior civil servants 
and political leaders on what their respective roles should be. It must be 
added that whether and how far this ideal differed from the reality would be 
hard to discern. Some of the arguments presented by some of my 
respondents seemed closely aligned to the classic (principally Wilsonian 
American) belief in a 'politics-administration dichotomy' (as described in 
Chapter Two) even though later scholars have long recognised that this idea 
is impractical. As La Palombara has explained: "The bureaucracy, 
particularly in its upper reaches, will always be deeply involved in the political 
process. Indeed, it is impossible, even in the most structurally differentiated 
political system, to conceive of a complete separation of the [political and 
administrative] function." (LaPalombara, in Dogan [1975a] :4).
Some interviewees agreed with this view and argued that there was an 
overlap between the worlds of the civil servant and the politician. Thus, they 
urged that the two groups should co-operate, while recognising each others' 
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exclusive functions. One most senior provincial office, for exampe said that 
it was important for "the HOD to respect and understand the MEC/minister if 
problems [between the two] were to be averted." A senior national official 
mentioned the need for "clear policy directives from Cabinet outlining a 
framework of co-operation" between the minister/MEC and the senior most 
senior official. As already explained above, the ministerial figures interviewed 
for this study were all of the ten MECs (the 'executing authorities') of the 
eight provincial-level Health and Education departments whose senior civil 
servants provided the bulk (140) of the 180 officials interviewed (plus two 
MECs in other provinces in one of which civil service interviews were 
refused).
A prellminary assessment of the perspectives of senior civil servants in the 
selected provincial government departments indicates that there is a great 
deal of short term, urgent fire-fighting taking place on issues which have 
their roots in apartheid. The new ANC government has been very keen to 
fulfil its promises made in the 1994 and 1999 democratic elections to 
improve service delivery (especially water, housing, health services and 
education) to the formerly marginalized sectors of the society {The Times, 
01/12/00) — in one word, 'transformation'. To do this, the ANC had to work 
within the structures (departments, ministries and other public bodies) that 
were created during the apartheid era to cater for the interests of only one 
racial group. This certainly posed a direct and formal challenge to those who 
were appointed to work in these structures after 1994, who often complained 
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about the subtle racism and "frustration they face[d] with the old apartheid 
bureaucracies whose tenure was extended by the sunset clauses" (City Press:, 
26/09/99).
Another difficulty faced by the senior civil service has been that South Africa 
retained many top officials from the apartheid regime and its separate 
satellites (the former 'independent' black homelands and self-governing 
territories). The departments and ministries of these old civil services were 
reorganised into the new unitary civil service after 1994. The new 
government's caution in encouraging the senior old guard to retire or resign 
offset the boldness of its formal policy pledges of a transformed civil service 
and wider public sector. Partly as a result, newly appointed officials in 
particular are feeling the effects of the old civil service. In 1999 one press 
observer commented that "What we are witnessing at the moment is that 
black incumbents are fitting into the old apartheid mould based on rigid and 
outdated bureaucratic habits and rules that can make working in the civil 
service a very frustrating experience" (City Press, 26/09/99).
Important changes included the policy of Affirmative Action (AA), the Batho 
Pele principles (see Appendix 2) and the overall transformation of the 
attitude and conduct of the entire public sector. On AA, many senior officials 
told me that they strongly supported the new laws and policies, although 
they felt that these measures had flaws, . notably an inconsistency of both 
policy and practice between different departments and even between civil 
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servants in the same department or ministry. Other alleged flaws of the 
policy were said to be the half-hearted application of the policy in some 
departments or included the unequal emphasis as between race, gender and 
disability. The Batho Pele principles particularly emphasise a more democratic 
and business-like approach to the public who were now to be treated as 
customers or clients. This is beginning to change the strongly negative public 
attitudes that used to be applied to the apartheid-era civil service by the 
majority of the population. The Batho Pele programme, a flagship policy of 
the ANC government, seems to have much in common with the UK's Citizen's 
Charter whose emphasis is on customer orientation — "a key feature of 
[British] civil service reform in the 1990s." Accordingly, "Government 
departments and executive agencies [in Britain were]...required to be more 
sensitive to the demands of the users of their services" (Butcher, 1997: 54; 
also, see Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000: 88).
The new business-like approach must rest on new ideas of assessed 
performance-related measures. It is still early days, but these measures will 
probably significantly affect the behaviour and roles of the senior civil 
servants who are placed on personal Performance Management Contracts 
(PMCs) (especially from Chief Director upward) - if they are properly 
applied. To begin with, this managerial innovation could usher in the gradual 
professionalisation of the top administrative positions of the South African 
civil service as these contracts are intended to change and control the work 
of these officials and, through them, their numerous subordinates. A
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remarkable aspect of these PMCs is that a department's or ministry's minister 
or provincial MEC evaluates the performance of the highest official in that 
department. The highest officials (Director-General, Deputy Director-General 
and Chief Director) in turn evaluate the performance of their immediate 
subordinates who do likewise with their subordinates. This process presently 
applies only down to the next "senior managers" grade of Director — 
although not all of them. Assistant Directors, Deputy Director and some 
Directors are not individually subject to PMCs but they are covered by the 
collective requirements of the Performance Agreements that apply to their 
sections of their departments or ministries. Thus, Assistant Directors who are 
assessed as performing poorly will be damaging their superiors' capacity to 
fulfil the requirements of their own PMCs and so may expect to feel some 
disciplinary pressure from above. If PMCs are seriously applied to the most 
senior officials, with sanctions attached to poor performance, their salary, 
bonuses or promotion would be at risk from weaknesses among their 
subordinates.
Analysis of the productivity issues facing the new South African civil service 
suggests that Performance Management Contracts should be extended down 
to at least Assistant Director's level. One current limitation is that there does 
not seem to be an effective means of monitoring their implementation. 
Evaluations that are currently being applied by the highest officials 
(Directors-General and Deputy Directors-General) to their subordinates seem 
uncertain or even open to manipulation. Very few of the eligible interviewees 
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had been formally evaluated by their superiors and therefore appeared to be 
uncertain or unconcerned about the effectiveness of these new personal 
contracts. Among those who had been formally evaluated, none stated ChaC 
they expected a salary sanction, demotion or dismissal if their performance 
was found unsatisfactory. All that would be expected to be done would be a 
review of the concerned official's weaknesses and the reasons he or she was 
unable to reach the desired performance targets.
Interviewees suggested that the idea was to use the individual PMC and the 
collective Performance Agreement as a tool for staff capacity-building rather 
than as a means to punish the officials concerned. It is currently doubtful 
whether and to what extent either of these devices may be used as reliable 
tools for measuring and improving productivity among South Africa's senior 
civil servants. Of course, such a radical change would be expected to begin 
cautiously, as a training or staff development device and to develop actual 
sanctions only rather gradually. The very similar developments in Whitehall 
in recent years have had this same educational and incremental character 
(Massey, 2001).
The performance contract innovation has been minimal, at least during the 
first five years of South Africa's new democracy. Not much was done at the 
outset because of the conditions set by the 'sunset clauses' which guaranteed 
apartheid era officials' positions. All the then negotiating parties accepted this 
policy on the eve of South Africa's historic elections. These clauses 
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stipulated, am°ng olzher things, that no apartheW era civd servants woiild be 
required to give up their jobs within the first five years of the new 
dispensation (Ndletyana, 2000). Therefore, the so-called 'rank-and-leg 
promotions' (a practice whereby all civil servants were promoted on seniority 
in spite of any poor performance) persisted.
Thus, the newly-appointed DGs and other senior civil servants had to endure 
the presence of many senior officials from the apartheid era, some of whom 
they thought were incompetent, reluctant to implement the new ANC 
government's policies or (covertly) opposed to the many changes in their 
respective departments. Needless to add, the presence of such officials in 
various government structures made it difficult for the senior civil servants 
(especially DGs) to play their roles of effecting change inside the civil service 
at the time when this was urgently needed. Many of those officials have, 
however, gradually opted for lucrative retirement and left the scene. The 
government had to pay dearly for this while also losing some more valuable 
skilled and experienced staff in the same Voluntary Severance Package (VSP) 
process. As one most senior provincial official toid me, "We are sitting with a 
lot of 'dead-wood' [in this department]", referring to cases where the so- 
called old guard officials had chosen not to take a VSP offer. However, 'dead­
wood' has also been used to refer to the largely untrained, unskilled and 
mostly black officials from the "ex-departments" of former apartheid 
structures.
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Another issue which has not been easy to investigate, but which could have 
affected the roles of the senior civil service, is the negative attitudes of some 
members the pre-1994 civil service. Scepticism and uncertainties on the 
changes taking place inside the civil service were often expressed by the old 
guard. For instance, when asked to 'name one main aspect that you think 
has changed remarkably the roles of the senior civil servants since 1994', the 
response from some members of this group was 'none', or that 'things have 
gone from bad to worse.' The same can be said about the negative attitudes 
of some senior civil servants towards employment equity. The need for 
equity cannot be over-emphasised, particularly given the apartheid legacy. 
However, some from the old guard felt that the government was wasting 
time on such policies and measures and sometimes argued that AA was (in 
the standard hostile phrase) reverse racism. (These and other opinions were 
featured in the quotation boxes in Chapter 3.5, above).
One difficulty facing South Africa's senior civil servants is their understanding 
of the twin mandates they must accept in the new dispensation. These two 
mandates are, firstly, the policies of the ruling party (as represented by the 
ministers at national level or MECs at provincial level) and, secondly, the 
administrative mandate — the rules, regulations and directives of the various 
Heads of Department. Several senior civil servants at provincial government 
level strongly believed that failure to understand this very often led to 
conflict and tensions between the minister/MEC and the most senior 
administrative officials. They were hopeful that the new Public Service Act 
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(1997) would address such problems between the pondcians and sentor civil 
servants as it was drafted for this purpose.
Generally, post-1994 changes are still unfolding in the different departments 
and officials complained that they have difficulties coping with the stream of 
new policies and laws. However, as the neighbouring (Commonwealth) 
countries also indicate, the functions of senior civil servants in Africa 
sometimes appear to be unclear or ambiguous (Lungu, 1997). This ambiguity 
may be affected by the nature of a department's work and responsibilities: I 
chose to interview in the Education and Health Departments of four selected 
provincial governments (and in the national level Department of Health) 
precisely because of their particular direct exposure to mass public demands 
for these services which makes them specially important politically. Apart 
from the 33 respondents working in the (national level) Department of Public 
Service and Administration, all my respondents were directly concerned with 
the 'sharp end' of delivering education and health services.
5,2 How the Structure Affects Officials' Perspectives
It has been argued that "...African bureaucracies are on the threshold of, if 
not already engaged in, important changes in their structures and forms, 
functions, roles and resource base" (Mukandala, 1992:557). Unlike in the 
rest of Africa, to which Mukandala is referring, changes in the South African 
context are (understandably) taking place largely because of the need to deal 
with the legacy of apartheid. This is not surprising because, as B.G. Peters 
has argued, "...the structure of the public sector depends very significantly 
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upon history and economic and social conditions, as well as ideas about the 
purposes of government" (Peters, 1984:111). Certainly, the debate about the 
purposes of government in South Africa has, as in other parts of the African 
continent, led many to ask questions on the nature of the post-apartheid 
government machinery. Peters further wrote that, ''No reform of government, 
however well informed by organization theory, is likely to be able to 
overcome all the inherited traditions embodied within the machinery of 
government." This might well be because government departments and 
ministries have certain traditions that are likely to affect the behaviour of 
their office-holders. Hall and Taylor (1996:942) have emphasised the 
importance of "...the relationship between institutions, ideas and beliefs." 
New institutionalism, as they argued, sought "...to elucidate the role that 
institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes" (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996:936). Of particular importance to this present study of 
South Africa is "historical institutionalism" which, as Hall and Taylor wrote, 
"...built on the older tradition of political science that assigned importance to 
formal political institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996:937). In this academic 
light of context, this section attempts to assess the possible impact of 
government structures on the roles and perspectives of the South African 
senior civil service after the country's 1994 general elections.
We may say, firstly, that it was inevitable that the overall changes taking 
place in South Africa would also affect the machinery of government. 
Whether the civil service should spearhead these changes is an important 
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question, but this chaptei- wiH not attorn^ to answer ft directly. Secondly,. it 
is important to understand that such changes are not a single event but a 
series of processes so it will not be easy to define the changes, or their 
momentum, inside the government departments.
It was mentioned in the preceding chapter that the old apartheid government 
structures were hierarchical and continue to be so today. By 'structure' is 
meant the design, arrangement and characteristics of the government 
departments and ministries, as illustrated by their organisation charts 
(organograms). Their hierarchical, pyramidal design suggests top-down 
deicc^iion-making. This has several implications. Politically, it might be 
advantageous to those at the top because the control of the organisation 
would rest almost exclusively on the higher echelons. But this might pose 
problems administratively because it encourages centralisation and stifles 
initiative at middle or lower levels. In other words, decision-making levels 
ride up much too high. Obviously, given the country's current drive towards 
democracy, any undue centralisation is unfortunate, as it acts against more 
open, participative and democratic values.
The continuing hierarchical design of the post-1994 departments and 
ministries appears increasingly redundant now that apartheid laws that this 
design was intended to support have largely disappeared. In the apartheid 
years, departments and ministries were not only very hierarchical in design 
and top-down in their methods, but also multiplied and duplicated to deal 
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separatdy with the tjtfferent: races to fit in wfth toe separate development 
ideology of the time. Obviously, the work of the civil servants in racially 
defined departments was limited by its racial basis: they were powerless to 
effect any wider changes or, indeed, much meaningful change at all. Another 
feature of the old system was the rude, uncaring and often blatantly racist 
attitude of many apartheid-era civil servants. This largely produced the 
widespread fear, suspicion and even hatred of government officials 
(especially in departments like Bantu Administration and Development and 
Bantu Education) in the black areas or among the black community.
The continuing hierarchical nature of the departments and ministries also has 
other implications for the roles of the senior civil servants, especially the 
Directors-General. They occupy a very powerful position in South Africa that 
is highly respected (in some cases feared) by the junior and middle 
managers, perhaps more than would be the case in a flatter structure. 
Clearly, the culture of the organisation is influenced by its structure and both 
culture and structure are readily taken to reflect the values and norms of the 
people at the apex of the organisation (Handy, 1993: 180; Pollit and 
Bouckaert, 2000: 60). This perception of the top officials' values may well 
undermine the expression of divergent views or debate among middle and 
junior grades. But undermining such debates creates political problems, 
especially in a rapidly changing and young democracy such as South Africa.
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The picture is not yet clear how far change is occurring to these departmental 
structures. Many civil servant interviewees were quick to emphasise that bold 
changes were taking place inside their departments and felt that such 
changes were certainly changing their own roles. However, there was no 
consensus on either of these points, or on whether changing methods and 
styles of work have yet affected the basic nature of departments. Changes 
mentioned by interviewees included the following:
(a) departments are now less rule-bound so each senior civil servant must 
exercise their discretion on matters previously deemed the preserve of 
the head of department; all officials must, therefore, be personally 
familiar with the legal requirements affecting their decision-making 
tasks;
(b) there is no longer firm discouraging of more junior or middle managers 
from meeting and discussing with their superiors or even with the 
political heads of their departments (national ■ ministers or provincial 
MECs);
(c) administrative heads of department (Directors-General, 
Superintendents-Generals or Deputy Directors-General) now enter into 
regular consultation with their subordinates, even on major policy 
matters;
(d) junior and middle managers are now able to voice criticisms of their 
heads of departments, without fear of victimisation or dismissal, unlike 
previously;
(e) introduction of the Batho Pete principles (see Appendix 2) has begun to 
lead to changes, however minimal, on certain unacceptable attitudes 
(especially racism) in government offices;
(f) in an attempt to deal with the multicultural nature of the South African 
society and civil service, civil servants must now make a concerted 
effort to learn to speak the (11) official languages (or, at least, to learn 
the predominant languages used in the provinces in which they 
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operate), it is to be hoped that this trend has begun to change the 
negative attitudes that the public used to have about the public sector;
(g) the Directors-General have now been given greater executive powers 
even though it is also true that their ministers or MECs are now legally 
designated the "executing authorities" of the departments they 
oversee; thus, the Directors-General are still accountable to Parliament 
for their department's expenditure, though their minister/MEC may 
overturn their decisions. In this case, the Public Finance Management 
Act (S.64.2) requires that ministers/MECs put their directives in 
writing, making copies to the Auditor-General's office (exactly the same 
rule as has long applied in Whitehall);
(h) on Affirmative Action, some senior officials said that their own attitudes 
have been affected in that the new AA law has helped them be more 
tolerant of new recruits to the civil service, possibly appointed on AA 
grounds.
As a result of such developments, managerial styles have had to change: 
authoritarian practices are much less acceptable. Tolerance of cultural and 
other differences, a great challenge facing South African communities in 
general, is gradually becoming a reality and will be tested, including in 
government departments. The relative decline of a rule-bound culture in the 
various departments does not necessarily imply the abolition of rules or 
regulations. It rather suggests a new approach of avoiding the often 
unnecessary formal recourse to some rule or regulation, whenever an issue 
arises for action, which has long been the style of at least some departments 
and ministries. This more flexible, discretionary, approach eases decision­
making, especially for the top three ranks of Director-General, Deputy 
Director-General and Chief Director, where formal final decisions on casework 
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has always bec°me cl°gged tip with the usiial delays associated with such a 
rule-bound, traditi°nal bureaucracy wNch passes decisions too high up the 
hierarchy for fear of making a wrong call or creating a precedent.
Certainly, the introduction of a consultative culture ((c) above) has meant 
that the civil servants are now more inclined to ask questions on matters 
which, under the old apartheid order, they would not have had an 
opportunity to ask. On the positive side, this has led to greater openness and 
has encouraged freedom of expression in the departments. On the negative 
side, however, this has often slowed implementation as heads of 
departments felt they had to consult their immediately relevant junior 
colleagues before a decision could be taken. It has been suggested that 
heads of departments have used the new custom of internal consultation as 
an excuse not to speed up a policy's implementation.
In relation to the new customer-friendly approach (as outlined in the Batho 
Pele White Paper) many changes have been introduced in government 
departments, but these still need to be followed by concrete action. Even the 
government has acknowledged that "One of the lessons from the past five 
years is that we have developed more policies than we have capacity to 
implement" [Pretoria News, 18/05/00). The implementation of the 
Affirmative Action laws in the new, post-1994 departments and ministries is 
one major example of this over-commitment. Senior officials must now have 
to deal with the consequences of this policy, whether negative or positive, 
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and must look for better ways to implement it while promote it inside their 
own departments and agencies and supporting it (no matter how unpopular it 
might be) among private sector employers, many of whom are doubtful or 
even hostile. They also need to learn how best to utilise and integrate staff 
with different skills bases, especially AA appointees. They may also need to 
help the AA appointees to deal with any stigma of being appointed on this 
basis.
Recent new influences of the roles and perceptions of the senior civil servants 
on their departments' structures have arisen from their changing personnel. 
Factors include:
• appointment of outsiders to senior posts with little or no civil service 
background;
• the diverse backgrounds of these new recruits;
• their greater commitment to change and to democratic ideals (equality, 
fairness, equity, justice, openness);
• their seemingly consistent effort to help the civil service shed its old 
negative image;
• their preference for more modern and participative management, helping 
to move on from legalistic bureaucracy.
There are positive and negative consequences arising from these 
characteristics. For instance, the appointment of technical and professional 
outsiders, (e.g. IT experts or doctors) has injected new blood into 
departments with new ideas, particularly from the private sector. Unlike the 
old civil servants, who were always suspected of trying to turn the clock
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backwarts, t:hese new have continued to enjoy legitimacy and
support from aH their colleagues, new and o|d. The appointment of papite 
from various racial and cultural backgrounds in senior government positions 
has also had positive spin-offs. The civil service is now fairly representative 
of the country's population, according to a recent government report 
(Pretoria News, 18/05/2000). It states:
...the government, as the country's largest employer, is in command of a 
workforce whose composition in both gender and racial terms almost 
matches that of the country: 70% black, 17% white, 9% coloured, 4% 
Indian, 51 % women and 49% men. (Public Service Review Report, 
cited in Pretoria News, 18/05/00).
However, there was a continuation of "stark inequalities in terms of rank and 
salary". Although the number of blacks seems to have increased 
dramatically, they continued to "dominate the lower levels of employment" 
(Pretoria News, 18/05/00). Similarly, "the government's plan to boost the 
management capability of the [civil] service is undermined by a bottom­
heavy structure" which has made it difficult for it to implement vital changes 
(Pretoria News, 18/05/00). One of the consequences of this bottom-heavy 
structure has been that very few experienced and skilled blacks are available 
to fill the top positions and help to implement the necessary policy changes 
in various departments. The combination of race and gender as part of the 
Affirmative Action policy raises interesting questions (looked at in Chapter 3 
where my respondents' perspectives on these issues were analysed).
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We may conclude that the re|ationshin l^ween t;he structures (namely how 
different departments are arranged) and the roles of the senior civil servants 
is not easy to establish, at least as a matter of data analysis resting on clear 
independenti/dependent variables. Can the manner in which a government 
department or ministry is arranged influence the behaviour and perspectives 
of its staffs, or is the influence the other way round? Some interviewees 
thought that the design of their departments or ministries did have an impact 
on their roles, whereas others saw no link. Departments are still mainly 
hierarchical and under top-down management styles. So it would appear that 
the structure, as illustrated in the departmental organograms, does have an 
effect on the roles and perspectives of the senior civil servants.
5.3 Challenges to Management: Unethical Conduct and Corruption
Any aspect of weak public service ethics, not to mention criminal corruption, 
represents a sharp challenge to the rational management of any civil service, 
however well-established and secure its norms and procedures may be — for 
example, in the UK's case. Where a public service is in dramatic transition 
and hoping to establish a democratic alternative to an authoritarian political 
heritage, any unethical and criminal conduct is far more damaging because it 
helps to drain away public acceptance and legitimacy as soon as it may have 
started to build up. Therefore, the issue of corruption has very serious 
implications for the development of the nost-anapcheid civil service. It would 
be unfair to state that corruption is rampant within the civil service, as has 
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been suggested by sections of the South African media. Nor is it useful if the 
media lump together as "corruption" any form of unethical conduct, partisan 
bias, personal or group nepotism or any other type of illegitimate and 
unacceptable conduct.
There is a need for a systematic investigation of such allegations. This study 
could not have attempted this but it can cite some of them. Two examples 
are collective criminal activities, involving numbers of officials and others 
running rackets on a continuing basis. The other four citations are individual 
officials' transgressions (not necessarily criminal acts) which are not 
individually of great importance. The question is, of course, how common 
such individual cases may be: are there many others which have avoided 
detection and redress and which therefore could lend their character to the 
system as a whole? Corruption in the civil service could affect the long-term 
viability of the civil service, if left untouched.
The most important (indeed, traditional) corrupt practice has long been the 
"ghost workers" racket, whereby officials and others manage to draw into 
their own control the salaries, pensions and other benefits of non-existent 
civil service staffs, mainly at provincial government level. In 1996, for 
instance, the South African civil service was reported to comprise around 1.2 
million persons (Cape Times, 19/12/96) which the government wanted 
reduced. This figure should, however, be treated with caution given the 
alarming number of ghost workers subsequently detected to have been on 
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payrolls in some provinces around that time (Daily Dispatch, 02/08/97). 
Some provinces, such as Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga, have been 
particularly associated with this practice: the post-1994 integration of 
different administrations brought this established practice to more national 
attention. In 1999, the Eastern Cape government threatened severe 
penalties for those stealing money by possessing as many as four faked ID 
books to draw four pensions from the welfare department.
My interviews could not realistically seek senior officials' perceptions (and 
certainly not confessions!) on this sensitive topic without risking the 
interviews' main objective. A question about ghost workers in the 
respondent's department was asked and these responses now follow. 
Inevitably, some officials comment on this traditional racket more broadly, 
often after saying that their own department was free (perhaps has always 
been free) of this weakness. This topic came last in the interview, often 
when time had run out, so the numbers giving a substantive response (don't 
knows excluded) to these three questions fell away, as shown:
(i) Are there ghost workers in this department?
Yes 15%; No 85% (n = 141)
(ii) Have there been any in the past?
Yes 90%; No 10% (n = 90)
(iii) Why has the civil service been experiencing this problem? (n = 82)
A problem of criminality and greed; (some reference to poverty):
27%
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A problem of weak persmnel and audit manag^ent in
those provinces/areas, which was not being addressed: 73%
The overall view of my senior respondents seemed to be that this particular 
form of civil service-related corruption had always been rather remote from 
them, both hierarchically and geographically, and was now being defeated by 
better management.
A second and much more limited collective fraud was the alleged sale of 
national identity documents to illegal immigrants by some senior officials in 
one department (Sunday Times, 21/03/99). The three individual 
transgressions to be cited here simply as examples are:
• the chief official (Director-General) of Mpumalanga province (Coleman 
Nyathi) who was "forced to resign earlier this year after press reports 
exposed his doctorate in administration as a useless 'mail order' degree 
from an uncertified British university" {African Eye News Service, 
26/10/00). At the time of writing, Nyathi's citizenship was also under 
investigation after a Home Affairs Department probe found he was an 
illegal Zimbabwean migrant who had used fake identity documents 
{African Eye News Service, 26/10/00). (A slightly earlier scandal in the 
same province concerned senior officials who had allegedly falsified job 
qualifications. The DPSA was said to be "... investigating scores of senior 
officials ... ten [of whom were] found to have fraudulent degrees" {The 
Star, 22/05/00)).
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• the prownc:^ minister (MEC) for ^ucaton in the KwaZuh-Natal province 
Ms Eileen kaNkosi Shandu was dismissed by the province's Premier for 
nepotism: she had appointed her brother, Isaac Nkosi, as a DDG in her 
department, "....ahead of better-qualified candidates" (Sowetan, 
23/08/00).
• a senior white, ex-army, official (former Major-General van der Merwe) 
held a senior post in the KZN province's Safety and Security department 
from 1997 but was additionally appointed its Accounting Officer in March 
2000. This double posting attracted publicity and official scrutiny: Mr van 
der Merwe claimed to see no real distinction between the two positions.
Stories such as these and their over-heated reporting naturally encourage 
allegations that some civil servants have joined with the selfish motive of 
enriching themselves. They are said to be interested only in the benefits 
offered by public sector employment (the 'gravy train' syndrome). These 
individual cases are of particular interest to this study in that three of the 
persons ('Dr' Nyathi, Ms kaNkosi Shandu and her brother, Mr Isaac Nkosi) 
were among my respondents. The fact that Mr van der Merwe is white 
reminds any observer that impropriety or criminality in the civil service is 
neither new nor confined to Africans. In 1999, the British scholar David 
Simon commented strongly on such ideas:
It is very difficult to verify claims that corruption is far more 
widespread than previously. Successive apartheid governments 
and their policies of fragmentation and creating despotic fiefdoms 
bred rampant corruption; the entire Department of Development
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Administration was abolished in the early 1990s for this reason.
By contrast, allegations of corruption are far more likely to be 
aired publicly and to be investigated nowadays. The current raft 
of investigations and trials relating to senior Mpumalanga officials 
and cabinet members — right up to and including the provincial 
Premier Matthew Phosa — is a case in point. Another — rather 
racist — myth is that the alleged rise in corruption is almost 
entirely due to the Africanization of the civil service. Actually, it 
also appears increasingly evident in various levels of the private 
sector where, despite Affirmative Action (usually styled 
'empowerment'), whites still dominate the upper ranks. 
Corruption is not racially based (Simon 1999: 93).
It would, of course, be desirable for the South African government system to 
try to emulate the countries where official business has traditionally been 
seen to be conducted cleanly — such as Scandinavia, especially Denmark 
(Jensen and Knudsen, cited in Page and Wright, 1999: 235) or the UK. 
Richard Chapman suggests that, in such fortunate circumstances, ethics and 
values, "...can even be articulated into core principles, centred around such 
notions as the impartial and accountable bureaucrat and the open and honest 
politician" (Chapman, 2000: 113). In the particular British case, Barker and 
Wilson noted, "Corruption or fraud are unethical because they are illegal, 
whereas ministers lying to the legislature, the mass media and the public at 
large ('misleading Parliament") are normally regarded as so unethical that 
they must resign" (Barker and Wilson, 1997, 232).
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5.4 Neo-Managerialism in South Africa's Civil Service: Performance 
Management Contracts and Performance Agreements
The recent civil service reforms in South Africa should be understood and 
analysed in the context of neo-managerialism — New Public Management 
(NPM). A number of both recent and envisaged changes within the 
departments and ministries represent this perspective. The NPM approach 
"...envisages a public sector organized more along the lines of the private 
sector and a civil service whose leaders have greater flexibility and more 
opportunity to exercise discretion" (Laegreid, 2000: 880). To some extent, 
there is a connection between this approach and others. Barberis (1998: 
454) states that, "The NPM has been associated, implicitly or explicitly, with 
a number of distinct approaches." He cites public choice theory, bureau­
shaping and deconstructionism or post-modernism . as the more obvious, 
adding that they have "sometimes been linked with other theories and 
models." Dunleavy and Hood have suggested that NPM should be seen as 
"...a summary description of a way of reorganizing public sector bodies to 
bring their management, reporting and accounting approaches closer to (a 
particular perception of) business methods" (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994: 9).
There is no doubt that in South Africa, like elsewhere, the main aim of 
introducing Performance Management Contracts and Agreements ...is the 
belief that they enhance efficiency" (Laegreid, 2000: 880). Per Laegreid's 
study of the introduction of NPM reforms is an important contribution to the 
debate about the usefulness of these reforms. His study focused on "one 
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Particijlar administrative reform: t:he ^reduction of contract systems foi- top 
civil servants in New Zealand in 1988 and Norway in 1990" (Laegreid, 
2000.880). Laegreid particularly wanted to find out "...how this reform affects 
the relationship between political leaders and the top civil servants under 
contract" (p.880). He looked at what he called "relational" and "agency" 
contract systems in both countries and argued that the relational contracts 
are the less formal of the two systems. Relational contracts, he stated, are 
not based on sanctions but "implicit understandings" and "shared needs" of 
the parties involved. By contrast, the agency contracts entail, "formal, 
binding and legal arrangements. They are goal-oriented, incentives-based, 
concrete and specific and have a limited time horizon" (p.880).
The government originally decided that the senior managers from Chief 
Director up to Director-General would (with effect from May 2000) be 
required to sign personal Performance Management Contracts. When the 
Government of National Unity took over from the National Party government 
in 1994, few observers could have imagined that its dominant ANC element 
would in the near future contemplate (let alone introduce) civil service 
managerial reforms that borrowed heavily from the private sector. However, 
personal Performance Management Contracts and collective Performance 
Agreements have been introduced and, indeed, already extended (in January 
2001) to the next grade of the senior civil service (Director). According to 
Regulation VII B.2.1, this "Contract [is] to be concluded between an 
executing authority [the minister or provincial MEC] and a head of 
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department in terms of section 12 (2) of the [Public Service] Act...." 
Accordingly, The rontoart may specfy ttie main delegations or 
authorisations to the head of department in terms of Regulation II B.l 
necessary in order to manage her or his department in terms of section 7 (3) 
(b) of the [Public Service] Act, and a provision stating that delegation or 
authorisation be added to or removed from the contract" (Public Service 
Regulations, 1999).
The personal Performance Management Contract policy now requires the four 
most senior grades of both national and provincial level departments and 
ministries to sign three- to five-year contracts that they agree with the 
national President or regional Premier (or minister/MEC delegated this task). 
These contracts embody targets, defined outputs and their time-scales. The 
Directors-General propose their own targets and time-scales but the 
President or Premiers must agree to them. Directors-General are now in turn 
empowered by law to evaluate their administrative Heads of Department on 
a quarterly basis. They must also sign personal Performance Management 
Contracts which they propose for their Director-General's agreement. High 
achievers, in terms of the contract, would normally expect to be rewarded 
(pay rise or promotion) although there can in principle also be a negative 
appraisal which could damage an individual's promotion and other prospects. 
At present (in early 2001) only the top four grades (DG, Deputy DG, Chief 
Director and Director) are signing these personal Performance Management 
Contacts. Any extension down to even a limited number of Deputy Directors 
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or Assistant Directors could not be expected soon, not least because of the 
relatively large numbers in those grades.
Below Director level (Deputy and Assistant Director) Performance 
Agreements are supposed to be applied more collectively in a department or 
section. They are intended to guide and sensitise these less senior officials 
(middle management) to the need to monitor and improve performance in 
their departments. Officials performing well or ill at these middle levels are 
supposed to affect outputs and time-scales so that their bosses at Director 
level and higher will be helped or hindered in meeting their own Performance 
Management Contracts' terms. This linkage is intended to make the most 
senior grades (who have Performance Management Contracts) more 
motivated to get better work from their subordinates at Assistant Director 
level and below. This may well particularly apply to the senior officials 
(Deputy DG or Superintendent General grade) who are designated the 
administrative Head of Department. They have the greatest need for 
leverage over their numerous middle-level colleagues whose performance 
and attitudes will determine the department's overall achievements.
Thus, there seems to be preference for the agency type of performance 
contracts (Laegreid, 2000) also in South Africa, though with initial 
government reluctance to enforce these contracts. A former DPSA Director­
General has said:
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The new Public Service Regulati°ns are designed to improve the 
performance and productivity of public servants...The regulations 
allow for decentralised decision-making and make it possible to 
hold managers accountable. They also introduce a performance 
management system and institutionalise the signing of 
performance agreements by public service managers (Paseka 
Ncholo, DPSA Annual Report, 1998: 3).
Furthermore, Performance Agreements (PAs) "...have been used as part of 
the performance management system to provide a uniform minimum basis 
for the performance management of senior managers to assist departments 
in realising their annual strategic objectives" (DPSA, 2000: 3 [emphasis in 
original]).
So, it is clear that the use of PMCs and PAs is not only expected to enhance 
performance and productivity but also to ensure accountability. This thinking 
is closely associated to the fact that the old South African public 
administration was "...not accountable and transparent. The institution was 
highly inefficient and provided poor quality public services which sustained 
racial discrimination" (DPSA Annual Report, 1998: 5). The introduction of 
these reforms has been widely accepted in South Africa generally, although 
with mixed reactions from the civil servants themselves. It is fairly clear 
from press and public discussion of civil service matters — amply confirmed 
by my interviews — that the government is proceeding only slowly with this 
policy.
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NPM is a new way of effecting reforms in the public sector, although its ideas 
have been around for some time. Critics have argued that, "Many NPM 
innovations seem to be a delayed response to ideas originally developed in 
the 1960s...but [that were] not applied to the mainline civil service at the 
time" (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994:10). In fact, the use of performance-related 
systems has been criticised in some countries. As Laegreid has found in his 
study, these systems have been very popular with governments but "...they 
have not been particularly successful" (Laegreid, 2000: 880). For example, 
on personal pay, Laegreid cites evidence from the work of several scholars in 
North America to support his argument on what he calls "a paradox of 
performance pay." He concludes that their evidence suggests that the 
performance-related pay reforms "...have yielded no clear improvement in 
performance and have failed to create a more flexible or more satisfactory 
evaluation and compensation system" (Laegreid, 2000: 880).
The South African government is presently assessing the relevance of NPM to 
the current civil service reforms. Government is also aware of the danger of 
managerialism, an "...approach [that] has been historically associated with 
what has been characterised as neo-liberalism and the rise of the so-called 
'new right.'" A further realisation has been that, " Managerialism ascended in 
Britain after a Conservative government took power in 1979 and has been 
linked to the rise of public choice theory and 'cut-back management'" (Public 
Service Review Report, 1999/2000: 60-1). While acknowledging the need to 
learn from international experiences and the Southern African region, the 
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government has stressed that "...we are committed to pursuing initiatives 
that fit with our local peculiarities, resource constraints and capacity" (PSRR, 
1999/2000: 61). Thus, the managerialist ideas and approaches are viewed in 
South Africa as "...a genuine search for public sector management 
improvement, not as an ideological exercise to cut back government" (PSRR, 
1999/2000: 61). This may well be true, but improvement, like re-invention, 
reform, modernisation and change of the civil service, has been described as 
a "loaded term" by Pollit and Bouckaert (2000: 16). These terms, they argue, 
"...strongly [imply] not just change but beneficial change — a deliberate 
move from a less desirable (past) state to a more desirable (future) state" 
(emphasis in original). Of course, these comments would generally be 
welcomed in South Africa, given the apartheid legacy.
There is no clearly discernible pattern presently being followed in South 
Africa in line with Lsgreid's (2000) views. Some interviewees' comments on 
this issue suggested an inclination towards the more moderate, less formal 
"relational type" contracts. Nevertheless, it appears that some government 
departments (notably DPSA) have successfully applied and prefer the more 
formal and rather stringent personal Performance Management Contracts. 
The debate about the merits and demerits of personal Performance 
Management Contracts and Performance Agreements — indeed about the 
whole spectrum of views on NPM — has just begun in South Africa. What is 
not clear is how far the PMCs will need to be applied to rid the country of the 
vestiges of centralised, hierarchical and top-down designs in departments. It
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is cteai", however, that (if sustained) such a couW serve as an inid
attempt to drive the final nail into the coffin of the former apartheid 
administrations.
5.5 Senior Officials' and MECs' Perspectives on Manageria I 
Performance: a Survey Report
Administrative quality, or managerial performance, is of obviously major 
importance to all senior figures in an organisation who are likely to call 
themselves professional administrators or managers — whether in the public 
sector or the commercial or business sector. Issues of efficiency and 
effecttveness may not match the emotional and political force of the 
pa^^iicular South African case of adjusting senior civil service recruitment and 
seniorities to a post-apartheid democracy — or the much more general case 
of a service which is being politicised in some way. Issues of managerial 
performance are not as radical as either positive recruitment for racial 
advancement or the politicisation of previously non-partisan, professional 
cadres. In both of these cases it is hard to see (whether it be for better or 
worse) how the policy could be reversed to produce a new version of a white- 
Cominated senior civil service in South Africa or a newly independent, non­
political civil service in any country whose government had set out to 
politicise it in its own support. By contrast, current policies favouring 
managerial efficiency and effectiveness could prove transitory as the received 
practical meanings of those two many-sided and flexible terms changes with 
a country's political climate or even intellectual fashion. This could well prove 
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so on, for example, incentivisation of very senior civil servants in South 
Africa and elsewhere (not least in Whitehall, to mention only one possible 
example).
I had chosen to interview a useful number of DPSA officials working at 
national level to sponsor the national government's policies for civil service 
reform — notably better managerial performance and 'representivity' through 
Affirmative Action. As mentioned above, DPSA operates mainly at national 
level although it maintains co-ordinators in the provinces. My expectation 
was that DPSA officials (whom I called specialists in civil service issues) 
might well have different views and perceptions from the other, generalist 
respondents whose thoughts would be more concentrated on their health and 
education policy tasks.
As has already been seen in Chapter 3.5, presenting the survey report on 
'representivity' and AA, a number of the twenty-plus principal interview 
questions relate to two or more of this thesis's topic-based chapters (AA, 
management performance; politicisation; policy-making and overall change 
in the senior civil service). To avoid repetition, each is reported only once, in 
what would seem to be the most relevant chapter, but mentioned in passing 
in other relevant chapters to register its connection. Four of these mentions 
follow next, to clear the way for the four principal questions which are to be 
fully reported in this section. These four questions due for only a mention 
and a brief comment here are:
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• (Q.21) "... South African senior civil servants think and act mostly like the
political heads (ministers/MECs) under whom they serve."
(agree/disagree)
This question mainly relates to the policy-making process and is therefore 
peeopted in Chapter 6.5. It clearly affects this section's topic of management 
performance because there would be little hope of improving it if senior 
officials and their ministers seriously disagreed on how it should be defined 
and promoted. Because officials' own salaries and career prospects could be 
put at risk by management innovation imposed by their ministers (notably 
personal contracts) there is probably less chance of their true consensus on 
these issues. (By contrast, they might argue completely on some particular 
policy choice.)
• (Q.22) '"Would you say that, as sometimes happens in some countries, a 
Director-General should be removed or transferred whenever a new 
minister/MEC is appointed?"
This question mainly belongs jointly in Chapters 5.xx (on politicisation of the 
senior civil service) and 6.5 (on policy-making) and will be reported there. 
Its relevance to management is significant, however. The loss of personal 
continuity if the chief official of a South African government department is 
moved away whenever the minister/MEC is changed would be widely seen as 
a weakness. In particular, the significance and influence of seeing its 
Director-General's Performance Management Contract cancelled and replaced 
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by a new Director-General's version could be serious. It would hardly 
encourage officials to see Performance Management Contracts and their 
associated collective Performance Agreements as serious, mid-term 
instruments for guiding the senior grades' overall improvement:.
• (Q-25) "How influential are the senior civil service in policy-making?"
This question is, of course, reported in Chapter 6.5 on policy-making but, like 
the previous two, also relates to managerial efficiency. If all or part of a 
senior civil service cadre had lost (or was losing) its traditional policy-making 
role, it is unlikely to maintain its authority in its ministers' eyes on internal 
questions of management and organisation. Almost all public policies have 
strong practical or implementation aspects which often dominate the policy 
choice. Governments must choose to do what is actually feasible rather than 
what would be desirable). The ANC has not provided the only incoming 
government of a dominant party in recent years: we may recall the later 
Thatcher governments and the first Blair government among other 
international examples. These three governments have been seen as policy 
initiators who did not look mainly to the senior civil servants for policy ideas 
or preferences. This (possibly temporary) turning away from policy work 
may stimulate senior officials' active interest in efficiency questions because 
this helps to maintain their professional status in ministers' and the public's 
eyes as experts in management, even if no longer in policy analysis.
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• (Q-64) '"Are there any 'Ghost Workers' in this department?" and
subsequent questions.
This question was reported above in section 3 of this chapter. It is 
mentioned here simply to register in this survey report on managerial quality 
the fact that such fraud is clearly a major challenge to South African 
standards of public finance administration. In 1995, Zola Skweyiya (former 
DPSA Minister) said that, "Government is sometimes hard put to say exactly 
how many civil servants South Africa has on its payroll", because a significant 
number are 'ghosts' {Mail and Guardian, 08-14/12/95). It was noted in 
section 4.3 that many interviewees claimed that this corrupt practice was 
now dying out as personnel and financial management gradually improved. I 
could not readily tell whether such managerial improvements had actually 
resolved this problem, which differed by province.
The first of the four interview topics reported in this chapter on management 
performance is the crucial issue of recruitment and promotion criteria for the 
senior civil service.
• (0.37, 38) "Please mention the criteria that you think play an important 
role in the recruitment and promotion of senior civil servants in this 
country."
Respondents were asked for a perception of the actual current practice, not 
an opinion on what it should be. Their responses are a report on how things 
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seemed to them to be on this vital question for the future of their civil 
service. The question is open-ended so they were free to claiiri as much °i- 
as Httie ttrealdng of the merit prindpte with nepotism, po|itical patronage or 
even corruption as they may have wished. Their first and second mentions 
are analysed. Responses were coded into two broad groups: 'rational' 
criteria (experience, education or other qualifications, ability, potential) and 
'irrational' ones (any kind of favouritism, bias or corruption, whether 
personal, ethnic, racial or party political). Emphasis should be given to the 
first-mentioned criterion (as usually in survey analysis) as this was the first 
point to come to the respondent's mind. The split on the first criterion 
mentioned was 63% (of 175 officials) perceiving rational criteria and 37% 
perceiving irrational ones.
The second criterion mentioned split the same way but rather more heavily: 
74% to 26%. This eleven-point increase in nominating rational criteria on 
the second mention suggests that, taken overall, these 175 officials did see 
rather more prominence for race (and possibly, to a small extent, gender) in 
recruitment and promotion. This difference between first and second 
responses (63:37 as against 74:26) indicates a modest tendency for 
respondents to perceive (typically) 'race followed by ability' rather than the 
reverse as the likely actual basis for staffing decisions. In asking this 
question, I fully appreciated its very simple, standard form. It asked a wide 
spectrum of senior officials, spread across the country, from the 'specialist' 
ranks of the DPSA's headquarters to the 'generalists' in a rather remote
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provincial health or education department, to give a general judgement on 
the senior civil service as a whole. Recruitment realities differ greatly 
between national and provincial levels and departments — as do the political 
pressures on senior officials and their ministers/MECs to apply AA policy to 
advance members of a political part or of ethnic or extended family groups.
The coding terms rational or irrational criteria also need brief explanation. In 
studying each response I segregated characteristics which would in 
conventional terms, contribute to a better performance (qualifications, 
experience, ability, imagination, etc.) from those which simply described a 
job applicant's other aspects (race, gender, age, party or political outlook). I 
tried to keep the traditional merit principle separate from any political 
qualifications (in the broadest sense) for a senior post. I therefore coded the 
few overt mentions of candidates for posts having anti-apartheid "struggle 
credentials" as an irrational criterion and part of the political patronage on 
which this question asked for a general perception. It is obvious that 
government or ANC efforts to place Africans who have suffered from or 
struggled against the apartheid regime in senior public service posts - 
despite their lack of traditionally defined qualifications or relevant experience 
- are not irrational, although their political wisdom must await some years 
to be confirmed. These efforts have plainly rested on a political rationality 
while weakening, at least in , the short run, administrative rationality which 
would call for the best qualified person to get a senior job on their individual 
merits — using such terms in the traditional way.
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Quotation Box:
Officials speak about Senior Appointments and Promotions:
1. '"Although we have to give priority to the goals of AA policy and to 
an applicant's understanding of the need to pursue transformation 
[in the department and its programmes] we do consider 
candidates' experience and capability." (Male, white; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
2. "Affirmative Action is totally out of control in this department. I'm 
the only white person in my directorate and none has been 
appointed since I joined in 1995. Many blacks are now being 
appointed even if they have questionable experience — than 
whites. I feel the way blacks must have felt before 1994." (Male, 
white; provincial government; less senior grades)
3. "Our first criterion is an applicant's political track record or 'struggle 
credentials', followed by qualifications [or ability] to manage well." 
(Male, Asian; provincial government; most senior grades)
The perceptions or opinions of the provincial government MECs are central to 
this topic because they are legally designated as executive actors on senior 
appointments. They carry their party's political mandate to advance 
particular racial or gender (or, in some cases, ethnic) applicants for civil 
service posts — whether ANC (blacks in general); IFP in KwaZulu-Natal 
(Zulus); or, perhaps, the DP/NNP government in the Western Cape (whites/ 
coloureds). They are normally the source of pressure on official HODs and 
their more senior colleagues to recruit on political and personal grounds, 
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often in parallel with pressure from the parties, mainly, of course, the ANC 
which controls the national government and aH but two of the provinces.
All but one of the small group of eight MECs whom I asked about 
appointment criteria followed the 175 officials in saying that traditional 
(rational) criteria were mainly given the priority. When political criteria were 
mentioned they were expressed in personal terms such as, "The need to be 
politically conscious of the [ANC] ruling party's mandate", or "Understanding 
of the new paradigm of the policy framework", or even "A person's vision" or 
'"Aspiration to democratic principles." Any civil service professional in a 
democratic system — notably including many non-Africans and non-ANC 
supporters in the South African senior civil service — would see an 
understanding of official policies and a commitment to democracy as the 
basis of their service and nothing to do with their race or personal political 
preferences. Only one MEC of the eight mentioned AA policy as a criterion 
(second, in his case, to "academic qualifications and experience"). Other first 
criteria were also mainly traditional (good management skills; ability and 
experience) while second criteria followed suit, including personality features 
("an ability to listen, understand and work with people"). Given the AA laws 
and policies and the known pressures from the ruling party to put its former 
cadres into senior posts, the impression given by these eight MECs (six of the 
ANC) is that they responded to me on this topic with diplomatic discretion. 
(One did not: the two effective criteria claimed by one non-ANC MEC were 
"political network" and "political affiliation ).
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Even if all but one of eight MECs were being discreet, the balance of 
perception among 175 officials is plain — and I obtained no sense of their 
particular self-censorship on this topic. In early to mid 2000, at least, it 
seems clear that these members of the senior civil service (about half of 
whom were non-African and two-thirds male — and so not personally in line 
for any AA benefits) did not see the merit principle being destroyed. It is 
always true that a survey question which asks for a perception of actual 
practices may be answered in terms of preference: some officials may have 
been saying that qualifications and merit ought to matter most. Also (given 
the almost overwhelming support for general change in the post-1994 senior 
civil service to be reported in Chapter 7) it may be that reservations about 
perceived damage being done to the merit principle are modified or offset by 
support for the new civil service as a whole. Even so, the majority 
perception of recruitment and promotion criteria arising from this important 
survey question is most striking.
(Finally on this topic, one male, black Assistant Director gave me amusing - 
and possibly satirical - triple criteria for senior appointments: "race; friends; 
luck").
Any organisation which is changing quite fast may develop strong defensive 
attitudes to 'outsiders' coming in, particularly to occupy scarce senior posts. 
I assessed this aspect by attempting a forced choice question.
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• (Q-42) "If you had to choose between ■ two candidates, both of high 
personal merit, for appointment as a senior civil servant, would you (all 
other things equal) choose one who has been a civil servant for 20 years 
or someone who has mostly worked outside the civil service?"
Knowing that many would reject this attempt to isolate the insider/outsider 
variable in such a choice, an option to "adopt another course" was offered: 
this proved valuable, as the 48% (of 179 respondents) who did reject it 
made comments running beyond the obvious platitude that they would seek 
a balance of background experience and ability. The other half (52%) who 
did accept the forced choice divided 31% in favour of the 20 years' 
experience and 21% choosing the outsider. This one-fifth positively wanted 
to appoint senior new blood, with fresh approaches and ideas, may be placed 
beside (although not combined with) the 48% who declined the forced 
choice, because that larger group were saying that being an outsider should 
not be a disadvantage, but only one aspect of the appointment decision. 
Overall, an impression of openness to new talent is given here. (A 
comparison with Whitehall's equivalent senior officials In early 2001, as 
rumours grow of more outside appointments during a second Labour term 
would be interesting.)
South Africa's senior civil service is under pressure to take directly into senior 
posts new blood or new brooms from the private sector, in the name of 
efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, it is also under direct legislative 
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mandate to implement the specifically South African AA laws and policy by 
similar direct senior recruitment. So this degree of openness to outsiders is 
noteworthy. It appears to display some degree of collective self-confidence 
in personal career terms if my 179 respondents are at all typical of all 
national and provincial level senior officials.
Quotation Box: 
Officials speak about Appointing Insiders/Outsiders to Senior Civil 
Service Posts:
1. "An outsider doesn't know much about the public service so I'd 
appoint the 20-years person who would know where we come from 
and are going to." (Female, Indian; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
2. "Twenty years experience might not be relevant. I'd appoint a 
person who is well versed in health policy and the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme." (Female, black; provincial 
government; senior grades)
3. "I would appoint an outsider because of fresh expertise, new ideas 
and motivation." (Male, white; provincial government; senior 
grades)
All ten MECs in my small group gave full and reasoned responses to this 
question, with clearly more enthusiasm for recruiting new senior 
management from outside the service. Five said without reservation that 
they would choose the outsider while three equally firmly preferred an 
outsider who had previous civil service experience or close knowledge - 
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(easier to wish for than to find, in any country). With only ten MECs, albeit 
representing three provincial controlling parties, it is impossible to judge 
whether MECs at large are more critical of long-serving career officials — and 
more keen on direct outside recruitment into senior posts — than my civil 
servant respondents.
Quotation Box:
MECs speak about Appointing Insiders/Outsiders to Senior Civil 
Service Posts:
1. "I would choose the outsider because most employees in my 
department are finding it difficult to adapt to change. An outsider 
is more energised to carry out changes." (ANC MEC)
2. "I would choose the outsider because we need someone who is 
client-driven if the government is to compete equally with the 
private sector. We also need to increase productivity in the public 
sector." (ANC MEC)
3. "I would chose the outsider because I would be looking for one with 
a different approach and who is not constrained by the habits of 





"I would choose the outsider because there is a need for flexibility, 
creativity and results, but such a person must also have the 
capacity to take risks." (non-ANC MEC)
Neither the insider nor the outsider is ideal. Therefore, I would 
appoint an outsider with inside experience. (non-ANC MEC)
I would appoint the one who can change, improve the system and 
be adaptable. Whether this person is new or old in the department 
is irrelevant. (ANC MEC)
This chapter's overall topic is management performance in the post-1994 
civil service. Administrative formality is the mark of all old-fashioned public 
services and the apartheid era civil service was notorious as some 
respondents recalled on a question (Q.55) to be reported below in Chapter 
7.1. It is an important theme of my analysis that formal structures, 
procedures and working relationships can considerably affect the practical 
outcomes of a government department, or perhaps any organisation above a 
certain size, notably the roles and resources of the officials themselves and 
the type or quality of the work they can do. Knowing of the traditional and 
rigid administrative structure of the apartheid era civil service, this question 
therefore asked whether today's formal structure was seen as a hindrance:
• (Q.50) "Would you say that the present structure (the organisation's 
chart) of this department makes it difficult for senior civil servants to 
perform their roles?"
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Only eight individuals had no opinion and 170 divided almost equally on the 
point: 47% saying Yes and 53% No.
The attitude of my civil servant and MEC respondents to the incoming 
personal Performance Management Contracts (PMCs) and the more collective 
Performance Agreements (PAs) was of great potential interest to my study. I 
asked for a general reaction; whether efficiency would be improved by them 
at the most senior levels; and whether this practice should extend to all 
senior grades.
• Q.56 asked for a general reaction to the topic which was, in 1999-2000, 
becoming more salient for officials, even though most respondents were 
not so senior as to have a personal contract and the associated formal 
assessment by their superior. Respondents often did not seem to 
distinguish between PMCs (for only the most senior grades) and the much 
broader PAs which were to be laid on whole sections, in aid of their boss 
(or even their boss's boss) passing the personal tests being laid on him by 
the department's DG/HOD or even by the minister/MEC. The responses 
therefore refer to the general idea of performance testing, based on 
targets or criteria for outputs or outcomes.
The open-ended comments on Q.56 were coded into positive, mixed and 
negative reactions. Only four individuals were d/k while eleven offered 
neutral or mixed views. Of the 142 who gave a direct positive or negative 
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response, 72% were unconditionally positive and a further 20% conditionally 
so. Thus only 8% were either unconditionally or conditionally negative.
• (Q-57) you think these contracts will improve efficiency in the top 
positions of the civil service?"
94% of the 124 officials giving a direct yes/no response said Yes and 6% No 
(a further thirteen persons being unsure or d/k).
• In response to the third point (Q.59) 70% of 125 officials thought that 
these contracts/agreements should be extended to cover in some way the 
work of all grades of the senior civil service, while 30% thought that this 
would not be appropriate for all of the work in question. Again, this issue 
seemed quite familiar even though little had actually happened in many 
respondents' departments or sections: only three persons said they did 
not know whether this radical extension would be a good reform. This 
apparent general familiarity with a new civil service process still in its 
infancy may indicate its salience for senior officials. The contract culture 
in the civil service could probably dwindle away almost as fast as it has 
grown up — as a matter of fashions in private sector-based management 
theories (Wright, 1997:8). It is certainly true that these devices could 
benefit or harm respondents personally. They potentially offer gain or loss 
to individuals, usually depending on the behaviour of colleagues, whether 
of senior, equal or junior status. Any given individuals in line to be 
personally contracted must rely on others to deliver the measured 
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performance for which they now expect to be rewarded or penalised in 
terms of bonus, salary or grade (promotion or even, possibly, demotion.)
As suggested earlier, the prospect of AA or possible politicisation could be 
said to be of more basic importance to a professional civil service cadre 
because of their probable permanence. But having a personal contract (or 
being pressurised to work harder or better to meet the demands of a 
boss's personal contract) may well have a sharp personal impact. Both 
civil servant and MEC respondents had plenty to say on this topic, 
although for nearly all the officials it was still only a prospective matter. 
However, for a few, more senior, people, the contract system was already 
in play in early-to-mid 2000. One told me that he had signed his PMC and 
discussed the department's inputs and outputs at monthly meetings with 
his HOD; the contract itself was assessed quarterly and evaluated overall 
annually. Revisions to targets were being issued to staff supervisors after 
each monthly meeting. This official was among the 70% (of 125) 
respondents who thought that personal contracting should be extended, at 
least to the next two grades (deputy and assistant director) and probably 
below that, beyond the senior service's range. The South African 
government is still assessing the usefulness of the performance 
management system and has identified "lack of systematic evaluation of 




Officials speak about Performance Contracts and Agreements:
1. The contracts have good intentions and I think they will enhance 
performance and result in higher productivity and high morale in 
the department." (Female, black; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
2. "I believe that one becomes more committed in the workplace 
when one has signed a contract." (Female, white; national 
government; less senior grades)
3. "I have been evaluated formally (every 3 months) by my Chief 
Director and I think that the performance contracts will jerk up 
efficiency and that they can protect the senior civil service." (Male, 
Indian; provincial government; senior grades)
4. "Performance contracts presently apply only between the MEC and 
the HOD. But I think that they should be cascaded down to the 
levels of cleaners in the department." (Female, white; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
5. "They are a tool aimed at structuring one's activities in line with the 
broader goals and objectives of the department. One needs to 
explain one's failure to attain objectives because the overall aim of 
this system is to justify earning the salary one earns. If these 
contracts are monitored and used effectively, they will improve 
efficiency in the top positions." (Male, white; national government; 
senior grades)
6. "I signed a performance contract in 1999 but I haven't yet been 
evaluated. I think that performance agreements will improve 
efficiency of the civil service and should be applied to every civil 
servant." (Male, black; provincial government; senior grades)
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7. Performance Agreements reptaced automatic promotion.
Everyone accepto the agreements because they're tied to the 
salary system. But performance confracto aren't managed well and 
there's no formal evaluation. However, the contracts will improve 
efficiency despite the presence of deadwood in the department who 
don't support the senior civil services." (Female, coloured; national 
government; senior grades)
8. "The performance management system does not work because 
there is no clarity about how it will be used. Neither are there 
resources to implement it. One's performance is analysed by one's 
immediate senior but there are different interpretations of this 
system by managers. Some use it as a punitive measure against 
their subordinates." (Male, black; national government; senior 
grades.)
9. "My HOD has signed the performance contract, but I am not aware 
of any evaluation. I view these contracts as a bad idea because 
managers are measured against key result areas and so they 
neglect other important duties. So I would not support extending 
these contracts to further grades." (Female, Indian; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
The reports and views of the six MECs who commented on contracts show 
the transitional status of this policy in early to mid 2000. One or two seemed 
to be settled in to it (at DG/HOD levels, at least) while others were clearly 
not. There were no differences of view between the three ANC and the three 
other MECs — unlike in their comments about implementing AA.
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MECs speak about Performance Contracts and Agreements:
1 "I have formally evaluated my administrative Head of Department 
and our contract is working well." (ANC MEC)
2. "I have formally evaluated the Superintendent-General of this 
department and our contract is based on 'key result areas' 
(towards which the SG has to work)." (non-ANC MEC)
3. "I am already semi-formally evaluating people in my department, 
although the performance management contract policy has not yet 
taken root. There is also no uniform application of the contracts, 
because of lack of common understanding in the department." 
(ANC MEC)
4. "I have not yet evaluated any of my department, but I shall be 
doing so formally next year (2001). Normally, an MEC/Minister 
must state in a contract what an individual must achieve during a 
given period (usually one year) and indicate how progress will be 
measured. If individuals fail to perform satisfactorily, they could 
have their salary reduced or be demoted. However, in practice it is 
very difficult for us to get rid of incompetent people. I think that 
these contracts will improve the performance of [top officials] but 
this depends on an MEC's or Minister's will to act... . . These 
contracts should not be applied at all levels, but only from Director 
level and up, as is currently intended." (non-ANC MEC)
5. "Guidelines for implementing the performance appraisals are there 
and we are undertaking formal evaluations in this department. I 
hope that the performance agreements/ 
appraisals will work well, despite the negative mindset about them 
in the department." (non-ANC MEC)
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We may note in conclusion to this survey report on management 
performance topics — and to this chapter as a whole — that this final MEC's 
comment on a negative mindset in his provincial department is in striking 
contrast to the overwhelming majorities registered by my interviewees. To 
repeat, 92% (of 142) officials were positive about contracts, either 
unconditionally (72%) or conditionally (20%) while 94% (of 124) said they 
will improve efficiency at the highest levels; and 70% (of 125) supported 
extending contracts to at least Assistant Director level.
This reformist enthusiasm was more limited on offering senior positions 
within their ranks to outsiders, where only 21% (of 179 respondents) 
favoured the outsider as a matter of general practice — although 48% 
wanted to balance outsider and insider qualities, with the result that the 
outsider would sometimes prevail. On the two requested criteria for 
appointing to the senior civil service, the merit principle was seen as safely in 
place by 63% (of 175) (first-mentioned criterion) and 74% (second 
mention). ' Together with respondents' equally overwhelming majorities 
welcoming change at large in the senior civil service (see Chapter 8.1) these 
positive results are indeed striking.
This chapter, on management innovation, began with an outline of senior 
civil service functions and the dilemma of the twin mandates of accepting 
political policy leadership from ministers while maintaining administrative and 
legal standards. It continued by outlining the possible relationships of 
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departmental structures and processes with senior officials' perceptions of 
their work, within a changing context of managerial styles and policy 
requirements (the Batho Pete principles). It concluded that the impact of 
structure on perceptions would be hard to establish, based on my interview 
results, because the respondents disagreed on this point. The chapter also 
outlined unethical and corrupt official conduct as a challenge to management 
quality. The need for (and the difficulties of) a systematic study of this topic 
amongst officials themselves were noted. Chapter 5.4 ■ reviewed the recent 
introduction of the New Public Management devices of personal PMCs and 
Performance Agreements, concluding that these policies could contribute 
crucially to different future departmental designs.
Finally, this chapter has presented my interviewees' striking level of support 
for PMCs and PAs as likely to improve senior level productivity and 
performance and as suitable, in the case of Performance Management 
Contracts, for extending down to at least the grade of Assistant Director. 
Officials' views on the recruitment of senior outsiders — and on the current 
state of the merit principle for senior recruitment in general — were also 
featured.
The next broad topic, in Chapter Six, is officials’ possible role conflicts with 
their political heads and the issue of the civil service's alleged politicisation.
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Chapter Six
Senior Officials and Ministers or MECs: Problems of Role 
Conflicts and Politicisation
6.1 Role Conflicts Between Officials and Ministers/MECs: 
Competition and Convergence
This chapter will present (in section 6.3) the survey report of my 
interviews with senior officials and MECs on their interactions and 
perceptions of each other. The data from the officials' interviews will show 
that a large majority of them (see pp.214-5) perceive problems and 
challenges in the official-minister relationship in their own department. 
For their part, the small group of MECs (who may, of course, not be 
typical of all MECs in the six provinces in which they serve) are not shy of 
criticising the senior grades of their department. My interview study was 
centrally concerned with the idea of the senior South African civil service 
being politicised in some sense since 1994, against the historical 
background of its different politicisation during the apartheid era. The 
empirical basis of my project has been the senior official grades. For 
them, the change from one dominant party system (the NP), through the 
transition of the GNU to another dominant party system (the ANC) is a 
major feature of their professional environment but does not immediately 
affect their own substance or character as officials. This and the next 
sections, therefore, are only an outline of this chapter's theme of role 
conflicts and politicisation, serving as an introduction to the survey report 
on officials' and MECs' perspectives on these issues.
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Role conflicts between senior civil servants and their ministers derive from 
(or are based on) certain factual differences between the two groups and 
their work or functions. These include differences in roles; resources; 
personal tenure in their posts; personal background and 
recruitment base; and personal, group or professional objectives. 
These conflicts may be reduced because of certain other factual or 
practical considerations which have the converse tendency to promote co­
operation: personal compatibility and mutual respect between a very 
senior official and a minister; having similar commitments; or similar 
tasks to perform — any of these can increase harmony. (Any reference 
to harmonising officials with ministers prompts once again thoughts about 
the convergence thesis, associated with several earlier writers, notably 
Aberbach, et al. This will therefore be mentioned again in this chapter 
before its final discussion within this study's conclusions in Chapter 8.)
Role conflict between the two groups derives, firstly, from differences in 
roles. The most senior officials in any government department, agency or 
other government body have an administrative or management role as 
their predominant responsibility: they are in day-to-day charge, using 
their official (grade-based) authority and carry executive responsibility for 
efficiency, propriety and legality (including the legal and proper spending 
of public money). To achieve this, their roles include devising and 
presiding over routines for casework decisions, record-keeping, financial 
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control, staff and house management — plus whatever more technical 
services or capacities (such as medical or engineering) their particular 
department needs to deal in. Once the machine is tended to, there may 
be time for thinking about new policy, or programme improvements or 
better ways of implementing current policies and programmes.
For their part, the department's ministers or, in South Africa's provinces, 
MECs are supposed to oversee all of this while being personally involved in 
taking the most important casework decisions; arguing with the finance 
ministry for more funds; sharing financial (audit) accountability with the 
most senior officials for all expenditure; thinking about major or minor 
policy developments; and helping to motivate the department's staff with 
good public relations efforts, such as visits to sections and branches. 
There is plenty of scope for role overlap and conflict because of these role 
distinctions: what, for example, is a major casework decision which
convention may prescribe should be referred up to the minister?; what is 
a new or a significant policy (on which the minister should, by convention, 
take the lead) as against only an amendment to policy or an insignificant 
policy item which officials expect to deal with? (At least one official can 
be seen complaining about her MEC in these terms in the Quotation Box in 
section 6.3 below.)
Role conflict might be stimulated by the differences in resources 
controlled by officials and ministers. They are very dramatic differences.
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The senior officials supervise hundreds (even thousands) of staff who 
alone can get the work done. The officials also control the physical 
resources which constitute the only places and equipment capable of 
doing the work (short of large-scale contracting-out). In addition, the 
officials possess and control all the department's existing information and 
records and probably have sole access to their established sources of new 
information — typically held by firms, trade associations and professional 
bodies outside government. A minister who tries to demand either staff 
efforts or any quantity of information from the department must accept 
the form of that effort or information and the assurance that nothing is 
being withheld. Apart from threatening discipline or retribution if they do 
not appear to obey fully, there is nothing a minister can do actually to 
check on the department's response.
In complete contrast, the minister has no physical resources, even if given 
a ministerial cabinet, on the French model, or a pair of political or 
specialist advisers, on the recent UK model (since 1997). But the sole 
resource the minister does possess — the constitutional law or rule that 
the officials must obey legitimate political authority — is an all-purpose 
trump card. So long as the minister's instructions are within agreed 
current cabinet policies and financial limits, while also being lawful, they 
will be obeyed — in form and outline, at least, and subject to all the 
reservations and devices which reluctant officials are so skilled at placing 
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in the way of unwelcome orders. This complete contrast in the nature of 
their respective resources offers much scope for role conflicts.
Differences in tenure are also very striking. The officials are 
traditionally in a life-time career service although later entry (and some 
early departures for various reasons) have been breaking down that 
assumption for some years in at least some leading well-established 
national civil services. But a lifetime career is still the norm, including in 
South Africa, if late entrants are set aside. The tenure pattern is usually 
different from the private sector. The senior civil servant is, of course, 
employed under contract: its terms are now changing to a personal 
performance basis (in formal terms at least) for the highest officials. (I 
comment on the merits of extending personal Performance Management 
Contracts in my recommendations section, Chapter 8.3.) By contrast, the 
ministers serve, technically, only at the pleasure of the head of 
government (in South Africa the President or provincial Premier) even 
though in reality their political tenure may be very strong. Being 
politically valuable — even indispensable — to the government and 
governing party need not entail a minister staying with a portfolio for long. 
Successful ministers rise through several departments to become senior 
while fading ones may be demoted. A senior official in conflict with a 
current minister may well only need to await a cabinet re-shuffle to have a 
new minister who may be more amenable, on that issue at least.
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If civil servants in general sense a conflict with the current government — 
irrespective of who is serving as their own minister or MEC — they may 
feel trapped by a dominant party which stays in office over several 
electoral terms, such as the UK Conservatives (1951-64 and 1979-97). 
These periods of a dominant party system produce a number of 
professional ministers who serve continuously for years. They reverse the 
usual idea in countries with competitive party systems that the minister is 
the short-term, amateur outsider who could never challenge the hugely 
experienced senior officials, either on policy details or any practical aspect 
of the department's work. After five or seven years in office, such a 
minister will easily have been doing the job for longer than most of the 
senior officials have theirs.
A fourth possible source of role conflicts might possibly be differences in 
officials' and ministers' personal background and recruitment base to 
their respective cadres. Officials in a country's high or senior civil service 
(rather than clerical or middle grades) traditionally need a good university 
degree as an entry qualification. This entails a clear social bias in 
recruitment, particularly reflected in the older and more senior officials 
who were recruited many years earlier. How many established middle 
class senior officials have come from manual class parental backgrounds 
and how many have relied on a good quality secondary education and 
promotion through the middle ranks (rather than the university graduate 
entry level) to reach senior grades, will vary considerably between 
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countries. Overall differences in recruitment base between officials 
(whether within one country's system or between countries) are probably 
much smaller than officials' overall differences from their ministers' 
recruitment base.
Senior politicians follow no rule or restriction in democratic, party- 
competitive systems as to their social or economic origins. Their success 
and promotion is based on personal and political characteristics or 
advantages. Without suggesting that all social classes enjoy equal access 
to elected political office (any more than to other favoured positions) in 
developed countries, there does seem to be only a random link between 
attaining ministerial rank and personal social and educational background. 
A department's next minister may be personally rich or poor, highly 
educated or not, politically powerful or marginal — and various other 
things — in complete contrast in one or other ways to the present 
minister. Senior officials must simply adjust but personal social and 
psychological distance between them and the new minister may suddenly 
increase. One form of it can easily base itself on contrasting ideas of 
authority and qualified opinion on issues. All of the officials have 
traditionally been well educated (usually to graduate level or, if not, they 
have had longer service and absorbed the dominant graduate-level 
techniques of senior civil service work). Some of them (countries vary 
widely) have professional qualifications, usually in law or accountancy. 
Occasionally, ministers will deal with officials who are also qualified 
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doctors, engineers, etc. Perhaps an uneducated minister is more likely to 
provoke a role conflict because the education gap is so clear, but it is 
much more likely that any such friction will be based on personality or 
political motivation rather than any objective difference in background.
Differences between senior officials and their ministers in terms of their 
personal or group (or professional) objectives can be the most plain 
and powerful basis for role conflicts. Career civil servants, like any other 
professionals, have a strong commitment to themselves (and to younger 
colleagues who will succeed them in their senior posts) to keep control of 
their department and run it on their ideas of good professional practice. 
Whether or not they enjoy constitutional rules or similar conventions, 
which strengthens their hold on the government structures, they will 
maintain the strongest possible hold. They will probably claim that the 
public service must be well-ordered by expert, professional, independent, 
impartial and dedicated career officials (the Weberian ideal-type) and 
protected from commercial or political infection. At a more subjective, 
even emotional, level officials feel that they not only protect the public 
service: they are the public service. They have public responsibilities and 
must, if necessary, resist improper political interference even from their 
designated political head.
This collective official objective is not confined to controlling their own 
departments in any narrow sense. It is also intended that they control the 
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department's policy-making; its relations with the outside organised 
interests with whom it constantly bargains on policy; and its relations with 
the other government departments, notably the finance ministry which 
decides the department's budget. The most senior official cadre at any 
one time feel responsible for the department's long-term welfare, long 
after any current minister will be gone. Having this institutional 
responsibility to conserve and strengthen the department means being 
entitled to control it without interference.
An active or ambitious minister faces a real challenge in trying to impose 
an overall political will on even a quite mild version of such an entrenched 
model of civil service ownership and control of the department. As we 
have noted, as against all the physical and organisation resources of a 
large government department, a minister has only the card of political 
authority. However, simply issuing orders, or even trying to follow up in 
any detail, cannot in itself bring success. External objectives must be 
pursued, notably the minister's own personal relations with the 
department's policy stakeholders (e.g. organised farmers or teachers in an 
agriculture or education department). If this goes well, the officials' 
monopoly on these key external relations is broken and the minister can 
then intervene in officials' own internal policy-making equipped with 
personal information and contacts in addition to their supply of formal 
briefings. Intervening in the strictly internal matters of staff or financial 
management is more difficult. But ministers also have colleagues in the 
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cabinet and they can co-operate in digging more deeply in to their 
respective departments by exchanging or leaking internal information — 
particularly if one is in the government's finance or budget department.
With respect to their objectives, the hands-on minister and the resistant 
department do not so much pursue different objectives as pursue the 
same ones in competition: the difference between them is who shall lead. 
The active minister is a public figure for whom reputation is dominant and 
who must be seen or must appear to control the department. (In 
contrast, officials are obliged — and are very glad — to control their 
minister in private.) The minister's public visibility is a limitation in that 
objectives must be contained within government and party policy and not 
give political opponents ammunition. However, it is a strength in that, as 
the elected representative in charge of a department, the minister is 
expected to act as its executive head, even though practicality makes this 
very difficult. Moreover, only the minister is free to speak in public about 
the department, while officials cannot reply (although they can leak 
damaging information against the minister).
Against such a list of bases for role conflicts, it is important to place at 
least some factors which offset it and explain the strong co-operation 
between most ministers and officials. Personal compatibility and 
mutual respect is important, particularly if they have some common or 
similar background, whether social, educational or geographical. Most 
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people are co-operative and respectful, even though highly active and 
even ambitious as either senior civil servants or ministers. These social 
skills can also combine with a strong moral commitment to organisational 
and political goals, respectively. However, personal relationships are 
subjective and can be overlaid by practical differences, as listed above. 
Despite this, practical factors can also reduce role conflicts and even 
substitute harmony. Senior officials and their ministers may both perceive 
their similar commitments (perhaps to a particular new policy) and also 
recognise that their work and their ideas for completing it successfully are 
really one enterprise. They would then each rely on the other to play their 
own part — political publicity from the minister and supporting staff work 
from the officials — and seek maximum benefit from their joint effort.
This increasing similarity of commitments and tasks is, of course, the 
basis of the convergence thesis of Aberbach et al. and other authors — to 
be discussed, as already noted, in Chapter Eight.
Because the minister is the legitimate elected political head of a 
department — and made formally or symbolically responsible for all that it 
may do — the senior officials must defer. Their key professional skill is, in 
fact, to get their way while deferring, in the well-know manner of "Sir 
Humphrey" in Yes, Minister and Yes, Prime Minister. To end this section 
on a South African note, the onus on the department to adjust itself to the 
minister, as the department's formal head, is described by Taylor:
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Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the DGs to ensure an 
effective working environment by adjusting their manner of 
working to the style and personality of the minister they are 
serving ... In most parts of the world it is the DG, as a 
professional in a managerial position, who is expected to make 
the greater effort to adapt to the style of the minister (Taylor, 
Siyaya, 1999:59).
6.2 Politicisation of the South African Senior Civil Service: a 
Contested Concept
The subject of the politicisation of the civil service is one that 
academics in the science of Public Administration, civil 
servants, and the politicians alike are apt to avoid or, when 
they do write about it, they would emphatically state that 
there is a clear line of demarcation between the functions of a 
political leader, particularly a Cabinet Minister as head of his 
department, and those of a civil servant (Marais, 1993:295).
This section looks at the inclination by the senior civil servants in some 
countries to be increasingly involved in those issues that would normally 
be seen, mainly at least, as the domain of the elected public officials. In 
many (especially democratic) systems a common example could be a 
blurring of the dividing line between the party in power and the 
government. This might occur if, for example, a senior official attended 
political meetings. In some countries (e.g. Botswana), civil servants are 
allowed to attend political meetings and rallies (provided they do not 
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speak) and become office-bearers in political parties. In addition, civil 
servants would be barred in many countries from campaigning for or even 
being identified with political parties, either directly or indirectly.
Politicisation could occur when the executive decides on issues like 
postings, transfers and promotions. Marais (1993) has argued that civil 
servants have to carry out instructions in a politically unbiased manner, as 
in the British tradition that was adopted in South Africa along with the 
cabinet system of government. He has added, "In the British literature of 
1920 to 1930, this question seemed to have been settled in that the civil 
servant, particularly the senior official, served his Minister with advice, but 
left all decision-making to him. This approach was adopted in South Africa 
from 1910 onwards...[but was abandoned when the National Party 
assumed power in 1948]" (Marais, 1993:295). In fact, it would seem that 
the politicisation of the civil service during the apartheid era was 
inevitable. Marais has argued that, "With one party being in office for so 
long, the civil servants gradually started to adopt the Government's way 
of thinking..." and he has said that this was "a totally natural 
phenomenon" (Marais, 1993:295).
As on the issue of the role conflicts between the politicians and the senior 
civil service (see previous section) a country's constitution often provides 
for rules on whether, and in what ways, the top echelons of the civil 
service may be politicised, notably the civil service legislation and 
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regulations. Such regulations normally spell out criteria for appointing 
and promoting the senior civil servants. However, in countries like South 
Africa that are experiencing rapid change to their socio-economic and 
political systems, such regulations might make room for politicisation of 
the civil service. A policy change on appointments might be effected at 
almost the same time as the public service regulations are introduced.
In western countries, such as the UK, the political neutrality of (especially 
senior) civil servants has always been seen as crucial to the 
professionalisation of the public service. Thus, it was assumed that a 
politically neutral civil service would serve the government and the public 
impartially, and perhaps also that it was less likely to be incompetent and 
inefficient. Barrel has commented that, "Other countries — including the 
major Western democracies — adopt differing approaches to the 
politicisation of the upper reaches of the civil service. Britain insists that 
civil servants remain neutral in a party political sense. In the United 
States, however, presidential administrations quite often place political 
nominees in the high echelons of the public service" (Barrel, 1999). As B. 
Guy Peters has noted, the principle that civil servants have to be politically 
neutral has come under attack in Britain. He cited Sir John Hoskyns who 
had argued that:
Britain needs a civil service committed to the program that it 
is administering and, as a consequence, more posts — 
especially senior posts — should be obtained by political 
screening and appointment (Peters, 1984:116).
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Recently, other observers have stated that, "In Britain, while any 
politicisation of the Thatcher/Major years was not overtly a party-political 
one, it was one based upon getting the right characters ('can do' 
candidates) in the top jobs ..." (Page and Wright, 1999:275).
Political neutrality in itself is a controversial (and value laden) concept, 
especially when applied to the developing countries in Africa. For instance, 
in countries such as Botswana (and other Commonwealth African 
countries), it would appear that political 'neutrality' does not always 
prevail within the civil service — particularly when applied to the ruling 
party. It would be difficult to say how far the concept might be applicable 
to the civil services of these countries. One reason for this might be the 
clandestine, or sometimes overt, involvement of the senior civil service in 
the politics of their countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Adamolekun, 1993:40). In South Africa, it would appear that significant 
numbers of senior civil servants are not in favour of political neutrality, 
and this tendency might be attributed to the country's turbulent political 
history. In the case of the Western Cape, for instance, an observer has 
noted that is seems that the province's "....'pale and male' top 
management haven't heard of such constitutional niceties as civil 
servants' independence from party politics" (Mail and Guardian, 27/08- 
02/09/99).
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As Marais (1993) has argued, the successive apartheid civil services were 
partial in favour of the then dominant political party. Present-day senior 
civil servants seem to be divided on this issue. In my interviews, some 
were less in favour of a politically neutral civil service, as they believed 
this would reduce its loyalty for the government of the day. They also 
argued that such neutrality was not feasible, in practice, as the 
environment in which the civil servants operated was itself politicised. 
Some interviewees particularly those at provincial level said that the top 
civil service ranks were politicised. Among those who supported this view, 
some were opposed to overt politicisation because essentially civil 
servants should remain apolitical. Those who opposed the idea of a 
politically neutral civil service justified this on the basis that the present 
changes in South Africa needed more politically committed and involved 
senior civil servants. Accordingly, such senior officials had to be aware of 
the urgent need to change the former apartheid status quo, and they had 
to be armed with the "vision" and "mission" of the ruling ANC to be able to 
do this. For this group, political neutrality would delay radical changes and 
slow the transformation process in the country.
In many countries, the ruling political party determines the nature and 
extent of the politicisation of the top civil service positions. For instance, 
the ANC's social democratic ideology — with the party's organising 
principle of democratic centralism — implies that members will "observe 
strict hierarchical discipline in carrying out party decisions" (Barrel, 1999).
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This would be in line with the party's "cadre policy" which outlines "...the 
need to deploy cadres to various organs of state, including the public 
service and other centres of power in society" (Barrel, 1999).
In line with party policy and discipline, deployment or re-deployment of 
cadres means that members should be willing to be appointed to any 
position according to party interests. Although this is never mentioned 
explicitly, members would be expected to toe the party line, thus 
"...fostering party supremacy over state-controlled bodies" (Barrel, 1999). 
I could not discover during a single, broad-based interview how far this 
had occurred and whether the roles of the deployed senior civil servants 
were in any way affected. However, some opposition politicians have been 
very critical of what they see as a very clear example of the ANC 
government's attempt to politicise the civil service. In 1999, the leader of 
the opposition DP in South Africa, Tony Leon, criticised the ANC, saying 
that it would "...not accept that there is such a thing as a neutral civil 
service". He added it was "making political appointments at the top of the 
civil service the norm, not the exception" (Barrel, 1999). As noted in 
Chapter 4.1, the ANC has denied these accusations, including the cadre 
deployment strategy as "unfounded" (Ngonyama, 1999). It has added that 
the DP's "...emotive statement regarding the ANC's deployment strategy 
lacks depth and is a serious misrepresentation of this policy".
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The ANC has often justified its approach by also stating that its staff and 
active members need to join the civil service urgently, to help deal with 
what the party sees as backlogs and the legacy of apartheid. A very few 
senior civil servant respondents boldly stated (while not openly admitting 
that they had been deployed by the party) that, in the present transition 
stage towards democracy in South Africa, the country could not afford to 
have a politically neutral civil service. There seemed to be a quite wide 
belief that the top three positions of Chief Director, Deputy DG, and DG 
inevitably would be highly politicised positions, to drive forward the policy 
implementation process. Some even suggested that deployment and re­
deployment should begin at the lowest levels of the senior managerial 
ranks (Assistant-Director). Another justification has been that the control 
of the implementing agencies should be in politically sympathetic hands. 
Thus, "...many of the senior public service appointments after the 1994 
election were made primarily on the basis of the need to substantially 
redraft government" (Taylor, 1999).
This "re-drafting" gave the public an impression that government jobs 
were up for grabs and that many positions could be acquired easily 
through a "jobs-for-pals" (Barrel, 1999) scheme that was thought to 
operate in some departments. Certain criteria were required: one had to 
be a relative of a very senior person in the government, a former political 
exile or prisoner, or, more generally, possess struggle credentials. Such 
credentials usually included a clear record of participation in the anti­
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apartheid political struggle. It is quite clear that the appointment and 
promotion of some senior civil servants are subject to these factors. 
Indeed, in my interviews it was suggested that senior civil and public 
service positions was being affected by some of these factors because of 
the government's drive not to appoint and promote solely according to 
merit. In fact the issue of merit was often frowned upon, perhaps 
justifiably, by some interviewees. A person's potential to do the job was 
also important — it would reduce the shortage of historically 
disadvantaged groups in many government positions.
The foregoing allegations of politicising the civil service were not aimed at 
one party specifically. All the major political players were believed to be 
involved, not only the ruling ANC (at national level and in the provinces in 
which it had a majority), but also both the IFP and DP-NNP alliance in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape provinces, respectively. In one way 
or another, these political parties could be tainted by the accusation of 
political patronage. If some or all these allegations were true, this would 
not augur well for the transformation process in South Africa. An observer 
has concluded that "...politicisation of the civil service has come to stay 
and moreover it will increase in intensity. No political party that may take 
over the government in future is going to revert to a non-politicised civil 
service. It is simply too convenient an instrument of political control in the 
hands of any government" (Marais, 1993:297). South Africa might be 
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moving slowly towards the overt politicisation of the upper reaches of the 
civil service, but it is too early for this gloomy prognosis to be confirmed.
6.3 Senior Officials' and MECs' Perspectives on Role Conflicts and 
Civil Service Politicisation: a Survey Report
This survey report section covers what my civil servant and MEC 
interviewees said in response to questions on their respective roles and 
the alleged politicisation of senior officials. It is not, of course, possible to 
place the interview questions into only one chapter when most of them 
relate to several. (For example, the important topic of "rational/irrational" 
criteria for senior civil service appointments was relevant to both AA policy 
and management performance and was therefore mentioned and reported 
in Chapters 4.2 and 5.5 respectively.) In the same way, this section will 
only mention two questions (to be reported in the next chapter on policy- 
making) and report on four others. These are, respectively, whether 
senior officials "think and act" like their ministers and whether they are 
influential in policy-making — and the four topics: role conflicts with 
ministers; a stronger political character for senior officials' work; their 
being, in fact, "highly politicised"; and the possibly only temporary, 
politicised, tenure of a department's DG.
It was the essence of the "convergence" thesis of Aberbach et al., 
(discussed in Chapter 2, above) that senior officials and their political 
executives (ministers) were thinking more alike in recent years because 
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they were facing increasingly similar problems. Officials were having to 
think politically and not only about managing their always scarce funds 
and staffing resources, while their ministers were having to think seriously 
about their department's management and efficiency, because of chronic 
resource problems, and not simply adopt attractive political policies whose 
delivery they could leave to civil servants. In this international context of 
the convergence thesis, I asked my national level officials whether they 
"think and act mostly like their ministers." Most agreed they did: the 
report is in Chapter 7.2 on policy-making.
Possible role conflicts between senior officials and their ministers/MECs 
form one of three key features of my interview survey, each of which 
justified a sequence of questions. (The other two sequences are views on 
performance contracts (Chapter 5.5) and overall views on the significance 
and desirability of post-1994 change in the senior civil service, Chapter 
8.1.) Role conflicts will presumably increase if senior officials and their 
ministers are dealing with increasingly similar tasks: political priorities and 
practical resources problems all mixed up together. Instead of prompting 
officials or MECs with such terms as conflict or dispute, I asked them 
about problems and challenges (intended to mean difficulties) in their 
working relationships. The report of these three linked questions now 
follows.
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Q.26 "Are there any problems that the senior civil servants in this 
department are facing in their co-operation with the minister/MEC under 
whom they serve?"
This was a deliberately wide question, allowing freedom to suggest any 
type of difficulty, whether personal, political or organisational. The 
wording was intended to imply that officials expected to support their 
minister and the government (co-operation) but may face problems if 
ministers/MECs seemed to threaten the normal basis for this very 
particular type of professional support. Out of 178 respondents, only 
twelve individuals did not know and a clear majority (61%) of the 166 
who did offer a yes/no response replied Yes, leaving 39% saying No. On 
the basic question of whether damaging "problems" marked the official 
department's relationship with its political head, a 60/40 balance of 
opinion claimed that they did.
This question was repeated, (Q.27) but confined to the respondent's 
possible perception of "problems" between the department's DG and the 
minister/MEC, as it is at this level that official/political relationships may 
be most at risk. Not surprisingly, more (43 individuals out of 176 officials) 
said they did not know about matters at that high level, but 65% of the 
133 officials who did offer a yes/no response said Yes and 35% No — very 
close to the 60/40 balance on the perceived general relationship of the 
senior grades to the political head. This perception or claim of difficulties 
seems remarkably high.
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An additional question was asked of the provincial level officials asking 
them to specify any "challenges" which they saw with the MEC. I expected 
political or role problems to be more marked at provincial level and this 
was an attempt to learn more. The question ran: "What are the main 
challenges your department faces with its MEC?"
All but one of the 140 provincial level officials responded, only eight 
individuals offer a d/k or an uncodeable comment. Some 21% of the 131 
direct responses said that they knew of no challenges or problems with 
the MEC. Among the majority (93 officials) who did see at least one such 
"challenge", their principal nomination (there was no multiple coding) 
was:
(i) committing the MEC to substantive policy and administrative processes
and realities (42%);
(ii) orientating the MEC to public service standards and ethics (29%);
(iii) trying to prevent the MEC's intrusion into operations, or dealing with 
personal friction (26%); and
(iv) trying to prevent illegitimate political considerations in decision­
making (3%).
These coding statements captured the range of respondents' actual 
comments. Code (i) proved to be the principal "challenge" (42%) and 
referred to MECs promising things to special interest groups or the public 
at large which were not official policy and which could not be paid for or 
delivered even if they were. Trying to get an MEC to introduce new 
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policies or suggested actions through the proper channels so that the 
department could explore and negotiate them with the rest of the 
provincial government — notably the Premier's office — was covered by 
this code. The complaint was, very broadly, that the MEC may drop highly 
unrealistic promises or claims directly into the public domain, leaving the 
department to explain how they might be met. Of course, this civil service 
claim to arrange for new policy announcements in an orderly manner is 
partly a claim to have a veto on ministerial ideas they dislike or find 
unrealistic — as students of Yes, Minister and Yes, Prime Minister will 
recall. The MECs' side of this principal perceived "challenge" is offered 
below. Code (ii) referred to MECs' initiatives which are seen by officials as 
improper rather than simply undisciplined. Nearly one-third of these 131 
respondents fell into this group, being often concerned with correct 
recruitment and promotion methods or with the proper treatment of public 
money and casework.
These matters are close to any plain political fixing or jobbery, which I 
tried to separate out from more general impropriety — probably not very 
neatly. This code (iv) (only 3%) should probably be combined with code 
(ii) to make a 32% score for perceived impropriety in general. The other 
code (iii) referred to role conflict rather than standards of effective 
operations, (i), or impropriety, (ii) and (iv). This is the familiar charge 
against all bosses, not just government ministers, that they interfere in 
their officials' domain — not necessarily unethically, but with adverse 
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consequences for the speed or standards of the decisions to be taken. 
Again, an active MEC would not see or describe the issues in this way. 
Officials' perception of interference in officials' proper business may be in 
their ministers' eyes their active involvement in the department for which 
they carry overall political responsibility.
Box 1: Senior Officials speak about their Ministers/MECs:
1. "There are no major challenges between the MEC and myself; we are 
both relatively new to the department. However, a common vision 
needs to be engendered through mutual respect." (Male, Indian; 
provincial government; most senior grades.)
2. "We face three main challenges with our MEC: red tape (we now have 
to wait for the MEC to sign memoranda before we can act); the need 
for a much flatter organisational structure; and communication 
breakdown between us and the MEC's office." (Female, black; 
provincial government; senior grades.)
3. "No, there are no specific problems between our DG and the minister. 
There are areas of synergy between them." (Male, Indian, national 
government; senior grades.)
4. "Yes, there is insufficient delegation by the minister to the DG, which 
impacts further down, and insufficient communication because it often 
stops with the DG's office." (Female, white; national government; 
senior grades.)
5. "We have no problems with the minister who is open and listens to 
officials, visits the directorates and even attends our management 
meetings." (Male, white; national government; senior grades.)
6. "The MECs don't know where to draw the line on political and 
administrative issues, particularly on micro-management issues." 
(Female, white; provincial government; less senior grades.)
7. "There are no challenges with our own MEC. He is very good, very 
approachable and very helpful." (Male, white; provincial government; 
less senior grades.)
8. "Our greatest challenges are for MECs to act and stay within their 
political mandate and not making promises to communities regardless 
of whether resources are available. Our own MEC also often confronts 
officials about public complaints, without first listening to the 




Box 5: MECs speak about their Senior Officials:
1. "The challenge I face is reorganising the department to integrate 
emergency medical services and redeploy senior managers into 
service delivery, within a five-year plan. I must also see officials 
trained in both management and communications skills." (ANC MEC)
2. "I share common objectives with my senior officials; but they are 
mostly reactive to new issues, despite their role of managing the 
department's goals, which should be based on a proactive approach. 
My other challenge is to make the whole department service delivery- 
orientated, more dynamic and responsive to public needs. They need 
to be more diligent, effective and efficient." (ANC MEC)
3. "My management challenge is to move from hierarchy to well-trained 
integrated management. My political challenge is getting officials to 
accept the ethics of human rights, accountability and the dignity of our 
clients or users — and this is still a problem." (ANC MEC)
4. "In my department, much training and general capacity-building is 
needed, under the new Public Service Act. Government policies must 
be understood and internalised as part of this. I want to separate my 
MEC's office from the HOD's office as part of this overall change." 
(ANC MEC)
5. "My challenges include rooting the performance contract system in the 
department and linking top management to our lowest levels of 
service delivery. I also aim for at least one top manager to be an 
African." (ANC MEC)
6. "The major challenges are to gear the department to service delivery 
(not merely obeying set rules) and to identify the best expertise, while 
removing the worst performers from the department." (ANC MEC)
7. "Before 1994 this department was five departments and we are still 
divided between two cities — while trying to build capacity, especially 
in financial management." (non-ANC MEC)
8. "My main challenge is my hands-on management style (in contrast to 
my predecessor) which might not be acceptable to some senior 
officials." (non-ANC MEC)
9. "Tensions and contradictions between politicians and officials are 
inevitable: the challenge is how to manage them." (ANC MEC)
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Reviewing these comments by MECs, it seems they took "challenges" in 
their work with their department to mean objectives rather than 
difficulties or frictions with senior officials. There are few criticisms of the 
civil service as against goals for general development. To this extent, 
these two sets of quotations are not to be matched against each other as 
intended: but there is enough overlap to show something of the tension or 
competition between officials and their political heads. One might 
paraphrase their dialogue in general terms: 'You interfere with proper 
routines and working methods in undisciplined or even improper ways'; 
'What I am actually doing is intervening in your traditional routines and 
imposing my personal or political priority which is to make you perform far 
better for our service users/
Policy work is clearly an essential aspect of the official-minister 
relationship so Q.25 deserves a mention here, before being reported fully 
in Chapter 7.2. It asked: "How influential in policy-making are the senior 
civil service?" As will be seen below, a generally positive perception of 
considerable influence was expressed, as would be expected of an 
established civil service in a developed country. If a senior civil service is 
in course of being politicised in some sense, its policy-making relationship 
with its political heads is certain to be affected. The politically impartial 
and professional civil service input is likely to be replaced, to some extent 
at least, by an executive service which simply tries to turn the 
government's ideas for new policies into practical plans and budgets.
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Given the financial and political constraints on what any government can 
actually achieved in any field (and in almost any country) it may not be so 
important where a policy idea arose from: a political party or government 
department. The civil service's largely monopoly role in designing the 
practical details of any potential policy and then implementing its finally 
approved version will probably be much more important for the policy's 
actual outcome than its origin. Particularly in the South African context 
where the first democratic regime is struggling to deliver policy 
achievement, it may not be an exaggeration to say that no policy has a 
true, political existence until it has been fully and successfully 
implemented. Until then, it is only a policy proposal or plan, even when 
quite far advanced. As my small group of MECs repeatedly mentioned, 
policy delivery should be the government's (and thus the civil service's) 
dominant objective.
The Aberbach, et al., concept of convergence between the most senior 
civil servants and their political executives (ministers) overlaps with both 
the ideas of civil service politicisation and of a more integrated 
(ministers/officials) model of policy-making. Convergence could be 
claimed if either senior officials' roles were taken over politically (reducing 
them to a partisan status) or if they and their ministers became closer 
partners in policy work (contrary to the Woodrow Wilson ideal type of the 
complete separation of politics from administration). Two important 
interview survey questions were intended to gain further comparative 
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data, following Aberbach, et al.'s and Ezra Suleiman's (1974) interest in 
both the convergence thesis and the concept of civil service politicisation.
Q,16 "In countries such as the US, Sweden and France, senior civil 
servants are known to assume a more political role than is expected in, 
say, the UK. Would you say that South Africa is presently becoming more 
like these three countries?"
Despite this question asking for a direct comparative judgement of these 
three countries about whose government many respondents may not have 
felt very knowledgeable, only nine out of 178 said they did not know, 
while nine more made comments without offering an opinion on the 
question. Of the 165 officials who have a direct yes/no answer on South 
Africa's moving towards these named countries' practices, 70% said they 
did see this (yes) and 30% said they did not (no). Lack of time led to only 
27 of these 116 who had answered Yes being asked which senior grades 
were affected by this trend towards "a more political role."
One might expect this effect to be perceived as being confined to the top 
two grades of DG and Deputy DG. However, this small group of 27 
respondents in fact split evenly across all grades: 37% suggested that 
only the two grades would be affected; 33% included the next grade 
(Chief Director); and 30% saw all senior grades, even including the lowest 
(Assistant Director) as affected by this politicising trend.
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Q.20 "Some observers say that senior civil service positions in South 
Africa are highly politicised. Do you agree/disagree?"
This question was intentionally pitched in strong terms, in order to see 
how far a strong (even extreme) statement would draw support, perhaps 
expressed with conditions. It also allowed for any more open-ended 
comments. The given statement did not merely suggest that political 
considerations were significant in senior civil service work nor did it 
confine its reference to only the top two or three grades. It asked for a 
reaction to the idea that the senior civil service as a whole was now doing 
work which was "highly politicised." The idea was to grade reactions 
between full acceptance of this very strong statement and only conditional 
reactions, or actual disagreement. It came as a surprise that only 13 
individuals out of 179 either did not know or made a comment avoiding 
agreement/disagreement with the statement and that 86% of the 166 
who did offer a view on this basis either strongly agreed (25%) or agreed 
(61%) with it. Only 13% disagreed and 1% (two respondents) strongly 
disagreed. This is a very powerful response to a deliberately strongly- 
worded prompt. However, I am aware that many respondents faced 
difficulties trying to give both officially approved responses and their 
honest opinions on this issue.
Finally in this survey report on role conflicts and politicisation, mention is 
made of the very important matter of the DG's tenure of office and, 
consequently, professional standing as the head official in a government 
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department at either the national or provincial level. The question asked 
whether the DG should be removed from that post whenever a new 
minister or MEC was appointed. (It is reported in the next interview 
survey report in Chapter 7.2: the officials' view was strongly negative, 
83%: 17%, among the civil servants but somewhat positive, 5 MECs to 3, 
among the handful of MECs whom I interviewed.) This strong rejection by 
officials of an idea that is already actually provided for in South African 
civil service law and regulations is of clear interest to the convergence and 
politicisation themes. It shows the senior cadre resisting the power of 
removal of the DG, which is already vested in ministers/MECs. As this 
power does actually exist, these officials' practical opinion is probably that 
it should not be used except in extreme and unusual circumstances as 
some of them said.
This chapter has presented the theme of role conflict and co-operation 
between the most senior officials and their ministers/MECs. Various 
differences between their roles, resources, tenure, etc., were reviewed, 
while certain bases for co-operation (compatibility, mutual respect, similar 
tasks, etc.) were also mentioned. Countries' constitutional rules or 
conventions on civil service-ministerial relations affect politicisation: in 
South Africa's case, ideas of officials' political neutrality may be changing 
among some of them. The chapter has found that it would be premature 
to state that overt senior civil service politicisation is inevitable. A 
remarkably high level of perceived "problems" between departments' DGs
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and their ministers/MECs has been a striking feature of my interviewees' 
responses.
Chapter Seven
Senior Officials and Policy-Making
7.1 The Policy Process in South Africa:
(a) from centralisation towards plural influences?
Public policy is itself not easy to define. Sometimes it is simply 
equated with outputs of government, but more usually policy 
is implicitly or explicitly contrasted with implementation or 
routine administration, although the distinction is not always 
clear cut, and may critically depend on the perception of the 
observer (Leach, 1995:33).
The formulation of public policy was once seen by a few analysts as the 
prerogative of the politicians alone. Others have long since contested this 
idea, notably Aberbach and his colleagues in their 1981 study who have 
argued that the "politicians energize the policy process...[whereas the 
senior civil servants] seek to equilibrate and accommodate, to avoid 
conflict, to avoid extremes (Aberbach et al., 1981: 92). The more modern 
argument is that ministers (political executives) are jointly involved in the 
policy-making process with their senior officials. Policy-making is not the 
joint preserve of these two sets of actors: it is shared, at least to some 
degree, with various other forces outside the government. This section 
comments on the participation of the senior civil servants and 
ministers/MECs in the policy-making process in South Africa. It will also 
allude to the roles of other interest groups. For this, it will use two major 
current policies — the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
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and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) — as 
examples. Both these policies have been formulated since apartheid, 
although the way in which different sections of the public received them 
differed strongly.
In South Africa, as in many other countries, the participation and influence 
of various actors like the trade unions shape public policy — especially the 
union federation Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Other 
actors include the non-governmental (and community-based) 
organisations, opposition political parties, the business and private 
sectors, and the traditional (ethnic) leaders through their Congress of 
South African Traditional Leaders (CONTRALESA). This body is "an 
influential lobbying group of 'progressive chiefs' aligned to the ANC" 
(Johnston, 1996:183). The ANC itself has formed, together with COSATU 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP), a "tri-partite alliance". 
There is no doubt that this alliance exercises a significant influence on 
public policy-making. Inter-governmental relations is another aspect that 
cannot be left out of any debate on public policy-making in South Africa 
because policies have sometimes been developed at either the local or 
provincial levels, before being modified and adopted by the national 
government.
In South Africa, policy-making involves varied groups and interests. Many 
of them have been largely influenced by the country's apartheid history,
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notably racial minorities and majorities, rural-urban groups, community­
based and non-governmental organisations, ethnic or traditional groups, 
political parties, trade unions and the business sector. Presently, it would 
appear that racial politics (black-white) largely affect the relations 
between the last-mentioned sectors, labour and business. Much of the 
economic wealth of South Africa is controlled by largely white corporate 
and other businesses, with the majority black population supporting these 
businesses with both its labour and consumer demand. The trade unions 
have also grown large and active since the days of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, thus organised labour and business presently appear to jostle for 
vantage points in policy-making. As is usually the case in many countries, 
the government is faced with a major challenge of dealing with these 
varied interests, possibly with a view to incorporate them into the policy- 
making process in some sense. There is no doubt that the politicians and 
the senior civil servants have to collaborate closely on these matters. The 
major test, of course, will be how far (and similarly how many of) these 
interests could be associated with, or even included in, the policies made 
by the politicians and the senior civil servants.
It was mentioned above that the ANC is part of a tri-partite political 
alliance that comprises COSATU and the Communist Party. As a labour 
federation, COSATU is normally active and influential on labour-related 
policy matters, whilst the SACP exercises particular influence on 
ideological matters. As an alliance, the three partners normally support 
229
one another's positions, although they sometimes disagree. Typical 
examples of disagreement are the RDP and GEAR policies which are 
discussed below. The alliance has insisted on many occasions that such 
disagreements are a healthy manifestation of any democracy and, further, 
that this was bound to happen given that the ANC is a broad church with 
differing interests. However, both COSATU and the Communist Party have 
shown a consistent but often low-key resistance to the GEAR strategy, 
perhaps to the embarrassment of the ANC. Despite such resistance, 
members of both COSATU and the Communist Party who have been 
deployed within government have to give their full support to the GEAR 
policy and to treat it like any other policy. Quite a number of such 
individuals have been appointed to influential positions inside the 
government, including the senior civil service. Some might have been 
deployed in various parts of the country because of the need to de­
populate the parties' headquarters. Others might have been deployed to 
other levels of government (or even non-government work) because of 
the need to delegate or devolve power from central government.
In the case of the provinces in which the ANC was not in the majority (or 
forming the ruling party) there were often no clearly discernible patterns 
of policy-making. Certainly, the relationships of the politicians and the 
senior civil servants in the IFP-ruled KwaZulu-Natal have been similar to 
those in the ANC-ruled provinces. However, as Johnston (1996:169) has 
observed, the politics of the IFP-ruled KwaZulu-Natal "differ in crucial 
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respects from those of other regions." He has further noted that, 
"Capitalising on ethnicity had always been an essential part of [the IFP's] 
mobilising strategies, and the new conditions of the 1990s tended to 
encourage its further exploitation" (p.175). Thus, the IFP might have used 
the ethnic factor to politicise the civil service positions in the province. A 
number of KZN senior civil servant respondents spoke of their uneasiness 
that the senior posts were increasingly politicised, but some were not 
aware of this. Those who expressed this concern said there was an IFP- 
ANC conflict in KZN. This, presumably, was having a dramatic effect on 
the roles and functions of the politicians and senior civil servants in some 
departments. As one official put it, "This IFP-ANC thing is like putting two 
bulls in the same kraal."
A comparison of KZN and the ANC-ruled provinces shows that most blacks 
(those who classified themselves as African) in the KZN departments 
which I surveyed were Zulus. Whether this was merely accidental, given 
that the majority of people in this province are Zulu speakers, or whether 
the provincial authorities were out to deliberately maintain a Zulu ethnic 
character in the departments concerned was not immediately clear. 
However, it is worth mentioning that I was warned beforehand about the 
dangers of asking questions on certain topics, especially those related to 
the conflict between the two rival political parties in the province. (This 
topic was not on my agenda, but it is possible that those who agreed to be 
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interviewed were very cautious about the matters which I did raise with 
them.)
Whether similar observations could be made about the Western Cape 
remains a puzzle. Unconfirmed claims have often been made in the past 
about the Western Cape provincial government's uncorrupt administration, 
compared to national and other provincial departments. However, there 
have been some allegations and unconfirmed reports of racism and 
corruption levelled against this provincial government. The provincial 
administration's refusal to implement Affirmative Action has also been 
attacked by the opposition ANC in the province, which has accused the 
government of "not been governed by its political leaders, but by a cabal 
of senior, white male civil servants" (Cape Argus, 20/10/99). The 
Western Cape provincial government, as would be expected, has been 
quick to refute such accusations. Gerald Morkel, provincial Premier, 
recently criticised South Africa's Public Service Commission for what he 
called "misrepresentation of transformation" in the province (Morkel, 
2001). He added that transformation in the Western Cape had improved 
and that the Commission was misleading Parliament on this issue.
After apartheid, South Africa emerged from a tradition of centralisation of 
the policy-making process (Marais, 1993) and this transition is not yet 
complete. During apartheid, most of the operations of the senior civil 
servants and the politicians were largely concentrated in Pretoria — the 
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administrative capital. Virtually everything, whether minor or major, had 
to be referred to Pretoria for decision and action. Policy-making was 
therefore heavily centralised and slow, resulting in delays in 
implementation — particularly at the provincial and local levels. It is not 
clear whether such centralisation hindered or helped the politicians and 
the senior civil servants in any way in their duties; but for ordinary 
citizens such delays were usually like a nightmare. People had to travel 
from all over the country to Pretoria, often having to make repeat visits 
whenever their matters were not resolved successfully. For those who had 
means of communication, the centralisation meant that they had 
constantly to call Pretoria and to send correspondence, which often got 
lost in the process, before they could receive services (such as identity 
documents or passports).
When the new government took over in 1994, there were initial 
indications that it would reduce centralisation substantially and delegate 
suitable matters to the provincial and local governments. This has since 
happened in many respects, but centralisation essentially remains on 
many other matters. There have been suspicions (according to South 
African media) that the Presidency has begun to centralise policy matters 
under the Office of the President. A typical example of such centralisation 
might be the appointment of the departmental DGs. Any such change 
might affect the roles of these senior officials in the policy-making 
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process. Of course, the newly appointed DGs may develop a 'Yes Minister' 
mode of thinking and behaviour (Taylor, 1999:59).
Policy-making in South Africa also reflects as much the views of the 
electorates as the interests of party politics. The New National Party 
appears to be gradually becoming less influential on policy and other 
matters, and its place in the national political spectrum appears to be 
gradually taken over by the Democratic Party. It is presently not very 
clear whether the DP is comfortable with its newly-found position of 
national opposition. This could perhaps explain the party's decision to opt 
for coalition with the NNP in the Western Cape shortly after the 1999 
general elections.
The advent of a free and democratic South Africa has ushered in 
constitutional provisions for human rights, including freedom of expression 
and assembly. However, such rights have meant that government should 
not focus on narrow interests such as white and wealthy social groups 
alone, but on a wide array of sometimes-conflicting political interests. 
Among some of these interests has been the need to ensure the equal 
representation of the different groups in the policy-making process. In 
essence, this has meant making policies that are sometimes perceived as 
intended primarily to achieve racial, gender, ethnic or other forms of 
balancing. Gender and racial balancing, for instance, means that such 
policies are aimed at ensuring a desired mix of people across the racial 
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and gender divides. This is irrespective of whether such people can indeed 
perform the functions for which they were appointed. In principle, this 
would lead to applying quotas for the different groups. However, the ANC 
government has attempted to meet this challenge (making laws and 
policies intended to enhance equal representation) without having to 
resort to formal quotas.
However, it would appear that this policy of balancing has been 
misunderstood even by the senior civil servants who, among others, have 
to apply the Affirmative Action policies. At present, it would appear that 
the government is aware that it should not sacrifice efficiency, 
effectiveness and good performance for the sake of gender, racial, and 
other forms of balancing. In effect, the government is in a predicament 
which requires a sometimes-costly balancing act. Of course, in a country 
like South Africa that has barely emerged from the scourge of apartheid, 
the need for ensuring all these forms of balancing inevitably becomes an 
emotive issue.
The issue of standards similarly also makes it difficult for these matters to 
be resolved objectively because many of these standards have often been 
blamed for the perpetuation of racial discrimination, particularly as they 
were formulated during the apartheid days. A fresh attempt to deal with 
this issue has been the enactment of the 1995 South African Qualifications 
Authority (SAQA) Act to look at the formulation of new and non- 
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discriminatory standards at the work place. Another attempt to look at the 
issue of balancing the different interests in the policy-making process has 
been the NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour Council) 
approach. This body is a forum where the representatives of government, 
trade unions, business and some NGOs meet regularly to discuss mutual 
interests. Some of these meetings have tackled the thorny issues and the 
forum has been quite helpful in bringing out such issues, although they 
have not always been satisfactorily resolved. The NEDLAC process has 
involved both politicians and senior civil servants and might have helped 
them to improve their approaches towards policy-making generally. 
However, NEDLAC's significant impact has not yet been felt. The NEDLAC 
forum seems to be a good beginning, given South Africa's racial history 
with its legacy of intolerance of any opposition and criticism. But many 
other interests are excluded from this forum and from whatever 
contribution to policy-making it may achieve.
(b) The RDP and GEAR as Controversial Policy Issues
After the 1994 general election, the ANC introduced a working paper that 
eventually became the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The 
aims and objectives of the RDP were to identify the undeveloped and 
underdeveloped areas of South Africa, and to suggest mechanisms and 
strategies for redressing development-related problems in those areas. 
The document also aimed to restore or replace infrastructure that was 
either damaged or destroyed at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle, 
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and generally to ensure an environment conducive for development. This 
policy was intended to redress the legacy of apartheid throughout the 
country and consequently had mass or social appeal. For the first time in 
the history of South Africa, a policy was developed that clearly identified 
the needs of the poorest communities and provided assistance. The policy 
stopped short of simply promising people jobs, houses or education but it 
gave them hope that these and other vital services would be provided 
eventually by the government. While it appeared as if many sectors of the 
society supported the RDP, the policy needed large-scale funding to begin 
the numerous projects with which it was expected to counteract many 
years of apartheid stagnation. The UK government supports the RDP 
within the £30m annual aid programme (2000-2001) administered by its 
Department for International Development. A brief commentary by DFID 
described RDP as setting ... "specific targets for service provision. Water, 
electricity and health care access are among the successes but progress 
on several fronts has not yet matched earlier hopes" (DFID, 1998:4).
The government initially appeared to be fully committed to the RDP policy, 
although some sections of the business sector later became sceptical 
about what they believed were ambitious or grand projects. Overall, it 
appeared as if both the politicians and the senior civil servants generally 
supported this policy. The inputs of each to the formulation of the RDP 
may, however, be difficult to assess because unsubstantiated comments 
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have been made that the ANC had planned this programme long before its 
1994 electoral victory.
In 1996 the South African government introduced another policy, GEAR 
(Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy). This was a macro- 
economic strategy aimed at tackling especially the problems of low 
investment and job creation. The DFID commentary described it in 
December 1998 as follows:
The 1996 Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy 
(GEAR) sets out the government's macro-economic strategy to 
promote investment and economic growth and establishes 
specific targets (recently revised) for the budget deficit, 
growth and job creation. Growth reached 3.3% in 1995 after 
a decade of stagnation but has since fallen back and may be 
barely positive this year. The official target of 6% growth is 
considered feasible provided South Africa takes determined 
action to tackle constraints including unproductive investment, 
insufficient savings, low productivity, excessively regulated 
and protected markets and the slow pace of privatisation and 
public sector reform. Recent turmoil in global markets 
threatens hard-won macro-economic achievements and there 
are fears of recession. Investors remain cautious. Despite 
high real interest rates the Rand remains vulnerable. 
Unemployment is estimated at 23% and rising. GEAR has 
generally won business endorsement for its macro-economic 
principles, but faces domestic challenge for its failure to 
generate growth or jobs (DFID, 1998:4).
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Whether this strategy originated from the interactions between the senior 
civil servants and the politicians in some departments (especially Finance) 
is not clear. It is also not clear how far consultations were undertaken with 
the varied interest groups before the GEAR was adopted. However, the 
business sector in particular appeared to be heavily involved in planning 
the GEAR programme.
Many sectors of the society welcomed the RDP after it became 
government policy. The reason for this might have been that it was 
introduced during the era of the charismatic Nelson Mandela but, perhaps 
more significantly, because it offered to overturn the apartheid backlogs. 
In particular, the trade unions (especially COSATU) seemed to be in 
favour of the RDP. On the other hand, these unions became increasingly 
opposed to the GEAR policy because it was seen as being against the 
interests of the working class. Many other trade unions outside COSATU 
gradually also came to oppose GEAR and to argue that, contrary to the 
government's claims and expectations, it would neither lead to job 
creation nor attract foreign capital investment. They further opposed the 
policy because they felt that it would not re-distribute wealth but lead to 
massive job losses, which would eventually further impoverish the poor. 
Undoubtedly, the unions and their other partner in the tri-partite alliance 
(the South African Communist Party) were opposed to GEAR on ideological 
grounds. This could have been primarily because of the overwhelming 
support for GEAR by the business sector (New African, 1999:17). For 
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their part, most business interests appeared to support GEAR on the basis 
that it would produce wealth and create jobs, attract much-needed foreign 
investment and eventually ensure South Africa's full participation in the 
global economy (Mail and Guardian, 27/08/99).
The stage was thus set for a business-labour clash over these two policies, 
for which the two sides increasingly offered vehement support. For the 
senior civil servants, their positions on these two policies could be said to 
have been clear. As public service employees, they were bound to support 
government policies. This was in spite of the fact that the government 
gradually toned down its emphasis for the RDP and shifted it in favour of 
GEAR. This might have led to uncertainties among the senior civil service 
in some departments, particularly when they had to help formulate 
financial retrenchment policies which, among other things, required 
moratoriums on civil service recruitment, whilst they were expected 
simultaneously to implement the RDP.
In terms of the nature of inter-governmental relations in South Africa, it 
could be argued that the senior civil servants and the politicians also faced 
uncertainties in the application of the requirements of the two 
programmes. In the provinces with an ANC government, perhaps the 
party was able to garner support for the GEAR policy without alienating its 
support base, but this must have been a difficult exercise. Even so, the 
party still had to convince its trade union and communist partners about 
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the merits of the GEAR programme. This issue has now become one of 
those upon which the tri-partite alliance partners have openly 
acknowledged disagreement. In those provinces where the ANC had no 
majority, (KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape) the situation was even 
more confusing. One reason for such confusion was probably that South 
Africa still had to decide whether it was reverting to the Westminster 
system or adopting federalism. As things presently stand, it could be 
argued that the country's political system contains elements of both 
federalism and unitarism, perhaps emanating from the political 
negotiations of 1993 among the different political parties. This however, 
had the potential of causing confusion not only among the politicians and 
the senior civil servants, but also for inter-government relations 
themselves. It was also possible that some politicians and senior civil 
servants could mistakenly believe that some provinces might one day be 
granted autonomy by the central government. Presently, it would appear 
that the country is enjoying the benefits of both the unitary and federal 
systems, even if this might negatively affect policy-making at the different 
levels of government.
It has been argued in this section that the policy-making process in South 
Africa now involves a variety of actors. The most prominent of such actors 
include the politicians and the senior civil servants, opposition political 
parties, the ANC's tri-partite alliance partners and other non-governmental 
and community-based organisations, notably business interests. The 
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Reconstruction and Development Programme and The Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy have been noted as examples of 
how policy-making unfolds in the South African context. These are by no 
means the only important policies and strategies of the new government 
and other policies could possibly be featured to explain the process better. 
The RDP has been outlined because it has appeared to enjoy 
overwhelming support from the ruling ANC and many of its supporters 
(many of whom are in the black communities). It has been seen as a 
socio-economic and political programme for redressing the development- 
related problems caused by the apartheid era. In contrast, GEAR has 
tended to be supported by the mainly white, affluent and business 
sectors. It has been mainly a market-based programme aimed at 
attracting foreign investment and creating jobs by relying on market- 
related strategies.
The influences of the different groups and interests have been to some 
extent reflected in the country's policy-making process. Some groups, 
including the politicians and the senior civil servants, have been seemingly 
in favour of the RDP, whilst others were apparently more in favour of the 
GEAR policy. This does not mean, however, that those who appeared to 
be in favour of one policy were automatically opposed to the other. 
Perhaps the majority of South African politicians (particularly from the 
ANC) were solidly behind the RDP policy, but the policy has been gradually 
losing its importance and significance, and has appeared to be superseded 
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by the GEAR policy. As for the senior civil servants, their positions on 
these matters have not been possible to assess — particularly given the 
fact that this group is also heterogeneous. However, the point was made 
that the senior civil servants really have no choice but to implement both 
the GEAR and RDP policies even if this meant having to de-emphasise the 
importance of one in favour of the other. To explore the nature and limits 
of the control of the senior civil service by ministers/MECs in the semi- 
federal South African system would require a different study from this 
one, with quite different priorities for its interviews. How far such 
ministerial control might have affected policy-making outcome is not clear, 
but this is also an important dimension of the relationship between senior 
officials and their political heads.
Another important observation about policy-making in South Africa 
concerns the delicate balancing act of the government in terms of the 
different interests. Thus, it was stated that the need for equality has had 
to be balanced against that of job creation; and racial and gender 
balancing has had to take into account the need for effectiveness, 
efficiency and performance. Similarly, the interests of the affluent sections 
of the society had to be counter-balanced with those of the poor in the 
policy-making process. Whether the government has succeeded in this 
exercise is still difficult to tell, but it would seem that it intends to follow 
this policy-making strategy. The balancing of various interests is in 
practice quite complex.
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The GEAR and RDP policies have been cited as examples to illustrate the 
difference between a policy with seemingly mass appeal and one with an 
appeal to business and the implications for the interests that normally 
cluster around such policies. Thus, on the one hand, the trade unions and 
other supportive groups were very critical of what they perceived as the 
government's deviation from the RDP. On the other, the private sector 
interests have constantly accused the government of pandering to the 
wishes of its trade union and communist partners at the expense of the 
country's economic prosperity. The business sector has also attacked the 
trade unions for chasing away much-needed investments by their 
allegedly militant and hard-line stances on labour matters. In short, an 
attempt at basic ideological influence on South Africa's policy-making 
process has probably equalled the influence of other, less ideologically- 
based, groups in society.
7.2 Senior Officials’ and MECs’ Perspectives on Policy-Making: a 
Survey Report
The question of how policy is made is clearly of basic importance in any 
study of high officials in advanced political systems in which officials are 
distinctively formed into a cadre, which is separate from ministers. 
However, for this study, policy-making could form only a minor part of my 
interviews for officials or MECs because the more dominant themes of the 
post-1994 civil service (overall change, managerial issues and AA) took up 
most of the time. On policy-making I asked a simple open-ended 
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question (which followed Suleiman (1974a) though he asked about 
influence on politics in general):
Q.25: "How influential is the South African senior civil service in policy- 
making?"
This was asked of the provincial level officials: as stated earlier their work 
is largely implementation of policies and goals laid down nationally so it 
was of interest to gather their claims on this traditional senior role. Their 
133 direct responses (there were only two uncodeable comments) divided 
into 43% claiming a "very significant" role with a further 31% claiming a 
"significant one" (74% combined). Only 11% said that this role was 
"weak" while 16% said that it existed "hardly or not at all" (27% 
combined). So 85% accorded at least some policy-making input to their 
service with only 16% virtually denying it. There was not time to press 
them on their conception of policy-making, but the Quotations Box, below, 
shows sharp disagreements about officials influence which may rest on 
different ideas of what policy-making covers.
Provincial officials may well define as policy work the essentially 
implementing or managerial tasks within policy laid on their provincial 
governments by the national level. Their colleagues in the national-level 
Departments of Health and Education might deny policy-making status to 
this work, saying that they and their ministers are the only authors of true 
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policy and the financial resourcing decisions that give policy its reality. It 
is a familiar and obvious feature of debates about the nature or priority to 
be enjoyed by policy implementation that, in any bureaucracy, one level's 
idea of what is a mere detail of implementation is seen and dealt with as 
policy at a lower level. Perhaps all policy consists of implementation at 
one or other lower levels so that there is no such thing as policy: only an 
elaborate succession of planned implementing tasks, becoming ever 
smaller at the margin until the policy can be declared fully implemented.
A few of my provincial government respondents did take the opportunity, 
at various points in their interviews, to comment or complain about the 
central-provincial balance of powers which they claim South Africa's semi- 
federal constitution (and the working methods of the ANC government) 
has produced. If, as these critics among the surveyed officials claim, the 
centre keeps the provinces too short of both opportunities for initiatives 
and revenue resources, then there is only limited scope for policy-making 
by MECs, their provincial cabinets or their officials. If a large group of 
these provincial officials have answered this question with a 74%:27% 
perception of a "significant" policy-making role for themselves, what may 
be deduced? This clear 3:1 majority may well be thinking of mainly 
management (implementation) policy issues towards (e.g.) the many 
hospitals, clinics, colleges and schools for which their Health and 
Education departments are responsible. Alternatively, these 74% of 133 
senior officials may have taken a more comparative view of the question 
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and said how significant their own cadre's input into policy-making 
(however defined) seemed to them to be as opposed to their provincial 
ministers' (MEC) input. The higher priority for interview time that I gave 
to my survey's dominant theme of post-1994 overall civil service change 
prevented much probing of this overall result on the policy-making 
function. But officials offered some comment to augment the basic 
findings. (The eight MECs asked about this divided: highly influential 
(four); influential (three); not influential (one) — along the same lines as 
their officials, although such tiny numbers can have no wider significance. 
They did not offer any comments, because of lack of interview time.)
Box 1: Officials speak about Senior Civil Service Policy-Making:
1. "In my department, the top management are highly 
influential in the policy-making process, but [not] the middle 
and lower levels." (Female, black; provincial government; 
less senior grades.)
2. "Senior civil servants do not have any influence on the policy- 
making process." (Male, black; provincial government; less 
senior grades.)
3. "The senior civil servants play a minimal part in policy- 
making. Their roles have little impact on this process and I 
think they are involved more in policy implementation than 
formulation." (Male, black; provincial government; senior 
grades.)
4. "The senior civil servants are very influential in policy- 
making." (Male, white; provincial government; less senior 
grades.)
5. "The provincial senior civil servants play a major role in 
policy-making. They are regularly invited to the national level 
where they contribute in all spheres." (Female, white; 
provincial government; less senior grades.)
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6. "It depends on each department's situation. In our 
department the senior civil servants have a lot of space to 
engage in the policy debate." (Male, coloured; provincial 
government; most senior grades.)
This section should deal next with two interview questions contributing to 
the thesis that there is convergence between senior officials' and 
ministerial roles and interests. The question comparing South Africa to 
countries such as France or Sweden in the political character of their 
senior civil servants' work deserves a repeated mention: it was reported 
in Chapter 6.3. In essence, the two things which are believed to be 
producing convergence are the minister's growing need to think about the 
official's resource and management problems while the modern official 
needs to think more than the traditional type may once have done about 
the minister's political policy ideas. This is in order to gain some practical 
grasp of them before their resources and management aspects make their 
impact.
The second of these convergence questions is reported here (it was 
mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 6.3 and will be touched on again in 
the Conclusion section (8.2):
Q.21 "When dealing with issues, South African senior civil servants think 
and act mostly like their ministers/MECs." (agree/disagree)
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This question is linked to previous studies, so continuity and direct 
comparability confined it to my national-level officials working in DPSA 
and the national Department of Health. Of the maximum of 40 of these 
respondents, only two were d/k. Of 38, 18% strongly agreed and 68% 
agreed (86% combined) while 11% disagreed and 3% strongly disagreed 
(14% combined).
Within this modest number of national-level officials, it seems that little 
idea of a policy/administration dichotomy exists. As Aberbach et al. 
suggested, senior officials see the varied stream of issues and problems 
coming to them as needing mixed political and technical treatment on a 
constantly changing basis, as issues evolve. This 86:14 majority is strong 
evidence for the conditions for significant convergence being in place — 
although other behavioural variables, notably some aspects of 
politicisation of the senior civil service ranks, could limit movement 
towards greater similarity of roles (Hojnacki, 1996:142; Kotchegura, 
1996:35). Thus, a more intellectually similar approach to a department's 
policy and management problems and tasks could be knocked off course 
by a more sharply politicised relationship arising between ministers/MECs 
and senior officials in a system such as South Africa's. Scholars argue that 
in other systems, such as the UK's, people are definitely not used to — 
and may actively wish to avoid — the more openly political identity of 
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some senior officials, which is traditional and accepted in France, Sweden, 
Germany or the USA (Wright and Page, 2000).
Another prominent set of interview questions, asking officials about any 
"problems" or "challenges" in their departments' working relations with 
ministers/MECs, was reported in Chapter 6.3 and deserves a repeat 
mention here. Any role conflict or other friction between senior officials 
and their ministerial heads, such as Q.s 26-28 explored, should touch on 
policy issues or disputes about policy-making roles or demarcations of 
functions. The same very much applies to the next matter to be covered 
and reported. This is the very important issue (previously mentioned in 
Chapters 5.5 and 6.3) of the permanent or semi-politicised personal 
tenure of a department's DG (and the Deputy DG or SG acting as 
administrative HOD). As already indicated, the question was:
Q.22: "Would you say that (as sometimes happens in some countries) a 
senior civil servant (especially a Director-General) should be removed or 
transferred to another department whenever a new minister/MEC is 
appointed?" (Yes/No/comment)
The question was clearly asking what should happen (would this be good 
practice?) but a number of the 175 respondents who gave an answer 
(there were only five who would not) seemed quite sure that this practice 
was already in place — even to the level of Deputy DG or Chief Directors 
being described as personal ministerial appointees who serve at the 
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minister's or MEC's pleasure. However, their opinion on the practice was 
not necessarily affected: no-one said they supported it simply because 
they thought it was already in place. Only 17% of the 175 said the DGs 
(eta/.) should be so removed; 83% said that they should not.
Officials commenting on this question sometimes combined their 
understanding of the current rules for DGs going or staying when a new 
minister or MEC comes into office, with an opinion on the merits of the 
idea. Officials seemed far from agreed on whether it is currently open to a 
new, incoming minister or MEC, to either seek or actually to execute a 
DG's removal and to choose a successor. One respondent seemed to both 
state and support the rule as she understood it to apply: "The DG must 
go out with the outgoing minister/MEC unless the latter wants to keep 
them. If the DG works well [with the minister/MEC] they must be 
retained" (female, black; provincial government; less senior grades). Two 
other officials endorsed the temporary tenure of the DG: "The minister 
has to be given a chance to change the DG [or the administrative HOD at 
Deputy DG grade] if the minister feels like it", (male, white; provincial 
government; senior grades); "Yes, the DG must change once a new 
minister is appointed; it makes a lot of sense for the DG's contract to run 
parallel to the minister's period in office", (male, 'South African'; provincial 
government; less senior grades). In contrast, the negative opinion of this 
practice was strongly in the majority, resting on the need for continuity — 
whether of administration or policy, or both: "No, the most senior official 
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in the department must not be changed once a new cabinet member is 
appointed. This is because of continuity: a new DG will not know how to 
continue. Moreover, a Director-General is not a political appointee" 
(male, black; provincial government; less senior grades).
The last comment reflects the different views of the status quo of this 
topic: many respondents did see the DG and other very senior grades as 
political appointees. The nine MECs who responded on this major feature 
of their potential power were evenly divided, with five in favour (at least 
two of them with conditions) and four opposed. Four of the five 
supporters of having these top officials potentially removable were ANC 
MECs but so were three of the four opponents. This 4:3 split among 
seven ANC MECs may indicate (even with such a tiny number) that this is 
a pluralist, not a strict party line, issue. The two non-ANC MECs took 
opposing positions, although the supporter of having these officials 
formally transferable was restrained: "It may be appropriate, but this 
should not happen at all times. It should be an option left to the 
minister/MEC." One ANC MEC agreed: "The legal option to change the 
DG/HOD must be there" — implying that this should only be a reserve 
power. Several negative ANC opinions on this issue emphasised the 
importance of the DG/HOD's contracts as the basis for their job tenure: 
"It is not acceptable; the removal of a DG/HOD must be based on their 
contracts, like all the highest civil service positions". This ANC MEC's view 
was echoed by another's: "It is not acceptable to change DGs because 
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they are normally appointed on a five-year contract". The third ANC 
opponent of the automatic transfer of a DG/HOD stated more simply: "If 
there is no change of government, DGs should remain in the department 
when the minister/MEC leaves".
Anyone making a broad inquiry into the tenure of either DGs or the other 
most senior grades (I spoke with 175 officials and eight MECs on the 
topic) soon appreciates that it is a rather uncertain subject. With an 
interview question, there is the usual doubt as to whether all respondents 
have given their opinion on what should be the practice, rather than 
information on what they believe the actual practice to be. Beyond this, 
there appeared to me (mainly meeting respondents in late 1999 and the 
first half of 2000) to be regional variation on the subject — whatever any 
national law or official rule may have said. A few officials clearly declared 
that not only their DG but all their most senior colleagues, even from Chief 
Director upwards, were already "political appointees." Many more 
respondents indicated that they did not see their DG in this light (and 
usually, as the figures show, added that they would deplore this change). 
It seems likely that some respondents were confusing the right or 
convention of a minister/MEC to determine (or strongly influence) a new 
DG's or administrative HOD's selection with an equivalent right to get rid 
of them. This is not the same thing, as comparison with many other 
countries, including the UK, confirms.
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South African ministers/MECs enjoy considerable initiative and decision 
power when the DG or HOD posts in their departments require to be filled. 
To remove incumbents from these or other very senior posts (around 
Deputy DG level), however, requires the minister/MEC to obtain the 
consent of the President or regional Premier, respectively (although the 
president often devolves this function to the minister for the DPSA). The 
arrival in a department of a new minister/MEC does not necessarily lead to 
the DG's or HOD's transfer out (much less dismissal or enforced 
retirement) — at least if there is no change of party control of the national 
or provincial government in question in hand. Change of party control has 
been the basis for the current regulations which made a transfer a 
possibility.
There has been general political talk or speculation that the ANC members 
of the Government of National Unity decided that their own future 
government would no longer tolerate chief officials at DG/SG/Deputy DG 
levels whom they were finding to be negative and hostile (Ngonyama, 
1999). Some respondents who repeated this explanation added that ANC 
ministers' bad experience with these apartheid era old guard officials led 
them to insist on having only pro-ANC replacement DGs, et al., if they 
were to trust them. These respondents saw the new rules allowing a new 
minister/MEC to seek the President's (DPSA's) or provincial Premier's 
consent to replace a high official as a rebound from the ANC's negative 
experiences in the GNU, before any changes had been made in the 
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operations or political outlook of the senior civil service. While supporting 
the new rules, as an appropriate outcome of the past experience, one or 
two respondents said that they hoped or expected they would fade away. 
This would leave the DG as a permanent career official like any other — 
removable only for a normal good cause and only very exceptionally on 
any political or policy ground. To make the DGs, or any other official, the 
current MEC's placeman would, rightly or wrongly, make them more like 
ministers' political advisers than senior professional managers. It would 
be a strongly politicising act, affecting our present topic of policy-making 
roles but spreading out to all of the senior service and its roles, sooner or 
later. This might be abated if the grounds for a possible request to 
replace a DG/HOD were confined to irreconcilable personal frictions with a 
simple personal preference or conflict on policy issues ruled out. But it 
seems they are not, so the politicisation is plainly in view.
It is the practice of the five interview survey reports in Chapters 3-7 
briefly to mention relevant interview topics where they contribute to each 
chapter in addition to reporting them more fully in their relevant place. 
This section on the policy-making aspects of the interview survey 
therefore concludes with two such mentions. Q.55 (reported below in 
Chapter 8.1) yielded results on a question asking which current civil 
service problems were seen by the respondent as rooted in the pre-1994 
civil service: 46% nominated continuing bureaucratic inertia. If this 
perception has substance, it must considerably prejudice policy-making, 
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however "influential" either officials themselves or MECs may say that 
senior civil service is in policy work. Secondly, a minor reference to 
policy-making arose from Q.30 — the final question of Chapter 8.1. Asked 
to name one aspect of the senior civil service that had particularly 
changed since 1994, 3% of respondents named officials' increasing role in 
policy-making. This is commented on at the end of Chapter 8.1.
This chapter began by asking whether centralised or pluralist tendencies 
seem to apply in South African policy-making and has taken as an 
example the two different economic policies, RDP and GEAR. Without 
claiming that officials' and ministers' experience with these policies offer 
evidence for or against Aberbach et al.'s (1981) concept of officials' and 
ministers' convergence, this chapter has reviewed the fortunes of these 
two policies within the context of pluralist pressures to influence policy 
outcomes (e.g. the role of NEDI_AC). The uncertainties experienced by 
senior policy-making officials within this pluralist setting have been 
mentioned. The chapter has continued with a survey report on 
interviewees' perspectives on civil service policy-making work. It has 
noted that a very strong majority (85%) saw at least some civil service 
input into government policy-making. Finally, the chapter's main result 
was the interviewees' striking level of opposition to any routine removal of 
DGs or HODs by ministers/MECs when these elected public officials arrive 
in a new department.
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Chapter Eight
The Changing Senior Civil Service: Survey Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 Senior Officials' and MECs' Perspectives on Post-1994 Change: 
a Survey Report
This final chapter reports the survey results on the central concern of this 
study: officials' perceptions of the significance and desirability of post- 
1994 change in the senior civil service. These perceptions include 
particular aspects of the changes which have deserved their own chapters: 
AA policy; management innovation; political role conflicts; and the policy- 
making process — so comments by officials (and the small group of MECs) 
will include further views on these matters. The theme of change, taken 
overall, will form the climax to this study's survey report, prior to its final 
conclusions and recommendations on senior civil service issues and for 
further research.
A historical sequence of my interview questions' topics, based around 
1994, is the best presentation. This will be:
(Q.55) Current civil service problems which are attributable to the old, 
pre-1994, civil service's character;
(Q.31) Whether there has been significant change since 1994;
(Q.32) Whether senior civil service roles are changing;
(Q.33) Whether changing significantly;
257
(Q.34) "In your own department?"
(Q.35) "How do you view these changes?"
(Q.36) "Are they desirable/undesirable?"
(Q.30) Naming one particular change since 1994.
I sought some views on the continuity of current problems and 
weaknesses (in 1999-2000) with the unreformed civil service before 1994. 
The question ran:
(Q.55) Which current problems of civil service productivity are in your 
view attributable to the pre-1994 civil service?
This open-ended question referred to practical departmental issues 
("productivity"). It has been commonplace since 1994 to ascribe problems 
or weaknesses to the apartheid era. Only three individuals replied that 
none of the current problems could be blamed or assigned in this way. 
Among the 129 officials who did nominate a sole or main problem with 
this character (no multiple coding) 46% referred to features which could 
be coded as "entrenched bureaucratic inertia and conservatism, being the 
legacy of the old guard officials." The rather different problem of 
continuing "race or gender prejudice within the senior civil service" was 
chosen by 29% (as already mentioned in Chapter 4.2, above, on AA). Five 
percent nominated "bureaucratic arrogance, secrecy, lack of a sense of 
accountability with touches of nepotism and corruption" as a pre-1994 
legacy while the remaining 20% spoke of a variety of other problems. One 
prominent problem in this mixed group was the continuing difficulties of 
258
South Africa having merged separate and widely differing apartheid era 
civil services and governments into one, supposedly integrated, operation.
A review of all the comments made overall about the post-1994 changes 
yields very few which referred back, however, briefly, to the old 
apartheid-based civil service. Three officials (the third one white) 
supported the new civil service saying respectively that changes were "a 
good and long overdue ... effort to redress the apartheid atrocities" [but 
there is a huge gap between expectations and achievement]; "they should 
have happened long ago, but South Africa stayed behind the rest of the 
world in apartheid isolation"; "the new government is not interested in the 
experience of the pre-1994 civil service ... we have lost many experienced 
white officials recently."
Quotation Box 8.1: 
Officials speak about problems attributable to the pre- 
1994 civil service:
1. "We have inherited from the pre-1994 senior civil service an ill- 
prepared and untrained group of people; bureaucratic attitudes 
(mostly around Director level and above) especially on AIDS/HIV 
matters; and subtle forms of racism (some sectors in this 
department are still purely white)." (Male, black; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
2. "I attribute staff fraud (stolen government vehicles, cheques, etc.) 
and nepotism to the pre-1994 civil service. We now have staff's 
uncles, aunts and cousins employed in this department." (Female, 
white; provincial government; less senior grades)
3. "In this department we have pockets of inefficiency because we 
have inherited the old Public Service Commission's officials. So, I 
attribute the top-down approach of these predominantly white 
officials to the pre-1994 civil service." (Male, Indian; national 
government; less senior grades)
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4. "The current challenges we face in our department are the same as 
before 1994, but perhaps there is now less money available for our 
programmes." (Female, white; provincial government; less senior 
grades)
5. "The current problems that I attribute to the pre-1994 civil service 
are mostly related to the presence of the old apartheid system's 
people in our midst. They practice apartheid in a very subtle way. 
The supervisors from this group still monitor an individual by 
always asking, 'Where are you? What are you doing?'. There is 
also resource allocation by favouritism amongst the whites which 
must be exposed." (Male, black; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
6. "I attribute the bureaucratic mindset, top-down management style 
and centralised, bureaucratic systems in this department all to the 
pre-1994 civil service." (Male, white; national government; senior 
grades)
7. "We have inherited from pre-1994 managers who don't take 
initiatives and also the issue of nepotism (which resulted from 
some personal incentives that were given to the apartheid-era 
officials)." (Male, black, provincial government; senior grades)
8. "The problems that we face, which I can attribute to the pre-1994 
civil service, are low morale, absenteeism (caused by stress-related 
illnesses) and high staff turnover among our officials." (Female, 
black; national government; senior grades)
9. "In this department, the challenges we face are that some officials 
are not performing up to expected standards, and some take longer 
to perform their duties because they are not used to the public 
service culture. The first problem was there [before] 1994 but the 
second is new." (Female, white; national government; less senior 
grades)
All ten MECs had comments, mostly extensive, on this interesting theme 
of attributing current problems to the recent past. Not surprisingly, the 
eight ANC MECs blamed many problems on the years before they took 
power. (The only MEC to reject this attribution altogether was a non-ANC 
MEC: "All our problems are inherent to all civil services in the world".) On 
the dominant topic of overcoming "entrenched bureaucratic inertia" (46% 
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of officials had been single-coded under this label) ANC MECs referred to 
"negative staff attitudes; poor work ethics and a culture of staff 
entitlement and a job for life; no concern for urgency; excessive 
hierarchy; and tunnel vision. All of these may be seen as aspects of 
inertia. As one of the non-ANC MECs put it, it is summed up as, "clinging 
to the old ways: 'we have always worked this way in the past'." 
Concerning the nomination (by 29% of officials) of "continuing race and 
gender prejudice within the senior civil service" as a problem attributable 
to the apartheid years, one ANC MEC reported that racial polarisation in 
this department caused a Workplace Friendship Forum to be launched, 
intended to promote social relationships away from the work routines. 
Where the post-1994 integrated system of departments rests on various 
separate pre-1994 structures (former black homelands and the former 
Transvaal Provincial Administration) a number of these general civil 
service problems are worse and their attribution to this past regime even 
more plain. The path to genuine integration is impeded by the "old blood 
and new blood" cadres failing to become one body, according to one MEC. 
This is the particular problem in KZN province. Speaking about "the 
political-administrative interface" as a whole, one ANC MEC stated that 
any weakness of current operations could be attributed to the pre-1994 
regime in the sense that no minister took any interest in this interface, 
"and had no idea about administration." No conflicts arose because 
nothing was done and nothing questioned.
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Turning to the period since 1994, Q.31 prompted respondents with the
ANC government's policy on the civil and public service and asked about
any significant actual change for the senior civil service:
Q.31 "In view of the changes introduced by legislation (e.g. the Batho 
Pete Principles and the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public 
Service) would you say that there have been any significant changes in 
relation to the operations of senior civil servants since 1994?" 
(yes/no/comment)
Only six out of 179 respondents replied d/k and 88% of the 173 giving a 
yes/no answer replied Yes and 12% No. A selection from majority 
opinions follows next offering examples or aspects of positive change and 
of problems and weaknesses. It is a wide selection because this theme of 
overall change since 1994 is at the heart of this study.
Quotation Box 8.2: 
Officials speak about changes in the senior civil service 
since 1994:
1. "A great shift from the administration model to the management 
model is the most significant change to the operations of the post- 
1994 senior civil service." (Female, coloured; national 
government; senior grades)
2. "Three main changes: accepting greater managerial responsibility; 
a move away from centralised to decentralised management; and 
the increasing accountability of managers." (Male, white; national 
government; senior grades)
3. "There is now a lot of commitment, especially from those in 
management positions. However, the post-1994 black managers 
carry a particular burden of proof to show that they can do better 
than those who have been in the civil service more than 20-30 
years." (Male, black; national government; less senior grades)
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4. "The structure of the civil service before 1994 constrained the roles 
of senior grades, but not any more." (Male, black; provincial 
government; most senior grades)
5. "The composition of staff (race and gender) is for me the most 
significant change." (Female, black; national government; senior 
grades)
6. "Firstly, there is much greater autonomy for officials, even at the 
lower levels. Secondly, there is now greater focus on results, not 
procedures. Thirdly, there was some democratisation, but only 
around 1994. The only negative change is that issues are often 
decided on an emotional (especially partisan) basis." (Male, white; 
national government; senior grades)
7 "These changes are positive in bringing in more flexible and better
management but negative in that power is abused when people 
move too quickly from one position to another and when some 
senior civil servants do not always follow the rules when making 
promotions." (Female, white; national government; senior grades)
8. "One innovation that I think has remarkably changed the roles of 
the senior civil service is the way in which they are now being 
promoted and appraised, using performance contracts." (Male, 
black; provincial government; less senior grades)
9. "I would say the introduction of a Patients' Rights Charter; the 
Batho Pete White Paper on the new civil service; and making the 
civil service representative." (Male, white; national government; 
senior grades)
10. "Our Departmental Secretariat now represents all racial groups and 
we now work as a team, unlike before. We are now also following 
the guidelines of the Batho Pete White Paper with its emphasis on a 
strongly customer-friendly civil service." (Female, 'South African'; 
national government; less senior grades)
11. "One of the negative consequences of these changes — especially 
the drive to reduce the size of the civil service through Voluntary 
Severance Packages — was that the skilled people left and the 
worst remained, especially in the Education department." (Male, 
white; national government; less senior grades)
12. "Managers are now expected to be strategic in thinking and 
entrepreneurial in approach, not mere passive implementers of the 
national government's policies." (Male, black; provincial 
government; senior grades)
13. "The main limitation on these changes is that the black community 
are not inclined to challenge the quality and standards of service 
delivery. This will make it difficult for us to evaluate it." (Male, 
black; national government; senior grades)
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14. "The changes we have had are good and are supposed to speed up 
service delivery, but the problem is that senior civil servants might 
not be ready for decision-making because of insufficient skills." 
(Female, white; national government; less senior grades)
15. "Yes, we have had significant and positive changes but our 
implementation may be found wanting. About 80 per cent of 
service delivery is in the provinces, but we have also lost skills at 
the national level. Moreover, we have not yet resolved the 
provincial-national problem on who is better qualified to handle 
certain issues." (Male, black; national government; less senior 
grades)
16. "The current changes in the senior civil service are very positive as 
they devolve power to operational levels and minimise centralised 
management. They emphasis cost-effectiveness, accountability, 
performance contracts and the customer perspective of the Batho 
Pete principles." (Female, black; provincial government; senior 
grades.)
17. "The move from a total lack of transparency, non-consultation and 
all the emphasis on rules, including the cultural diversity that we 
now have, are the changes which I would mention." (Male, white; 
national government; senior grades.)
18. "There is now more focus on policy implementation and capacity 
building. In addition, community participation has increased 
dramatically." (Male, black; national government; senior grades.)
19. "We no longer have a white male-dominated civil service. We also 
have a greater sense of accountability towards the electorate. 
Finally, our roles emphasis development." (Male, white; national 
government; senior grades)
20. "I would point to four main changes: a more problem-solving 
approach; targets and plans (as part of personal contracts); more 
open management; better training for middle managers." (Male, 
black; national government; less senior grades)
21. "We've had change in terms of service delivery and the campaign 
to implement the Batho Pele White Paper (the customer-oriented 
approach). These two are, for me, the significant changes." (Male, 
Indian; national government; less senior grades)
22. "The main aspect that I think has changed in the roles of the senior 
civil service since 1994 is that it now has new ideas and is no 
longer rule-bound or inclined towards red tape." (Male, white; 
provincial government; less senior grades)
23. "I think the different training methods that we now have; the 
higher morale among civil servants; and their general optimism, 
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are the significant changes." (Male, black; national government; 
less senior grades.)
The next question moved from the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods to ask 
about the present:
Q.32 "Would you say that the roles of the present senior civil servants in
South Africa are changing?"
The response was exactly the same as on the period since 1994: of 172 
officials giving a yes/no answer, 87% said Yes and 13% No (compared 
with 88%: 12%). I wanted to know whether these continuing and current 
changes were seen as either significant or desirable:
Q.33 "If so, are they changing significantly or only a little?"
Only four individuals (2%) out of the 168 who answered said there were 
no changes currently going on. Of the 164 who saw changes, 66% said 
they were significant (or, for some officials, very significant) while 34% 
said that things were changing only a little — a 2:1 majority. This 
majority is much less overwhelming than those perceiving change overall 
or in principle. Instead of majorities of 88%:12% and 87%: 13% on the 
two general questions just reported, the majority seeing significant (or 
very significant) change over those officials who said they were seeing 
"only a little" is 66%:34% (2:1, as just noted). This would seem to 
265
suggest that one third of respondents saw the publicity and official 
rhetoric of civil service reform as less important than the government 
might claim. Perhaps this large minority was finding the practical 
implementation of reforms less impressive than the political promise. In 
contrast, responses to the next question — concerning respondents' own 
departments gave a quite different impression.
Q.34 "Are the current changes taking place in your own department far- 
reaching/significant/insignificant/no changes/dk?"
Again, 2% declared no changes, leaving 169 respondents with a view to 
report. Fully 63% of these described their current departmental changes 
as "far-reaching"; 33% as "significant" (96% combined). Only 5% saw 
changes which they described as "insignificant". So a 96%:5% majority 
declared for far-reaching or significant changes in their own department 
as against a 66%:34% majority declaring for significant change in the 
senior civil service as a whole. Respondents would obviously know more 
about departmental change and expect to be more plainly affected by it 
than generalised civil service change spread across the country. This very 
strong perceptions of real (even dramatic) change in respondents' own 
departments (ten departments were included in the study) deserves the 
emphasis among the survey findings.
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Quotation Box 8.3:
Officials speak about the significance of current changes 
in senior civil service roles, notably their own 
department:
1. "Our roles are changing significantly with the move from rules to 
innovation and creativity. In addition, we now emphasise value for 
money and a customer-orientated focus." (Male, white; national 
government; senior grades)
2. "There are far-reaching changes in my department. Some are 
desirable whilst others are not." (Male, black; provincial 
government; most senior grades)
3. "The senior civil servants now have to identify and be responsible 
for their targets. If they don't perform they won't get rewards." 
(Female, 'South African'; national government; less senior grades)
4. "The roles are changing significantly. South Africa is unique 
because I believe that public servants cannot be apolitical." (Male, 
black; provincial government; most senior grades)
5. "Much of the change is good, but too often changes occur 
whenever a new minister comes into office." (Female, white; 
national government; less senior grades)
6. "At the highest levels — Director and above — the roles are 
changing significantly, but below Director level there is not much 
change." (Male, coloured; provincial government; senior grades)
7. "The roles of the present senior civil service are changing a little 
and we need to concentrate on policy and planning." (Female, 
black; provincial government; less senior grades)
8. "The roles of the present senior civil servants are not changing at 
all." (Male, black; provincial government; senior grades)
9. "I am unable to say, because in this department we have two 
groups: those who want change and those who resist (or even 
sabotage) such change." (Male, white; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
A few comments by the small group of MECs should be noted — 
remembering that all eight of the MECs in charge of the eight provincial 
Health and Education departments whose officials appear in this survey 
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are included (plus two other MECs in other provinces). Four (all ANC) said 
that the senior civil service as a whole was currently changing 
"significantly" while three (two of them also ANC) thought "only a little" 
(Q.33). Like the officials, their opinions on the extent of change in their 
own departments were different. Seven MECs (all but one ANC) said 
current changes were "far-reaching", while two others (both ANC) thought 
there were changes in process, but not far-reaching ones. Speaking of 
the senior civil service overall, one non-ANC MEC said: "The roles are 
changing because the senior officials now have to sign performance 
contracts and enter into agreements with their ministers/MECs. They play 
a much more advisory role to the politicians." This last remark meant 
that, in this MEC's view, senior officials were no longer often pursuing 
policy goals or operating practices on their own, more independent, 
authority.
The other non-ANC MEC in my small group declared that the senior civil 
service was changing only a little and added a striking comment:
"Nothing has really changed, except for new faces in the senior posts: the 
approaches of the past continue. The ANC have done what the old 
National Party used to do — appointing a politically influenced senior civil 
service. The ANC is deploying its cadres just as the NP used the 
Broederbond to place its people."
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Regarding changes seen in the MECs' own departments, one ANC MEC 
selected the new approach to human resources (personnel) management 
as an example of far-reaching current change: a "user-friendly
environment" would now be maintained. Another saw basic departmental 
re-organisation (twelve former district offices being merged) as the far- 
reaching change.
This survey report now reaches the most important interview questions, 
whose responses were the principal goal in conducting this study. What 
do a good number of South Africa's current senior civil servants, located 
all over the country, think of the changes in their service? At different 
points during the interview, I asked two general questions, intended to be 
a check on each other. In fact, their responses are similar (although 
unfortunately on the basis of a varying 'N' because of lack of interview 
time for the later question).
Q.35 "How do you view such changes in the senior civil service?"
The response to this open-ended question was that 60% of the 169 
officials who gave a direct response were coded as unconditional 
supporters while a further 24% supported the changes which they 
perceived, but with some conditions. 15% gave mixed views on the 
changes as they saw them, with positive and negative points stated 
together; 1% (two persons) opposed the changes as they saw them.
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The parallel version of this basic test of opinion on the merits of the 
changes each respondent perceived, formed the final question in the 
sequence about "significant" changes in the senior civil service as a whole 
and in the respondent's department in particular. It simply asked "are 
they desirable/undesirable?"
Q.36 "Are these current changes taking place in your own department 
highly desirable/desirable/conditionaI support/undesirable/highly 
undesirable?"
Based on the rather lower number of 156 officials who gave a direct 
response, 32% replied "highly desirable" and 53% "desirable": a total of 
85% plainly positive support. Conditional supporters of the changes in 
question numbered 9% while 6% declared for "undesirable" (there were 
no responses of "highly undesirable"). Thus 94% offered some degree of 
support for what they were seeing in their own department.
A comparison of these two basic attitude questions — one asking about 
current changes in the senior civil service in general and the other about 
those in the respondent's own department — shows an even higher level 
of unconditional or conditional support for departmental changes than for 
changes at large. As we have noted, it is obviously changes in the 
respondent's own department which will generate the stronger personal 
attitude.
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Table 8.1: Comparison of respondents' attitudes to current 
changes in the senior civil service at large and in the 
respondent's department
Q.35 "How do you view such changes [in the senior civil service]?"
(n = 169)
Unconditional/conditional support Mixed views Changes opposed
84% 15% 1%
Q. 36 "Are these changes [in the respondent's department] desirable, 




Note: if Q.36 had been open-ended, requiring the coding of free
responses, it may well have produced a similar number of "mixed views" 
to Q.35 and a very similar profile of responses.
Quotation Box 8.4:
Officials speak about the desirability of current changes 
in the senior civil service and in their own department:
1. "The current changes modernise the civil service by doing away 
with many rules: this frees management." (Male, black; provincial 
government; most senior grades)
2. "These positive changes are right to emphasise indicators, quality 
measures and compassion. We are dropping bureaucracy and non­
value-adding processes such as too many meetings and reports." 
(Male, black; provincial government; most senior grades)
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3. "These changes are overwhelming and unsettling in terms of both 
structures and personnel, but necessary." (Male, black; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
4. "The current changes promote transparency, inclusiveness, equity 
and interactions between politicians and the public service. But 
there is no follow-through of plans and few measurable objectives. 
There is not enough accountability, nor value for money." (Female, 
coloured; provincial government; most senior grades)
5. "These changes are very necessary but we civil servants need a lot 
more expertise to handle them." (Female, white; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
6. "It would be unrealistic to think that we can always get fresh
outsider recruits of good quality: quality is bound to be
compromised initially." (Male, Indian; provincial government; 
senior grades)
7. "For most departments in this province, transformation is still in 
process. This department is about to implement changes, but we 
have a problem of staff shortage." (Female, black; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
8. "These changes are not fast enough and transformation is very 
slow." (Male, Indian; provincial government; less senior grades)
9. "I have nothing against these changes, but I think that they are too 
drastic and rapid. Overall, however, they are effective." (Male, 
white; provincial government; senior grades)
10. "Current changes in my department are unfortunately not far- 
reaching: problems, particularly nepotism, can set in if we do not 
act against them." (Female, black; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
11. "These desirable changes in my department are not far-reaching; 
there is a big gap between the intention on paper and actual 
delivery." (Male, coloured; provincial government; senior grades)
12. "We are now more informal than the very structured old senior civil 
service. However, promotion is still slow because there are many 
junior people and very few top positions." (Female, white; national 
government; less senior grades.)
13. "There are still people in this department who are reluctant to 
accept these changes. They opt out and accept the severance 
packages." (Male, black; provincial government; most senior 
grades)
14. "These changes have introduced problems of unstructured work 
processes. The new government isn't interested in the experience 
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of the old government's people." (Male, white; national 
government; less senior grades)
15. "Change doesn't really take place; whites are still put in top 
positions to manipulate the officials." (Male, black; provincial 
government; less senior grades)
16. "The community now have easy access to the department, but we 
are experiencing such rapid and chaotic change that our people 
aren't quite sure where to refer the public for services that they 
need." (Female, white; provincial government; less senior grades)
17. "The current changes taking place in my department are far- 
reaching in terms of policies and vision but little political linkage 
with other departments." (Male, black; provincial government; less 
senior grades)
18. "I haven't seen anything of these re-structuring or other changes, 
yet." (Female, white; provincial department; less senior grades)
19. "Eighty percent of these changes are good but the bad ones include 
the linking of Affirmative Action to nepotism." (Male, black; 
provincial government; less senior grades)
20. "I view these changes as positive, but they are mostly on paper 
and I think they have less effect on the senior civil servants." 
(Female, black; provincial government; less senior grades)
My ten MEC respondents had much to offer on how they viewed both 
senior civil service changes at large and the desirability of changes in their 
own department. One fundamental point on their own formal position 
naturally attracted the attention of more than one MEC. This was the 
legislative change making the minister/MEC the "Executing Authority" of a 
department and the DG's clear legal superior. As one ANC MEC said: 
"The MEC has been made accountable by the rules, unlike before when 
the province's DG could step in and overrule the MEC". A non-ANC MEC 
echoed this point: "The MEC used to be a mere figure head but is now, as 
the Executing Authority, fully accountable to the provincial Parliament on 
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all issues in the department." The other non-ANC MEC in my group of ten 
respondents agreed: "The changes are positive because they increase 
accountability."
MECs' working relations (and probable role conflicts) with senior officials 
were touched on as part of these current changes. One ANC MEC 
commented: "Politically, the sunset clauses [which had protected senior, 
white pre-1994 officials] made it difficult for ministers/MECs to change the 
senior civil service. The political and administrative mandates clashed with 
each other." In contrast, as another ANC MEC commented, MECs are 
legally entitled to evaluate senior officials under the performance contract 
policy. A third ANC respondent commended a more decentralised and 
accountable civil service operation which would strengthen officials’ 
accountability; while a fourth one noted that the path to an output-based 
management system, with accountability and transparency, would be a 
long one. One of the non-ANC MECs praised the newly-legalised public 
service trade unionism in principle but claimed it was already over- 
protective of individuals' interests against the collective interest. This MEC 
also claimed politicisation ("interference") with the senior civil service now 
that MECs can appoint new provincial DG/HODs and even Deputy DGs.
The final survey question to be reported concerned a point of saliency in 
respondents' minds about these senior civil service changes: what may 
have stood out in their perceptions?
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Q.30 "Please specify one aspect of the roles of the senior civil service 
which has particularly changed since 1994."
This open-ended question's 127 direct responses were coded as citing 
either a welcome or unwelcome principal change. Some 39% of 122 citing 
a welcome provincial change nominated changes among senior officials 
themselves which were gathered under a code "improving senior civil 
service attitudes" — i.e. attitudes towards both each other and to the 
public. These mentions were similar to other suggestions, coded as 
"greater democratic commitment by the senior civil service to the 
government's policy goals" (9%). Another 34% spoke of changes which 
could be coded together as more formal "public sector reform and better 
standards." These three themes all concerned the senior civil service's 
own performance and accounted for 82% of respondents' choices. A 
further 16% specified their welcome for the better racial and gender mix 
in the senior civil service which they detected, while 3% welcomed the 
greater policy-making role for officials. Only five respondents chose 
principal changes which they found unwelcome: the weakening of the 
public service's legislative independence (two persons) and the loss of 
senior skills as blacks replaced whites (three persons).
The nine MECs who commented on their choices of one particular aspect 
of change offered only a few points not previously mentioned under other 
questions. Several choices of the eight ANC MECs naturally reflected their 
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own position as department heads: the Public Service Act now allows 
failing officials to be dismissed under their contract terms; senior officials 
now share policy-making with MECs; they are now accountable to their 
MEC for managing funds and other resources; overall, officials now work 
to a ministerial responsibility model which has made the MECs fully 
accountable to the provincial Parliament and therefore the undisputed 
head of their departments. Looking more broadly, one or two of these ANC 
MECs chose the senior civil service's place in the wider society as the most 
significant change since 1994. Becoming a bit less critical of their senior 
officials than they had previously been, they added to their colleagues' 
choices of greater civil servant accountability and policy-making interest, 
the view that senior officials had become less office-based ("more hands- 
on"). Officials were also said to have a much sharper focus on the needs 
of "the majority of the population in areas of need" — (the response of a 
black ANC MEC, presumably referring to mainly black communities 
neglected under apartheid). As to how all this good new work was to be 
achieved, this survey report might well conclude with two phrases by a 
non-ANC MEC which capture the style of open democratic pluralist politics 
which is the new South Africa's goal: "Everyone now has to negotiate; 
previously they gave instructions".
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8.2 Conclusions on the Survey Findings and 
'Convergence' Model
The installation of a Government of National Unity shortly after South 
Africa's first democratic elections in 1994 brought hope to many people, 
both in that country and abroad. Subsequently, the post-apartheid civil 
service experienced tremendous pressure to deliver on the government's 
pre-election promises. In 1996 Harber noted, "The extent to which the 
government transforms the public service will be its most important test 
this year — and the most important indicator of its determination to 
deliver on its election promises" {Mail and Guardian, 9-15/02/96). Such 
promises heightened expectations on the performance of civil servants, 
which was expected to be much higher than that of the apartheid era — 
including, arguably, other African states.
In retrospect, perhaps the new government may have over-reached its 
capacity by adopting policies that required abundant experience or 
expertise. Despite its middle income status, South Africa remains "a 
country with exceptionally high levels of poverty and inequality" (DFID, 
1998:1). Therefore, the majority of civil servants who were expected to 
drive the transformation process were hamstrung by several factors, 
including lack of capacity and relevant expertise. Neeshan Balton, acting 
DG in the Gauteng Premier's office recently explained that the office faced 
"...important challenges in the recruitment of managers and staff who 
have the necessary skills and commitment to serve the public and in 
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ensuring the successful implementation of [the] new policies..." {City
Press, 10/09/00).
Throughout my interviews, many (provincial) senior civil servants 
complained about inefficient and ineffective implementation. This was 
certainly their major challenge. For most officials, policy implementation- 
related challenges could help explain South Africa's post-apartheid 
reconstruction and development difficulties. Examples include the acute 
shortage of educational materials and books, essential medicines and 
other supplies, inadequate or unavailable medical personnel, untrained 
teachers. These were, for most of my interviewees, by far the most 
pressing challenges to effective policy implementation in their 
departments. Even where supplies and personnel were obtainable, 
departments still faced transportation and communication problems 
common to many African countries. The unethical practices of some 
officials (as discussed in Chapter 5.3) also added to the officials' 
implementation problems, which are acute in the provinces although not 
confined to this level. At the national level, major challenges included the 
drafting of policies and legislation by the senior civil servants, overall 
support to ministers/MECs, lack of information (particularly as 
disaggregated by race, gender and other variables as required for post- 
1994 policy-making).
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Other challenges for the senior civil servants were pertinent: many had 
never worked in large, culturally very diverse — and especially multi-racial 
— departments. The challenge here was the "...creation of a new public 
service from those of the four former provinces and ten homelands and 
capacity to turn agreed policy into practical programmes..." (DFID, 
1998:5). As one senior KZN provincial official explained, they had to 
merge a patchwork of "ex-departments" inherited from apartheid. My MEC 
interviewees also confirmed these difficulties. Each of these structures 
brought along its own peculiar organisational culture (Handy, 1993) with 
implications of harmonising these diverse cultures within the same 
department. Moreover, smooth integration was further hampered by the 
sunset clauses because, at least before 1999, the DGs could not sack the 
dead-wood in their departments. In 1995, this alone was reported to be 
"...costing South African taxpayers millions of Rands in either redundancy 
packages or in keeping on staff from the former homelands who have no 
work to do but do not want to move to other areas" (Mail and Guardian, 
8-14/12/95). In my interviews, some respondents said that mutual 
suspicions emanating from apartheid were bound to persist during South 
Africa's transition to democracy. A number of most senior officials 
mentioned, not surprisingly, that they experienced a negative mind-set 
(euphemism or official-speak for racism) in their departments. Van Zijl 
Slabbert, a former opposition leader in the apartheid era, has said that, 
"...you can invent new constitutions, but you can't invent new people"
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(The Guardian, 19/04/01). Such a mind-set possibly affected the officials 
in many ways, but my research could not determine how prevalent it may 
be or how far it affects the reform process.
Despite the current reforms which, among other things, sought to deal 
with these issues, many officials expressed dissatisfaction about 
administrative red tape and unnecessarily hierarchical structures and 
arrangements in their departments. Such observations had been made a 
few years earlier. In 1998, possibly referring to such practices, the 
Presidential Review Commission stated in its report that "...the public 
service inheritance of the new government in 1994 was fundamentally 
flawed...." (PRC, 1998). That the senior civil servants still experience 
"bureaucratic" and other hurdles more than five years into the new 
dispensation is perhaps not surprising, given the more than four decades 
of apartheid. The only worrying factor is that — in spite of the real 
challenges posed by apartheid's legacy — it would appear that some 
officials prefer to harp on this legacy, even in cases where they might 
have combated it. Certainly, this tendency to flog a dead horse (blaming 
apartheid for all ills) might give temporary relief to some officials and 
politicians. In the long run, however, it could give the system false 
assurance and possibly encourage complacency within the civil service. 
Failure to guard against this tendency could in future make it difficult for 
civil servants to explain lack of delivery and good performance.
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The need for 'representivity' and Affirmative Action within South Africa's 
civil service is generally attractive, politically and morally defensible — 
given the apartheid legacy (Qunta, 1999). However, the application of AA 
in government departments quite understandably evokes strong emotions. 
I agree, in principle, with those among my respondents who, from their 
comments, felt that the policy was justified; but I would not support AA as 
a long-term measure (say, more than 20 years). (Almost all — 98% of 
166 respondents — confirmed that their department had an AA policy but 
one third (32%) offered significant reservations on its quality; from their 
comments, most of this group wanted it to be more effective.) As Hugo 
(1998: 18) stated, South Africa's AA incorporates "merit, albeit racially 
restricted." As a long-term strategy, however, it could become 
incompatible with the merit principle in the strict Weberian sense, 
although critics have argued that in Africa such principles were selectively 
applied by the former colonial powers (Adamolekun, 1993: 38-40). By 
this, I do not intend to raise debates on the definition of merit, which, like 
'standards', is controversial in South Africa. My other problem with this 
empowerment tool is that its intended beneficiaries ("affirmees", as they 
are called in South Africa) are often not given sufficient help and support 
(Ramphele, 2001). These "affirmees" (especially women) it would seem, 
are often thrown in at the deep end, with little or no support wherever 
they are appointed. Mentoring by a more senior official, especially during 
the first six months of appointment, could be an example of such support.
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission summarised the relevance of AA 
to South Africa's transformation as follows:
The principles of Affirmative Action and employment equity 
are essential to the transformation process. To facilitate this, 
training in career development and professional skills for all 
sections of South African society needs to be given priority. 
Special attention, in this regard, needs to be given to the 
eradication of inefficiency and the promotion of a culture of 
hard work and honesty (TRC Report, 1998: 313).
In practice, AA poses major implementation challenges for South Africa's 
civil service. To begin with, it is understood differently by officials in the 
same department. One example could be the "disjuncture between 
national and provincial departments", which an interviewee mentioned. In 
addition, the AA policy is not applied uniformly within the civil service 
because of various (and often conflicting) interpretations. Usually, though 
not always, AA focuses on race and gender but excludes disability, an 
important criterion for "affirming" previously marginalised individuals in 
the civil service. With the onset of democracy in South Africa, policy­
makers have been asked to be careful not to exclude issues such as 
disability from the policy agenda, yet it appears that the disproportional 
focus on race/gender issues has put disability last in policy-makers' list of 
priorities. On gender issues, some officials (mostly women) complained 
about what they saw as a lukewarm (if patriarchal) approach to gender- 
related disparities in their departments. However, such comments were 
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very few and observers have stated that the position of South African 
women in politics and the civil service has been improving. In 1996, as 
Morna reported, "about one quarter of South African Parliamentarians 
[were] women — the seventh highest percentage in the world." Similar 
advancements were noted in the civil service where the numbers of 
"...women in senior management positions [were said to have] increased 
from 3% to 10% since 1994" (Morna, 1996). If these observations are 
true, it would mean that South Africa has veered off the regional 
(Southern African) trend whereby women are generally marginalised in 
civil service and political positions (see Geisler, 1994; also, Maphunye, 
1996: 10). Despite these observations, much still needs to be done on 
gender: women officials at or above the Deputy DG level are very rare.
Furthermore, there is no time limit set for the application of South Africa's 
AA, probably for political reasons; but failure to specify any time limit 
creates restlessness and uncertainty (especially among white civil 
servants) about their future in the civil service. Government could in 
future find it difficult to assure especially the white officials that AA does 
not aim to remove them completely from the civil service. A very careful 
"balancing" of merit-based criteria with AA will have to be followed here; 
otherwise this policy could detract from its intended objectives. Closely 
related to this is the perceived reluctance (resistance, in some cases) 
mostly by the white senior civil servants, to support the new changes. 
Perhaps such reluctance stems not so much from true resistance, but the 
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uncertainty created by these changes for these officials' careers. During 
the restructuring of departments in 1996, for example, it was reported 
that there were "...many fears, especially among whites, over the future 
of the civil service" (Mail and Guardian, 16-22/02/96).
Transformation in South Africa has as much to do with changing negative 
attitudes of the civil service — particularly the old guard — as reforming 
its administrative structures. In December 1995, a local weekly reported 
that "nearly two years after South Africa's April [1994] elections, many 
governments are still struggling to rid themselves of the detritus of 
apartheid and emerge as sleek and efficient operations", (Mail and 
Guardian, 8-14/12/1995). Certainly, in my interviews I felt that these old 
guard officials were sceptical about changes in their departments. I also 
thought they reluctantly accepted the spirit of the new "rainbow nation" 
(as used by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Mandela to describe the new, 
diverse South Africa) which post-apartheid policies aimed to support.
Calls for transforming the civil service in South Africa are, as noted in 
Chapter One, closely linked to the provisions of the country's constitution 
(s. 195, 1996). This constitution — which "has won global praise" for its 
comprehensive human rights provisions (DFID, 1998:5) — outlines the 
values and ethos of the post-1994 civil service. Many other laws and 
policies that inform the current civil service reform were formulated 
following the adoption of this constitution. As I inferred during fieldwork in 
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the provinces, such values were readily supported in the ANC-ruled 
provinces but less so in those ruled by the opposition. It is commonly 
known in South Africa that the New National Party is critical of the ANC- 
initiated AA policy. Thus, its Western Cape provincial administration is not 
keen on AA. As an MEC interviewee in this province told me, the Western 
Cape prefers merit-based appointments. AA was blamed for unnecessarily 
politicising the top echelons of the civil service.
An observer noted that shortly after the 1994 elections, the GNU wanted 
to "...avoid conflict and ensure the loyalty of civil servants." However, 
"...this focus on reconciliation has come at the cost of effective service 
delivery" (Harber, Mail and Guardian, 9-15/02/96). This well summarises 
post-1994 South Africa's dilemma: on the one hand peace, stability and 
reconciliation were critical, given this society's contradictions that were 
once perceived as irreconcilable; on the other hand the civil service 
needed change urgently. Some viewed this civil service as "the body, 
heart and organs" of a serpent that kept it alive {Mail and Guardian, 04- 
10/07/97).
On managerialism or New Public Management reforms in the civil service, 
South Africa is not following the UK trend whereby "...almost every reform 
in the 1980s and 1990s included participation by one or more big 
management consultancies...", e.g. Andersen, Ernst and Young, KPMG 
(Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000: 20). However, international experiences on 
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civil service reform now appeal to South Africa. The Public Service 
Commission recently studied performance management contracts in 
several countries (PSC, 2000). At the time of writing, the PSC is 
formulating guidelines to evaluate South African HODs. It had examined 
the civil service systems of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Singapore 
and the United Kingdom (PSC, 2000:1). Three interesting observations on 
the evaluation of the HODs in these countries were made. The PSC 
learned that the "...evaluation of the Directors-General/Chief 
Executives/Permanent Secretaries, the elite of the public service, is a very 
high profile event, accorded top priority." This evaluation, it was noted, 
"...is located at the highest office in government i.e. Prime Minister's Office 
(President in our [South African] case), and led/driven by high level 
functionaries from the Prime Minister's Office and Public Service 
Commission" (PSC, 2000:1). Pollit and Bouckaert (2000:19) also refer to 
this high level of policy leadership (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000: 19). The 
Commission further observed that evaluation "...is linked to the 
appointment process through a performance management instrument of 
one kind or the other" (PSC, 2000:1).
Such observations appear to support the managerialist innovations noted 
elsewhere (Pollit and Bouckaert, 2000). NPM-related reforms in South 
Africa's civil service clearly have begun. It might not be long before all 
officials at and above Chief Director level have signed personal 
Performance Management Contracts and are being evaluated by their 
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ministers/MECs. What is not clear, however, is how far the government 
intends to proceed with these NPM reforms. If it does, it will find very 
strong support among senior officials, assuming my respondents to be 
typical. Fully 94% of the 124 interviewees replied that performance 
contracts "would improve efficiency in the top positions of the civil 
service." Similarly, it is not clear how far these reforms will develop 
"professional career administrators" from South Africa's cadre of civil 
servants (Aberbach et al., 1981). As part of introducing these reforms and 
to discourage, in particular, unethical conduct within the civil service, 
South Africa could consider adopting the whistle-blowers practice of the 
UK civil service (OECD, 2001: 5). This involves the use of an official toll- 
free line by both the public and officials to warn departments on the 
dangers of any malpractice. Accordingly,
The United Kingdom's Civil Service Code obliges civil servants 
to report any actions which are illegal, improper, unethical, in 
breach of constitutional conventions or a professional code, or 
which may involve possible maladministration, or be otherwise 
inconsistent with the Civil Service Code (OECD, 2001).
This could perhaps help departments to deal with the problems emanating 
mostly from the former apartheid civil service (such as the ghost workers 
problem in some provinces). Overall, it could take some time before South 
Africa's NPM reforms bear any meaningful fruit. Observers have said that 
it normally takes between five or more years in the OECD countries before 
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success on management reforms can be assessed (Pollit and Bouckaert, 
2000: 70). While welcoming the stress on management as part of 
introducing private sector innovations in the civil service, some critics 
have expressed concern on what they perceive as undue centralisation in 
South Africa. Steven Friedman argues that "...improving public 
administration — and centralising authority to do that — has taken 
precedence over strengthening democracy." He felt that more power was 
being concentrated in the President's Office {Mail and Guardian, 8- 
14/09/00).
The politicisation of senior civil servants deserved specific treatment in 
this study on South Africa. I used politicisation as understood by several 
public management reform and comparative executives scholars (e.g. 
Adamolekun, 1993; Hojnacki, 1996; Page and Wright, 1999; Peters, 
2000; Pollit and Boukaert, 2000; Subramaniam, 1977; Suleiman, 1974; 
Verheijen, 1999). Hojnacki (in Bekke et al., 1996: 142) has argued that, 
"It is virtually impossible to be a high level civil servant in any society 
without being political in some way" and this might be true, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Adamolekun, 1993). However, I did not think that 
South Africa intended to emulate France's cabinet system or the United 
State's "...long history of political appointments in the federal 
bureaucracy...[nor even the] increasing levels of political selection of 
personnel in other countries" (B. Guy Peters, 2000: 133). If by 
politicisation we mean "...the degree to which politicians are involved in 
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making partisan appointments to senior administrative posts" (Page and 
Wright, 1999: 8), this was probably happening in South Africa at the time 
of my study. However, it was not clear whether the ANC intended to have 
government departments staffed solely by partisan appointees, however 
desirable this option might seem to them.
A large proportion of positive responses to this question on the senior civil 
service being "highly politicised" ("agree" 61%, "strongly agree" 25% out 
of 166) suggests that the politicisation of the senior civil service in South 
Africa is occurring. As figures suggest in the text, a large proportion of my 
interviewees believed that the senior civil service positions were 
politicised. These results are particularly striking given that South Africa's 
new approach legally empowers the "executing authorities" to remove or 
replace the departments' chief executives. Thus, whether politicisation 
was actually occurring is a different matter that this study has not been 
able to ascertain as I had largely to depend on the officials' own 
understanding of the perceived politicisation.
Similarly, the remarkably high 83% response in favour of retaining the DG 
when the minister/MEC leaves office, as against a mere 17% who were in 
favour of the DG being removed or transferred, deserves comment. On 
the one hand, it might signal a rejection by the officials of encroaching 
politicisation in their departments or civil service generally; on the other, 
it could be a manifestation of different interpretations of politicisation by
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my interviewees. These comments also apply to the strikingly high 65%: 
35% response of the officials who said they perceived problems with their 
MEC. Certainly, I cannot fully discount my interviewees having responded 
in ways they thought would be more acceptable to me. Despite this 
apparent limitation, this question has given me a good indication about 
how open and transparent South Africa's new civil service might be, 
especially to outside researchers. I had sought to test such openness and 
transparency, as part of this study, as these terms are now common in 
South Africa's civil service laws and vocabulary. I was well-received in 
many departments and provinces and, judging by this, my overall 
impression is that the traditional "inward-looking" (as one respondent put 
it) civil service culture is gradually disappearing. However, this still has to 
be verified in the Western Cape, where the refusal of my access may have 
implied this traditional attitude.
On the Aberbach et al. (1981) idea of convergence, there seem to be 
indications that South African senior civil servants (especially DGs/HODs) 
may well "think and act" like their ministers/MECs. The majority within the 
group of 38 national officials who perceived this process was striking: 
86% to 14%. A possible explanation for this result could be the general 
post-1994 South African trend towards reconciliation and avoidance of 
overt conflict. Without claiming a conclusive contribution to the theme of 
convergence between political executives and their higher cadres, this 
concept has been a particular interest of this study. In fact, as Aberbach 
290
et al. contended, convergence might apply mainly in the developed 
countries and its relevance to developing countries could be questionable. 
They were quoted at the beginning of this thesis stating that in only very 
few developing countries is power is actually divided between elected 
politicians and career officials. This may not be true of South Africa, 
judging by what many of my interviewees said on issues of politicisation of 
the civil service and on whether ministers and senior civil servants "think 
and act" alike. However, South Africa's case is unique in that it has barely 
recovered from its apartheid hangovers and the distortions of the past 
system (especially race) make it difficult for one to assess the relevance of 
convergence to the country. Nevertheless, the Aberbach et al. study's 
Image IV could resemble South Africa's situation. According to this image, 
politicians and civil servants share policy formulation, brokering of 
interests and articulation of ideals; but only the civil servants implement 
policies. Of course, some energizer ministers/MECs appeared eager to get 
involved in the implementation process because of fears that the old 
guard could sabotage or at least delay post-apartheid changes in their 
departments.
Page and Wright (1999) have recently revisited the Aberbach study; they 
looked at the roles, perceptions, status and power of senior civil servants 
in western Europe over the past three decades. They have criticised, 
among others, Henry Jacoby's (1973) "bureaucratization-of-the-world 
thesis" which posited that "bureaucratic elites would become increasingly 
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powerful", and the Aberbach study (Page and Wright, 1999: 2). They 
argued that "...the available evidence to support [the Aberbach et al. 
thesis] is exceedingly thin" (Page and Wright, 1999: 2) concluding, 
"...there is no evidence from studies of bureaucracies before 1945 to 
support it" (Page and Wright, 1999: 4). These claims are interesting. 
However, they might be of less relevance to my study on South Africa as 
it did not specifically seek to challenge the Aberbach study but to learn 
from it.
In conclusion, I agree with observers' comments that, probably because of 
its "universally admired constitution", overall, "...South Africa has made 
great political progress in a short time" (DFID, 1998: 1, 5). In legal terms 
at least, this constitution has introduced major changes: the need for 
accountability, transparency, equity and a customer-orientated civil 
service — that were virtually absent before 1994. My personal 
observations were that even many of my civil servant interviewees still 
needed to adopt and practice these values. I am unable to comment 
comprehensively on the direction of the changes in the civil service 
primarily because transformation in South African departments has just 
begun. Some observers also stated that in the wider society, as in the civil 
service, "...transformation is far from complete" (DFID, 1998: 1).
This final chapter has presented the interview results on this study's 
central interest: the perceptions of recent changes in the South African 
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senior civil service among its members and their opinions on the merits of 
these changes. It has concluded that support is very high (84% offering 
unconditional or conditional support and 94% finding changes in their own 
department either "desirable" or "highly desirable"). The chapter (and this 
study) have concluded that the heightened general expectations on civil 
service performance since 1994 have stimulated public concern over such 
problems and issues as the integration of the former apartheid 
departments, policies for Affirmative Action, unethical or corrupt official 
practices, personal Performance Management Contracts and alleged civil 
service politicisation. Final findings of this study are that South Africa's 
unique post-apartheid situation makes it difficult plainly to discern an 
Aberbach et al. convergence between senior officials and ministers/MECs. 
However, their Image IV model has been found possibly to resemble the 
South African case. Overall, I have concluded that the necessary qualities 
of transparency, accountability and equity in a customer-orientated civil 
service still lie in the future because transformation in South Africa has 
just begun. This conclusion is notwithstanding the clear political and legal 
progress achieved since 1994.
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8.3 Recommendations for Policy on the South African 
Senior Civil Service and for Further Research
i. I agree with the overall NPM reforms currently unfolding in South 
Africa's civil service and I recommend, in addition, that the 
government should consider extending the personal Performance 
Management Contracts to Assistant Director level and above. My 
interviewees at these middle-management levels expressed 
disappointment that they were neglected by the new reforms. In one 
interview, an AD jokingly said that he detested the tag "Assistant 
Director." "There is nothing to direct at this level", he said.
ii. I agree with the Public Service Commission's (2000) view that the 
evaluation of the senior civil servants — especially the HODs — has 
either not been done systematically or is lacking in some respects. So, 
government needs to design a transparent and effective system of 
evaluation for HODs and other most senior officials. The help of 
various specialists such as SAMDI, Forum for SA DGs, South African 
scholars of public administration/management, to name only a few — 
could be enlisted.
iii. I recommend that the implementation of Affirmative Action be closely 
analysed to ensure that those "affirmed" by AA are not set to fail. 
Government needs to set up a monitoring body (or Commission) 
comprising, for example, selected DPSA officials and Public Service 
Commissioners, representatives from the Forum for SA DGs, the 
South Africa Gender Commission and selected provincial HODs. Of 
course, the PSC, all HODs and ministers/MECs have to spare no effort 
in avoiding the use of AA especially for party-political gain by anyone.
iv. I also recommend that the government should consider setting 
specific time limits for the application of AA. In other words, it is 
important to decide whether this policy should be a short- or long­
term measure. Government cannot afford any more unnecessary loss 
of vital expertise (especially among the white, coloured and 
Indian/Asian officials who — either rightly or wrongly — might feel 
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threatened by AA). Many of these officials, as I observed in the 
different departments, were usually dedicated to their work. South 
Africa's civil service cannot afford the loss of valuable expertise either 
to the private sector or to overseas countries where such expertise is 
in high demand. A task force or appropriate commission needs to be 
established to look into this issue.
v. On politicisation of the senior civil service, I recommend that the 
government should carefully consider having a reasonably balanced 
mix of political and merit-based appointments — especially at and 
above Chief Director (level 14). This could leave the Directors (level 
13) and their immediate supervisors (Chief Directors) relatively free 
to apply themselves to purely administrative matters, and in turn help 
speed up policy implementation lower down the hierarchy.
vi. I therefore propose further research (e.g. as done by the DPSA and its 
international partners, notably DFID) on the effect of hierarchical 
structures and practices. One interviewee said that working in their 
departments was like "operating in silos" but this study has not 
investigated such claims although other respondents alluded to them.
vii. On ghost workers and other forms of unethical conduct in some 
government departments, I recommend consideration of setting up a 
mechanism like the UK civil service's whistle-blowers project of 
dealing with such conduct (OECD, 2001). Run by officials from DPSA, 
PSC, Public Protector's office, etc., this would identify real or potential 
cases of maladministration and other improper practices.
viii. I also recommend that the DPSA and PSC should investigate the 
allegedly increasing centralisation in the formally integrated "ex­
departments."
ix. Such an investigation could well extend to the entire civil service 
because centralisation is a broad critical theme.
x. I have noted that South Africa is currently assessing the civil services 
of a range of (mostly developed) countries, including those of the UK, 
France, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Singapore. This is 
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commendable, given South Africa's unique quasi-federal politico- 
administrative system, plus the fact that the country straddles the 
'poor'/'rich' divide among countries. Therefore, I recommend that the 
country should equally examine the civil service systems in the 
developing countries, particularly in Africa, — even if, as might be 
argued, many of the lessons that might be learnt in this regard could 
be essentially negative (e.g. politicisation, bribery, corruption, 
nepotism, etc.).
xi. "It is commonplace to end discussions on African organisations and 
their management with a plea for more research" (Jones, 1990: 63) 
and this study cannot but follow this example. My study could not 
have hoped to cover every conceivable topic in the literature. 
Therefore, I recommend further studies especially by researchers on 
African public administration and management, comparative 
executives and the wide minister-senior civil servant relationship. 
Such studies could help to further examine in particular the issues of 
politicisation, NPM reforms and the Aberbach et al. notion of 
convergence.
It is quite fitting to conclude this thesis with the following pertinent 
comments from one observer of South Africa's young democracy:
...we remain prisoners of our past, on both sides of the divide. 
And, if this country does fail to create the kind of society to 
which our Constitution aspires, it will not be because blacks 
are innately incompetent or whites inherently prejudiced, but 
because we could not unlearn our past. The baggage we bring 
from the past is understandable. But it is also, as we have 
seen over the past couple of years, the greatest obstacle to 
building the society most of us want. While the good news is 
that this generation will one day be replaced by one without as 
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much baggage, we do not have to travel the route of those 
societies who have had to progress by learning from the costly 
mistakes of a generation (Steven Friedman, Mail and 
Guardian, 02/02/01).
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Appendix 3 (a)
The Interview Questions and Guide to their reporting in the text 
(Source: some questions in this Interview Guide, although modified to suit the South 
African situation, were taken from Ezra N. Suleiman (1974: 391-415)
I am a University of Essex Ph.D. student and as part of my doctoral research I 
am conducting a study on the roles of senior civil servants and politicians in 
South Africa. You have been identified as one of the interviewees who could 
provide information on the relationship between these two sets of public 
officials at national and provincial government levels.
The information you are asked to provide is required for research purposes only 
and will be treated with utmost confidentiality. You are not required to provide 
your name and the information you provide will not be used to jeopardise or 
compromise in any way your position, or the integrity of your office.
Guide to the interview survey questions and results reported in the thesis 




2 Departments of the 180 interviewees Appendix 3b
3 Current grade Appendix 3b
4 Previous grade Appendix 3b
5 Gender Appendix 3b
6 Race Chapter 4.2
7 Age Appendix 3b
9 Years in the respondent's current post Appendix 3b
14 Years of employment outside the civil service Appendix 3b
15 The range of non-civil service previous employment Appendix 3b
Data on Issues
s.2 Civil Service Issues: Political 
Relationships and Roles
16 In countries such as the United States, Sweden and 
France, the senior civil servants are known to assume a 
more political role than is expected of such officials in, 
say, the UK (contrasting case). Would you say that 
South Africa is presently following the same trend?
Chapter 6.3
18 If 'yes', is this applicable to all grades or only some? Chapter 6.3
19 If only some, from DDG upwards?
If only some, from Chief Director upwards?
Chapter 6.3
If only some, from Director/Assistant Director upwards?
If only some, from some lower grade upwards?
20 Some observers say that senior civil service positions in Chapter 6.3 
South Africa are "highly politicised". Do you: strongly 
agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree/d/k?
21 When dealing with the issues confronting their Chapter 7.2
departments/ministries, South African senior civil
servants think and act mostly like the political Heads 
(ministers/MECs) under whom they serve. Do you: 
strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly disagree/d/k?
22 Would you say that, as sometimes happens in some Chapters 6.3 I 
countries, a senior civil servant (especially DG) should 7.2
be removed or transferred whenever a new 
minister/MEC is appointed?
25 How influential are the senior civil service in policy- Chapter 7.2
making?
26 Are there any problems that the senior civil servants in Chapter 6.3
this department are facing in their co-operation with the 
minister/MEC?
27 In your view, are there any problems between the Chapter 6.3
highest administrative official (DG) and the elected
political head (minister/MEC) in this department?
28 What are the main challenges your department faces Chapter 6.3 
with its MEC?
s.3 Assessments of Changes since 1994
30 Please specify one aspect of the roles of the senior civil Chapter 8.1
servants which has particularly changed since 1994.
31 Would you say that there has been any significant Chapter 8.1
change in relation to the operations of senior civil
servants (Assistant Director upwards) since 1994?
32 Would you say that the roles of the present senior civil Chapter 8.1 
servants in South Africa are changing?
33 If Yes, are these roles changing significantly or only a Chapter 8.1 
little?
34 Are the current changes taking place in your Chapter 8.1
department: far-reaching/significant/insignificant/
no changes/d/k?




36 Are these changes desirable or undesirable? Chapter 8.1
s.4 Views on Recruitment, Promotion and 
Affirmative Action (AA)
37-8 Which criteria do you think presently play an important Chapters 4.2 &
role in the recruitment and promotion of senior civil 5.5
servants in this country?
42 If you had to choose between two candidates, both of Chapter 5.5 
high personal merit, for appointment as senior civil 
servants (all things being equal) would you choose:
• one who has spent the past 20 years as a civil 
servant?
• one who has spent most of his life outside the civil 
service?
• adopt another course of action? (please explain)
44 Does this department have an Affirmative Action policy? Chapter 4.2
46 Does the implementation of AA in the department place Chapter 4.2
equal emphasis on race, gender and disability?
48 (Only for non-African Respondents) Chapter 4.2
Do you personally feel threatened by the Affirmative 
Action policy?
s.5 Organisation, Management and 
Performance Issues
50 Would you say that the present structure or Chapter 5.5
organisation chart (organogram) of this department 
makes it difficult for senior civil servants to perform 
their roles?
55 Which problems, if any, are attributable to the pre-1994 Chapters 4.2 &
civil service? 8.1
56 What is your view of the new Performance Management Chapter 5.5 
Contracts and Performance Agreements in the civil
service?
57 Do you think that these contracts will improve efficiency Chapter 5.5 
in the top positions of the civil service?
59 Should these contracts be applied at all levels of the Chapter 5.5
senior civil service?
64 Are there any "ghost workers" in this department? Chapter 5.3
65 Have there been ghost workers in the past? Chapter 5.3
66 In your view, why has the South African civil service Chapter 5.3
been experiencing the problem of ghost workers?
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed
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Appendix 3 (b)
Report of Data Not Covered in the Thesis text
Q.2 National or provincial government departments of 180 officials interviewed 
(% of 180):
Provincial government official, Department of Health,
Mpumalanga: 7%
Provincial government official, Department of Health, 
North West: 6%
Provincial government official, Department of Health,
Gauteng: 13%
Provincial government official, Department of Health, 
KwaZulu-Natal: 14%
Provincial government official, Department of Education, 
Mpumalanga: 7%
Provincial government official, Department of Education,
North West: 7%
Provincial government official, Department of Education,
Gauteng: 12%
Provincial government official, Department of Education, 
KwaZulu-Natal: 11%
Not a provincial official (national government: DPSA or national 
Department of Health): 22%
Provincial DG: 2%
Q.3 Current grade (% of 180):
DG (Provincial government) 2%
Deputy DG (National or provincial government) 6%
Chief Director (National or provincial government) 3%
Director (National or provincial government) 28%
Deputy Director (National or provincial government) 35%
Assistant Director (National or provincial government) 26%







Less senior than Assistant Director 51%
None (their current post is their first scs position) 8%









Q.14 Years of employment outside the civil service (% of only 39 national-level 







No non--civil service employment 51%
Q.15 The range of non-civil service previous employment (% of only 34 
national-level officials who gave this information):
Other public service (but non-cs) administration 
Private sector: business/professional practice 
Aca d e m ic/resea rch





Q.5 Gender (% of 180 respondents):
Male 67%
Female 33%














Officer Rank 1 6
Officer Rank 2 7
Officer Rank 3 8






DG or Superintendent-General SG) 16
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Appendix 5
A Performance Management Contract for a Senior Official
STAATSKOERANT, 1 JULIE 1999 No. 20117 43
ANNEXURE2
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT PROMULGATED UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE ACT, 1994 (PROCLAMATION NO 103 OF 1994)
FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENT
ENTERED INTO BY AND BETWEEN
The Government of the Republic of South Africa herein represented by_______________________
(full name of political office-bearer) in the capacity of Executing Authority 
of______________________________ (indicate portfolio) (hereinafter referred to as the Employer) 
and
________________________________________(full name) as head of department (herein after 
called the Employee.)
WHEREBY IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Appointment
1.1 The Employer hereby appoints the Employee, who agrees and accepts appointment
as Head of Department__________________________________ (name of Office,
Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) in terms of section 
12 of the Public Service Act, 1994 for a period of__________years (___ calendar
months) commencing on the_____ day of______________ and terminating on the
_______day of____________ .
1.2 In terms of this Contract -
1.2.1 the Employee shall serve the Employer as Head of the 
 (name of 
Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) at 
such place as may from time to time be directed by the Employer;
1.2.2 the Employee will be responsible for the efficient management and
administration of__________________________________(name of Office,
Department, Organisational Component or Provincial Department) as 
contemplated in section 7(3)(b) read with section 7(4) of the Act;
1.2.3 the Employee is also responsible for the exercise of the powers and the
performance of the functions entrusted to a head of department in general or 
to the incumbent of Head of Department of_________________________
(name of Office, Department, Organisational Component or Provincial 
Department) in particular, by or in terms of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (Act No 108 of 1996), the Act or any other law.
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2. Remuneration
2.1 The remuneration that the Employee shall receive as from the date of assuming duty 
as stated in clause 1 above, is that specified in Appendix A.
2.2 The salary and benefits will be payable in twelve (12) equal monthly instalments on 
the fifteenth day of each month and should the fifteenth fall on a Saturday, Sunday or 
public holiday, on the preceding working day.
2.3 The general conditions of service and benefits specified in Appendix A, except for 
item 2.1 of Appendix A, will be as stipulated and provided for in terms of the Act, 
Regulations and applicable collective agreements reached in the Public Service Co­
ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC). The parties to this Contract accept that the 
general conditions of service and benefits in Appendix A (excluding item 2.1) may be 
changed from time to time by means of collective agreements in the PSCBC and/or in 
terms of determinations by the Minister for the Public Service and Administration in 
terms of section 3(1 )(b) or 12(2)(a) of the Act.
2.4 Subject to section 7(4)(b) of the Act, the Employee will also qualify for participation in 
other benefits and special privileges normally bestowed on a Head of Department as 
far as this is arranged accordingly in this Contract or other applicable prescripts.
2.5 When required to perform official duties away from her/his headquarters, the 
Employee shall travel at the Employer’s expense and shall be paid a subsistence 
allowance in accordance with the provisions prescribed in the Act.
3. Deployment during the contract period and re-appointment on expiry of the Contract.
The Employee acknowledges that she/he familiarised herself/himself with the provisions of 
section 3B and 12 of the Act.
4. Termination of employment
4.1 The term of office of the Employee may be terminated in the following ways:
4.1.1 On reaching the prescribed (or earlier optional) retirement age [section 16(1), 
(2), 2(A) and (4)] of the Act.
4.1.2 On completing a term or extended term of office [section 16(3) of the Act].
4.1.3 Premature retirement at own request of Employee [section 16(5) of the Act].
4.1.4 Discharge in terms of any of the subsections of section 17 of the Act.
4.1.5 Re-determination of original term or extended term of office by the Employer 
[section 12(1) or (2) of the Act].
4.1.6 Voluntary resignation.
4.1.7 Death.
4.2 Pension and other payable benefits are directly linked to the specific section of the Act 
which is utilised, as regulated by the Government Employees Pension Fund Law, 
1996, the regulations promulgated thereunder as applicable to a Head of Department, 
the Public Service Regulations and the collective agreement(s) reached.
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4.3 Subject to the provisions of sections 16(5) and 12(1) or (2) of the Act, and the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995, either party may, after consultation and agreement, terminate the 
Contract before the expiry of an original term of office or an extended term of office, 
by giving to the other party three months' notice of termination, which notice shall -
4.3.1 be given in writing; and
4.3.2 be given on or before the last day of a month and take effect on the first day 
of the succeeding month.
4.4 Should notice of termination be given as contemplated in clause 4.3, the Employer 
has the right to require the Employee to vacate the office occupied by her/him and to 
leave the premises of the Department before the expiry of the three months notice 
period on a day stipulated by the Employer and not to present herself/himself for duty 
any time thereafter.
4.5 Should the Employer invoke the provisions of clause 4.4, the Employee will still be 
entitled to all such benefits as contained in the relevant prescripts and collective 
agreement.
4.6 In the case of inefficiency and misconduct, the Employer may deal with her/him, in 
accordance with the procedure contained in the applicable collective agreement 
reached in the PSCBC and the relevant labour legislation.
5. Renewal and extension of term of office
5.1 The Employer shall in writing confer with the Employee at least two calendar months 
prior to the expiry of the term contemplated in clause 1 (supra) whether she/he 
proposes to retain the Employee in service for any extended period not exceeding five 
years (60 calendar months), or not. If the Employee is so informed of such intention 
to retain her/him in service for an extended term, she/he shall in writing inform the 
Employer, within one calendar month from the date of that communication, of her/his 
acceptance or not of such extended employment.
5.2 In the event that agreement is reached that the Employee shall enter into a further 
Contract on termination or completion of her/his Contract, the continued service of the 
Employee will be recognised under the new Contract so as to avoid any break of 
service and any accrued or pro rata entitlement will be carried forward into the new 
Contract.
5.3 Should the Employer not renew the Contract period beyond the initial period as stated 
in Clause 1 above, the Employee shall be entitled to the pension and other benefits 
directly linked to the specific section of the Act which is utilised.
6. Conduct
6.1 In the interest of the protection and maintenance of the trade secrets, technical 
business know-how, confidential information, business connections, customer 
connections and all other confidential information ("trade secrets") of the Department, 
the Employee undertakes to the Employer that -
6.1.1 she/he will not during her/his employment or at any time thereafter, either 
herself/himself utilise or cause to be utilised and/or directly or indirectly 
divulge and/or disclose to any third party (except as required by the terms and 
nature of the Employee's employment with the Employer) of any of the 
Employer's trade or other Government secrets;
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6.1.2 she/he will treat as confidential all confidential information which a third party 
has in terms of any agreement made available to the Employer and which has 
become known to the Employee in the course of her/his duties and not 
divulge to any other third party any information regarding such confidential 
information contrary to the terms of such agreement;
6.1.3 any documents or records (including written instructions, notes or 
memoranda) relating to the trade secrets of the Employer which are made by 
the Employee or which come into the Employee's possession during the 
period of her/his employment with the Employer, are deemed to be the 
property of the Employer and will be surrendered to the Employer on demand, 
and in the event of the termination of the Employee's employment by the 
Employer, the Employee will not retain any copies thereof or extracts 
therefrom; and
6.1.4 she/he shall comply with the prescribed Code of Conduct.
6.2 The restraints imposed upon the Employee in terms of this clause -
6.2.1 are deemed to be, in respect of each part thereof entire, separate, severable 
and separately enforceable in the widest sense from the other parts thereof 
and the invalidity or enforceability of any clause or any part thereof will in no 
way effect the invalidity or enforceability of another part of the clause or the 
Contract; and
6.2.2 are deemed to have been imposed separately in respect of each of the 
provinces of the Republic of South Africa and the fact that they may not be 
valid or enforceable in respect of any one of the provinces, will not effect their 
invalidity or enforceability in so far as the other provinces are concerned.
6.3 The Employee -
6.3.1 acknowledges that she/he has carefully considered the provisions of the 
clause;
6.3.2 agrees that this clause is, after taking all relevant circumstances into account, 
reasonable and necessary for the proper protection of the interests of the 
Employer and the Government of the Republic of South Africa and that if 
she/he should at any time dispute the reasonableness of this clause, then the 
onus of proving such unreasonableness will be upon her/him; and
6.3.3 acknowledges that she/he entered into this Contract freely and voluntarily and 
that no circumstances exist and/or existed for her/him alleging either now or 
at any future time that she/he was at a disadvantage in agreeing to the 
restraints set out in this clause or was other than in an equal bargaining 
position with the Employer in agreeing to such restraints.
7. Additional terms and conditions
The Employer and the Employee hereby agree to the following additional terms and conditions 
as contemplated in section 12(4) of the Act (delete if not applicable):
7.1 The Employee shall enter into an annual performance agreement with the Employer, 
linked to a specific financial year, which shall include at a minimum the following:
STAATSKOERANT, 1 JULIE 1999 No. 20117 47
Xxix
7.1.1 Salary increases will be based on the performance of the Employee. 
Performance will be assessed in accordance with her/his responsibilities and 
key performance areas contained in her/his performance agreement and the 
extent to which the Employee complied therewith. In terms of an agreement 
reached in the PSCBC, salary increases for the Employee will be based on 
individual consultation. The Employee along with the Employer have the 
responsibility to consult annually regarding her/his salary increase and cash 
bonus within the restrictions of the budget based on the performance of the 
Employee. In consulting on the salary increase and cash bonus of the 
Employee, the guidelines forwarded by the Minister for the Public Service and 
Administration should always be borne in mind.
7.1.2 An annual performance agreement provided for in terms of paragraph 7.1 
above linked to a specific financial year, stating clear performance 
areas/criteria/deliverables of the Department and the Employee must be 
entered into for the duration of this Contract. As performance agreements are 
linked to financial years, it should be entered into and presented to the 
Employer at the latest on 30 June every year for the duration of this Contract. 
The Employee should enter into her/his first performance agreement not later 
than three months after assumption of duty. In terms of the Public Service 
Regulations VII B.2, the Employer shall record delegations and/or 
authorisation in the performance agreement.
7.1.3 The performance agreement shall be revised if, at any time during its term, the 
work or environment of the Department is so altered (whether as a result of 
Government or management decision or otherwise) that the contents of it are 
no longer appropriate.
7.1.4 This Contract is directly linked to the performance agreement referred to in 7.1 
supra. In the event that the Employee does not achieve the prescribed 
objectives/milestones of the Department, the Employee acknowledges that the 
Employer may deal with her/him, in accordance with the procedure contained 
in the applicable collective agreement reached in the PSCBC and the relevant 
labour legislation.
7.1.5 __________________________________________________________
7.2 Any other particular duties of the head of department:
7.3 The grounds upon, and the procedures according to which, the services 
of the head of department may be terminated before the expiry of his or 
her term of office or extended term of office, as the case may be:




In the implementation of this Contract, the parties undertake to observe the utmost 
good faith and they warrant in their dealing with each other that they will neither do 
anything nor refrain from doing anything that might prejudice or detract from the rights, 
assets or interests of each other.
8.2 Applicability of the Act
Any matters arising from this Contract, which are not specifically provided for herein, 
shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Public Service Act, 1994, 
as amended, the aforesaid Public Service Regulations, applicable collective 
agreements and other relevant legislation.
8.3 Interpretation of Agreement
The interpretation of this Contract shall be governed by the laws and legal principles 
applicable in the Republic of South Africa.
8.4 Jurisdiction of courts
8.4.1 The Employee submits to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Republic of
South Africa in the event of any legal proceedings arising from the provisions 
of this Contract. ./ !
8.4.2 It shall not be a breach of the,Contract if a party to this Contract is prevented 
from or hindered in the performance or observance of its obligations 
hereunder by any Act of Parliament or other action of the State or by any 
cause or event outside the control of that party.
8.5 Variation
8.5.1 The Contract constitutes the whole of the agreement between the parties to 
this Contract relating to the subject matter of this Contract, and save as 
otherwise provided, no amendment, alteration, addition or variation of any 
right, term or condition of this Contract will be of any force or effect unless 
reduced to writing and signed by the parties to this Contract.
8.5.2 The parties agree that there are no other conditions, warranties or 
representations, whether oral or written and whether expressed or implied or 
otherwise, save those contained in this Contract, the Public Service Act, 
1994, the Public Service Regulations, collective agreements and other 
relevant legislation (e.g. Government Employees Pension Fund Law).
8.6 Waiver
No waiver of any of the terms and conditions of this Contract will be binding for any 
purpose unless expressed in writing and signed by the party giving the same, and any 
such waiver will be effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose given. 
No failure or delay on the part of either party in exercising any right, power or privilege 
precludes any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, 
power or privilege.
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9. Notice and Domicilium
9.1 The parties choose as their respective domicilium citandi et executandi for the 
purpose of legal proceedings and for the purpose of giving or sending any notice 
provided for or necessary in terms of this Contract, the following addresses-
Employer Employee
Physical address ___________________ ______________________
Postal address ___________________ ______________________
Telefax Number ___________________ ______________________
provided that a party reports any change of her or his domicilium to any other physical 
address, postal address or telefax number by written notice to the other party. Such 
change of address will be effective seven days after receipt of notice of the change of 
domicilium.
9.2 All notices to be given in terms of this Contract will -
9.2.1 be given in writing; and
9.2.2 be delivered or sent by prepaid registered post or by telefax; and
9.2.3 if delivered, be presumed to have been received on the date of delivery; or
9.2.4 if sent by prepaid registered post, be presumed to have been received within 
three business days of posting unless the contrary is proved; or
9.2.5 if sent by telefax, be presumed to have been received on the first business 
day following the date of sending of the telefax unless the contrary is proved.
SIGNED by the Employer at on the___day of____________________
AS WITNESSES:
1.
EMPLOYER (EXECUTING AUTHORITY 
ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT)
2.
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SIGNED by the Employee at ______________________on the___ _  day of _ ___________ _______
AS WITNESSES:
1. _______________________________ _____________ :___________________





List of Apartheid Era Prime Ministers and Presidents 
(1948-1994)
D.F. Malan (1948-1954), Prime Minister
J.G. Strijdom (1954-1958), Prime Minister
H.F. Verwoerd (1958-1966), Prime Minister
B.J. Vorster (1966-1978), Prime Minister
P.W. Botha (1978-1989), Prime Minister, later State President
F.W. de Klerk (1989-1994), State President
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Appendix 7
Research Plan and Calendar
Academic Years Activities And Place Duration










Apr. May & June 1999: Preliminary
May preparations for Interviews,
Jun. Questionnaires
6 Months, July-
Jul. Documentary study (archives), Dec. 1999
Aug. Contact with Heads of Departments and
Sept. (AB away) ministers/MECs (and Premiers) 
Cape Town (South Africa)
YEAR 2(1999-2000)
Pilot Interviews: Northern Cape (Oct. 1999)
Oct. Interviews: (1) Mpumalanga (Nov.-Dec. 1999)
Nov. Interviews: (2) North West (Jan.-Feb.) From January-
Dec. (1999) Interviews: (3) Gauteng (Mar.-Apr.) August 2000
Jan. (2000) Interviews: (4) KwaZulu-Natal (May-Jun.)
Feb. Interviews: (5) Western Cape (Jul.-Aug.)
Mar. About 2 Months in
Apr. each province
May
June From Sept. 2000: Data Collation &
July Ordering, Data Analysis, follow-ups on
Aug. non-responses, Cape Town Sept. & Oct. 2000
Sept.
YEAR 3 (2000-2001)
Oct. (Return to Essex) Essex (Further Data Analysis &






First Draft Thesis by mid-May 2001
May Submit by 28 May 2001
June Examination: late June 2001
